¶1Hello and welcome to Unbelievable, the show that brings Christians and non-Christians together to discuss theology, philosophy, and culture. I'm John Nelson, and today on the show we're discussing the argument from fine-tuning. Are the fundamental constants of nature fine-tuned in such a way to permit life, and does that life point to a designer? Joining me to discuss that question, we have two gentlemen who are seasoned veterans of the show. On my right is Peter Williams, a Christian thinker and author of several books, including A Universe from Someone, which discusses, among other arguments, the argument from fine-tuning.
¶2And joining me on my left is John Richards, the president of Atheist UK, an organization which is dedicated to advancing atheism and promoting a rationalist worldview. Gentlemen, it's a pleasure to welcome you both back to Unbelievable. Thanks for having us. >> Yeah. Peter, you've highlighted the fine-tuning of the constants of nature as a potential evidence for God.
¶3Um maybe for some listeners who haven't come across this argument before, what are the constants of nature, and how are they supposedly fine-tuned? Well, the way to sketch the kind of headlines of this out is to say um that scientists have discovered that our universe uh exhibits uh a highly unlikely uh specific kind of pattern uh of natural laws, uh initial conditions uh that permit uh functional complexity, including life uh and even some of this evidence also pertains to uh how scientifically discoverable the universe that we exist in is. Uh we can go into uh later, if you want to, some of the specifics of what some of those initial conditions and constants and laws uh are. Uh, I also think we've got principled ways of looking at data and arriving at a a justified conclusion that the best explanation of that data is designed. Uh, and when we apply these methods to this fine-tuning data, it justifies a conclusion that the fine-tuning of the universe is the product of design.
¶4I would then say it's another step on from that to make arguments saying that the best explanation of that design is a theistic explanation. That's I something I believe, but I know that it's a step on. You can't just say, um, we've arrived at this conclusion of design, therefore the designer is God. You know, that there's a leap there that you need to fill in with some additional justification. So, could you take us through maybe some of those parameters that seem to be fine-tuned and then explain to us how you're using that in an argument for God?
¶5Right. So, um, an initial condition, one that's often talked about is the amount of of entropy in the initial first stage of the universe. Uh, a law or, um, you know, what's called a constant would be something like, uh, gravity or the cosmological constant that gov- governs how, uh, the universe expands over time. And these are very, very finely tuned. What that means is they they have to be adjusted in a very unlikely way out of the the range of values that we can assess that they they could have.
¶6So, for example, the odds of the universe's initial low entropy condition uh, has been calculated at one chance out of 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 123. Right? Now, um you know, many people aren't familiar with talking of numbers in terms of to the power of. Um but here's an illustration. Um it's generally thought that there's about 10 to the power of 80 uh atoms in the observable universe.
¶7So, that number for the fine-tuning is the entropy that I just mentioned is a number that's so big that if you could write one zero on all of the atoms in the observable universe, you literally couldn't write that number out. So, it's a literally beyond astronomical number. Uh the cosmological constant that I mentioned is fine-tuned to one part in 10 to the 120. Uh and so on. And there are multiple of these kind of initial conditions and constants um that combine to make the universe somewhere where you can have functional complexity, where you can have chemistry, let alone organic chemistry, all right?
¶8And so, the odds of that happening by chance are just hugely unbelievable, all right? Now, I think we've got principled ways of looking at any set of data and saying, do we have justification for thinking the best explanation of that data is design? There's a kind of a handful of ways that I can mention, um but two that are particularly often used in in this kind of conversation are the ideas of uh Bayesian statistical analysis, sort of um a probability uh theorem thinking, uh and also the criteria of what's known as specified complexity. That's where you have um uh an independently kind of functionally specified pattern that's that's being exhibited by something at very low probability. So, to give a kind of concrete illustration of that, if you're playing cards, any hand of cards that you're dealt is one possible hand of cards out of all of the possible hands of cards, right?
¶9So, each hand of card is equally and quite improbable. But, if you're playing cards with someone and every time that they're in charge of dealing, they get a royal flush. And that happens 20 times in a row, right? Well, you can bet that they're cheating. Because they are getting this functionally specified result of the, you know, a hand that'll win at very, very low odds.
¶10And that, in our experience, indicates design. And that same kind of criteria would apply to the fine-tuning of the universe. John, before we, you know, move on to consider evidence of design, I just wonder what you make of fine-tuning itself. I mean, do you do you think that the universe is fine-tuned as a matter sort of scientific fact? Well, you correctly introduce a subject, John, as the fine-tuning argument for God, right?
¶11And I think we'd agree that an argument is an association of ideas, right? It's not evidence. Evidence is something else, which an an advocate in a law case would call upon to substantiate their argument. I mean, very crudely, it might be a smoking gun. Mhm.
¶12That would be the evidence to bolster the argument. Right. So, what fine-tuners are doing is bringing non-evidential case to the table and claiming that it supports the contention that there is a god. And that this is this is better than many apologists because they're actually bringing data, you know? I mean, Peter's he's very au fait with all the necessary figures and pieces of observed uh measurements to to to bolster his case.
¶13And and that's unusual because most apologists don't bring any data. They just bring story, narrative, and it's based on some scripture or other. So, fine-tuners are better in that respect, but the problem is they are not bringing data to support the contention that they wish to demonstrate. They're bringing data which supports a question. Mhm.
¶14The question is and Peter used the word improbable. The question is why we have this weird number of uh a huge If you were a gambler, you wouldn't want to bet against it cuz it's such a huge odds. And so so the first thing that we have to in examine is whether that is a valid question. Mhm. Right?
¶15And I'm contending that it isn't because the these uh I'm going to call them constants. I I know whether uh we've used that word yet in the in the show, but uh uh they have been identified by scientists for some length of time now as values that do not vary. And that's why they've been called constants, okay? So, the the the first thing that needs to be shown here is that they can be tuned. And I mean, the very fact that they're called constants would indicate that they can't be tuned.
¶16Mhm. The reason that they have been identified in that way is because they've always shown been shown to have the same values. >> Mhm. I mean, if they had shown to be variable over a period of time uh that we've been observing them over the centuries, that we've been making these measurements, if they've been shown to vary, then we could we could make the case that they are tunable. Mhm.
¶17Or or if they'd been shown to be to have different values elsewhere, you know, in different parts of the universe, that the value for gravity is a different number, Mhm. then again, we could expect "Oh, these things aren't constants. These things are variable. They can be tuned." Mhm. That's not the case.
¶18So, so I suppose John has taken the, you know, the ax to the the bottom of the tree there and is is is suggesting that these these constants may be um maybe in some way necessary, that they are just, you know, when we when we think about, say, a triangle, you know, its degrees adding up to 180°. We don't ask why that is. It's just a sort of necessary thing. I mean, could it be that the constants are necessary in the same way that you can't change them. We've never observed them changing.
¶19What do you make of that objection? Yeah, I think it's a very interesting question at the kind of root of this tree, as you say. I think um it's a bold metaphysical position to say that the the conditions and the laws and the constants are um metaphysically necessary uh in some way uh seems to go against our modal intuitions about this, I think. Um that it seems plausible that uh things could have been different. I mean, um standardly in various scientific theories um they propose that things uh were different.
¶20Indeed, if you think about inflationary cosmology, for example, that depends upon uh the the cosmological constant varying over time. So, that you had a Mhm. very uh rapid uh expansion phase early in the universe, uh and then the rapidity of that expansion slowing down after the initial expansion. Mhm. Um if you think about multiverse theories, which are often invoked uh as alternative explanations to design for this observation of apparent fine-tuning to say, "Yeah, we do hit this specification that allows for complexity and life and so on, but actually maybe it's not improbable if there were lots of other universes." Mhm.
¶21Uh right? Well, the idea that there could be lots of other universes with different tunings of the law Mhm. because they'd have to be not just like photocopies of our uni- of the one lifeless universe, but they'd have to vary in order to up the odds of our universe existing. The the very idea of a multiverse is is the idea that the these uh conditions could be different. What do you make of that, John?
¶22I don't think it's very profitable speculating about how things came to be. I I live in the world I live in and I observe it to be how it is. And uh going into I'm not going to use the word hypothetical because it isn't hypothesis, it would be a speculation. Uh I'm not sure how useful that is because uh there's no evidence for any of these things, multiverse uh any of the alternative creation, any of the alternative explanations for how uh we we came to live in the universe that we live in. I'm I'm you know, I'm I'm willing to accept that it's how it is and it's it's a question as to why or how it got to be how it is, but I it's not a very utilitarian question.
¶23I suppose this this idea that the universe is is uh necessary or the constants of the universe are necessary in some way. It certainly seems like logically we could imagine a universe with different constants. We can imagine Humpty Dumpty. Well, but but there there are universes that are yeah, that are logically possible. I suppose how do we get to the how do we get to ruling out the idea that these are met just not just logically possible, but actually metaphysically possible, these alternative scenarios.
¶24Is there a way of doing that? Well, that would really be a question for John since the question is how do you justify making the the that actually all of these conditions are metaphysically necessary realities. Um as I say, I I I think our intuitions are that physical realities are contingent realities that uh can be potentially explained. Um So, um for the person adopting the position of saying no no actually contrary to those intuitions uh I want to say that they are metaphysically necessary. Uh well, the question well, why are they metaphysically necessary?
¶25Why are these other possibilities not actually genuine possibilities? Um why uh this whole kind of discussion of of fine-tuning uh comes up. Um what justifies making a difference between this data and the data that I talked about of, you know, if I when I'm dealing, I keep getting a royal flush and you say, I think you're cheating. Hm. Uh and I reply, uh no no this is just the way that things are.
¶26This is just how, you know, what you you experience that reality is this way. I've got 20 royal flushes in a row, uh but you know, maybe that's metaphysically necessary and it couldn't have been any other way. So, I've got no case to answer. Hm. Another word that's been bandied about already is natural laws.
¶27And uh I regret that that these things are described as as being laws Hm. because uh as Peter will agree in in the common in the common consciousness, a law is something which is punishable if it's disobeyed and and that is not the case here. There are no sanctions for for for disobeying any of the natural so-called laws. That comes out of our human jurisdiction legal system and and there isn't any evidence for that to be analogous to nature. Mhm.
¶28So I would contend that although things seem to have been different in the origin Peter was talking about um the early stages of the universe as we as far as we can speculate we know it now. And and that's true because if our current assessment is right there was no matter at the beginning of the universe. It was all energy. And since matter is where the mass condenses almost none of the laws of physics I'm using the quotes sign were applicable then because almost all of them depend upon the existence of matter. E equals mc² where m is matter, you know?
¶29So I'm not sure how how far we can go down this route until we get actual evidence. And what would constitute that evidence for you? >> Good question. I contend that evidence is at least potentially observable. That all other forms of so-called evidence are dubious in their value contestable uh uh can be fiddled, you know?
¶30Unsatis- I mean, Peter was talking about dealing cards. Yes, of course, there are the likelihood of somebody getting constant royal flushes is that they are cheating, but it's not impossible that, you know, every time it comes Every time you toss a coin, it comes up heads. That's can't rule it out. And uh so I I I would say that uh really, until we've got observable evidence, or at least potentially observable evidence. I mean, take the Higgs boson as an example.
¶31It was uh suggested mathematically that it might exist, and then uh they had to build CERN, really, before they could produce actual observable evidence, but that did come. Mhm. And and and therefore, the way towards genuine evidence, it's not it doesn't come from tradition, it doesn't come from opinion, it doesn't come from experience, because experience can't be shared. Mhm. I experience things I I experience things that you are not aware of, and so you have to take my word for it.
¶32Mhm. So, there is an area of du- dupiousness there. Um so, I I I'm very much of the view that observation is the only sort of useful evidence. Furthermore, the Renaissance philosophers also came to the opinion that you can think your way so far, Mhm. but when you've come to the end of your logic, your rational argument, that's still unconfirmed.
¶33And that's why they instigated testing for a match or not between the inference, which was the outcome of their thinking, and observations of the natural realm. They invented science. So So in the context of fine-tuning, would empirical evidence for you look like being able to see a universe with particular constants, and then being able to compare that with another universe you can see with different constants that do not permit life? Would that be the sort of thing that would intrigue you and take you further maybe with this argument? >> I'd want to see variability.
¶34Okay. If it's variable, it might be tunable. As to who's doing that, that's a different question as Peter started out saying today. Yeah. Well, gentlemen, we've opened up the discussion.
¶35We do need to go to a short break, but if you're enjoying the podcast, check out premierunbelievable.com, where you'll find more shows, debates, and resources like this. We'll be back in just a moment. Pretty much universally, social science suggests that many of the institutions that we hold dear that shape us, that provide a social support, a huge amount of this used to happen anyway inside of these traditional religious structures, and there really has been nothing to replace it. >> It's amazing how quickly ostensible deontologists transform before our very eyes into utilitarians on this question. We're talking about what the self is here.
¶36I mean, atheists believe in the self. Everybody believes in the self. >> Well, no, that's not I mean, that that that I I find difficult to believe. Why Why wouldn't atheists believe in the self? The self is a series of non-deciding mechanisms.
¶37The arguments against God are are fairly compelling, and I think the arguments against atheism are fairly compelling. The difference is that most people who believe in God have expressed doubts, and a lot of people who are atheists tend to be more religious in this way than many of the people who are God believers. >> If people listening agree with me that free will in fact doesn't exist and simultaneously agree with you that free will is somehow necessary for the upkeep of civilization, then I would simply ask them to consider who's relying on the delusion here. This show does seem to have an extraordinary capacity for putting me face-to-face with people that I've been talking smack about online. So, thanks again.
¶38Welcome back to Unbelievable where I'm discussing fine-tuning with Peter Williams and John Richards. Uh Peter, I wonder if you could respond to John on this point about needing empirical evidence for fine-tuning. Yeah, well, it seemed to me that um before that break, John was um giving a fairly restrictive definition of uh of the of evidence. Um that seemed to rely upon direct human observation. Mhm.
¶39Uh rather than accommodating the idea of indirect observation. A lot of science works through uh indirect observation. A lot of science works through um coming up with theories to explain data. Mhm. And uh going with well-supported theories that do that the best job of explaining certain data.
¶40Um so, I would I would wonder if in in this context uh aspects of reality like the force of gravity, you know, you don't see gravity. You know, I point to right? >> Mhm. But gravity is a well, you know, featured part of of of our physical description of the way in which reality works. Um we can talk about the strength of the law of gravity.
¶41And the the strength with which things are attracted towards each other and so on. We can talk about the electromagnetic force or the subatomic weak force in our best theoretical understanding of how the physical universe works. And also we can observe that the way in which our universe is described is not the only way in which it could be described. And that out of all of those ways in which those kind of features of reality, like gravity, etc., could be described, the strength of those forces just so happen to be crucial for the existence of complicated interesting things uh up to and including you and me, right? Uh and so as with any observation of or theoretical kind of need to explain as deeply as we can in reality.
¶42This is what science is trying to do. And then, you know, beyond natural science or natural philosophy as it used to be called into the realms of of our best kind of philosophical understanding of reality. Uh the question of well, what what kind of world view, what kind of ontology best explains our scientific observations of reality alongside our other kind of experiences. As you were saying, the way in which we have individual personal experience and and so on. Um and if even there as you mentioned here, I don't have direct observation of your experience of the world.
¶43Um but if you tell me about it and I trust you, I'm a liar. then I can get an insight in into your experience. And yeah, we can be deceived. Right, you can lie. Uh our observations, even our direct observations can be mistaken and that's why it's it's you know, the repeatability is important.
¶44Uh and so on, getting independent witnesses to a crime and so on. You know, Yeah, yeah. there are ways in which we we we try to do our best to rationally handle the fact that we don't have direct kind of omniscient knowledge of reality, right? But still working with our best methodologies uh in the scientific realm and in the need to kind of philosophically explain that, I think these are um important, significant questions. Uh and also just to react with with something else that you said John about um I can't remember your your precise wording from that previous section, but you were saying kind of um are these issues of of relevance Mhm.
¶45to us, right? Is this just kind of abstract theoretical stuff? Uh I think the abstract theoretical stuff is interesting and important and you know, as humans we we are, you know, interested in that. >> need we need abstract. >> But there is a cash value to these things in in terms of that worldview question of well, for example, you know, is there a purpose to life?
¶46Well, if we live in a universe that is not the product of design, we're not here for a purpose, then objectively speaking there is no purpose in life. We can have our own individual subjective purposes, but the question, you know, what is the purpose of existence or whatever, but the answer is well, there isn't one. Mhm. All right, as a a naturalist philosopher like Alex Rosenberg will say, you know, there is no purpose of life. You just have to live with the fact that that philosophical nihilism is true.
¶47Mhm. Um well, this is one of those issues that allows us to get at that question of purpose in reality. Um the kind of story of reality that we're living in. Uh it's an argument based in evidence that allows us to get at what story of reality are we living in. So, it ties up these these issues in a very interesting way, I think.
¶48Mhm. John, I wonder what you make of Peter's response, especially about the fact that science itself is is full of theoretical speculation. It needs theorizing and doesn't always rely on direct empirical confirmation. Well, two or three things here. First of all, I've got no objection to indirect observation.
¶49Mhm. That's fine. I mean, if we see something that's an effect, then we can observe that and we can look for the cause. Mhm. Right?
¶50The cause is the direct source. The observation of the effect is the indirect, but it's still an observation. Mhm. And I very much agree that more people observing is better than fewer people observing. Multiple observations, ideally using different observers in different locations at different times using different means of detecting, that's all good.
¶51Mhm. That's all science and consensus of agreement leads us to a strong outcome. Right? Um Uh where did you go from there, Peter? Um motor pool or Oh, um the the value of uh metaphysics and speculation.
¶52Yes. Of course, scienti- I I Ah, yes. Theory. Mhm. Peter, you used theory in two ways there.
¶53You talked about uh scientists having theories, small t, about how things what the explanation might be. Mhm. Okay? Uh but that's entirely different from theory, capital T, Mhm. which is the scientific meaning of the word, which is the strongest type of explanation there is.
¶54Mhm. You know, it's not absolute because nothing is absolute except in our heads. Except in metaphysics. Except in thought. Except in philosophy.
¶55Coming out of our heads into the natural realm of external reality, the best we can do is gather observations about where we find ourselves and construct speculations, which is what scientists do when they are theorizing with a small t, Mhm. about how what might be the possible reason for this being as it is. And at that point, they're not doing science. Mhm. They're guessing.
¶56Like you and I. You? It's only when they start to construct an investigation which could lead to an observation that might either confirm or deny that speculation. Mhm. That's when they start doing science.
¶57Mhm. What do you make of that, Peter? Mhm. Well, I'm not sure that I buy that um observation is the only way to confirm or disconfirm uh theories. I think there are a range of explanatory values that we would look at uh in- including uh can we uh confirm or disconfirm through evidence, uh but also looking at things like uh explanatory power explanatory scope, uh simplicity, so the use of Occam's razor for example in science.
¶58Uh um f- fruitfulness and so on. Um some um cosmologists and so on even even physicists will talk about like the beauty of of theories. Uh mathematically uh sort of elegance and so on. So, we have a a kind of range of explanatory virtues, if we like. And when we're looking for the best explanation uh of uh you know observational level that we we try to explain, we would invoke a range of those things.
¶59You're lowering the bar. When you do that, that's my contention. Because uh What was it you just said? Um Uh we we Uh we we want to look at beauty and we we want to look at elegance. Well, these are opinions.
¶60These are not scientific pieces of evidence. And I mean I I I take your point about parsimony. Occam's razor, it's not It's not concrete. But it is a good principle to apply. And incidentally, I live not far from Occam where William of Occam lived.
¶61But the thing is here that we're talking about what's going on inside people's heads rather than what is actually physically out there. And so I find that less than satisfactory. I take it I accept that sometimes philosophical arguments cannot be contested. Occasionally, there are a few. I mean a good example would be um making the argument from reasoning that uh heavier objects don't fall faster than similarly sized and shaped lighter objects because you can make a an argument that says if you tie them together uh they're obviously going to fall as one and you can't refute that.
¶62But of course it's validated, verified by actual observations. There's been some brilliant video done inside um the best vacuum chambers that we can create, which are better than the vacuum of space. And and they show that dropped at the same time a uh a a a 10-pin bowling ball, big, heavy ball, and a bunch of feathers, dropped at the same time, land together. Mhm. So, there you have an agreement between a sort of an incorrigible philosophical argument and actual of scientific observations.
¶63But, that's rare. Mhm. Hardly any I can't think of any other examples where you can wrap things up to a final conclusion by thought. So, I prefer to use, instead of the word conclusion in regard to thinking processes, I like to use the word inference. Mhm.
¶64The outcome of thought is an inference. Put that inference into an investigation, get out some observations that either confirm or deny it, that's the conclusion. Mhm. When you've got that confirmation, that's where you should use the word conclusion. So, it seems I mean, you talked there about valuing parsimony and Occam's razor.
¶65Is Do you think that that sort of criterion is sort of guiding your approach to these questions? Because you sort of talked about, you know, not wanting necessarily to go down the multiverse route. And then you talked about the universe itself being perhaps metaphysically necessary, the constants of the universe being metaphysically necessary. We don't sort of look to anything beyond the universe itself. Would you say that sort of Occam's razor is really a sort of guiding principle here of your your thought?
¶66Occam's razor is a thought tool, Mhm. like logic. It's useful. I don't deny that. But, the the yardstick is the universe.
¶67We have to hold up our thoughts to the universe to see do you agree, mate? You know? You're the boss here. You've got the the the phenomena that we can observe. Have we got our thoughts right?
¶68Or not? That's where I'm coming from. So, uh I'm not a big fan of metaphysics, although it's it's fun, you know? I was I was going to say say John, aren't you really there arguing against metaphysics? Um you in which case you're arguing against naturalism?
¶69Because naturalism is a metaphysical position just as much Yes. >> as theism is a metaphysical position. I think what we've got is well-established scientific theories which give us data uh and we want to give the deepest best explanation of reality that we can and that includes, I think, going beyond simply saying, you know, well, this is a scientific description. Uh I think you could argue that if it's it it would seem that if it's possible to give an explanation of something, we ought to try and give an explanation of it and and you know, that seeking a kind of natural end point to our quest for explanation. Um but we want to push that quest for explanation as as far and as as deeply as possible.
¶70And so when we have data like this fine-tuning data which seems possible to explain and there's a range of possible explanations on on the table. Uh well, I I think it it it's a valid question because it seems possible to to explain. The question is is this something that needs explaining and what's the best explanation? Well, that question is a why question, isn't it? Why is it like it is?
¶71>> Well, why is it how it is, or you could you could say how did this come about? You could rephrase that. How or why. The thing about those questions is they include an assumption. They're not just a question.
¶72The other The other questions, where, what, when, who, they have areas where you can isolate a potential answer from. Where is obviously a location. Uh who is obviously an individual. When is obviously a chronological time. But why and how, they don't have those isolated areas where you can find the answer, because they are also not merely questions, they are also assumptions.
¶73They assume that there is a reason, purpose, or meaning behind whatever the proposition under discussion is. And that's not necessarily the case. Do they assume that there is a meaning, or do they assume that there might be a meaning? Yes. Well, Yeah.
¶74Because I suppose that Peter was sort of pressing you earlier in that you were sort of coming across as sort of anti-metaphysics, but one of his points was that you have yourself got a metaphysical stance in the sense that around this table we're asking the question how might you explain fine-tuning, and you did offer a kind of metaphysical explanation of that, which is that it is metaphysically that the constants are metaphysically necessary. If we If we If we want to hold you to your constant If we want to hold you to your own standing, so our question should be, okay, if you want to say that actually the fine-tuning is not unlikely because it's metaphysically necessary, our question would be, what direct observations do you have that justify the idea that physical reality is metaphysically necessary? Well, I don't because I'm I have I'll put that back to you. Just let me refute something you said earlier, Peter, because you you pointed to naturalism. Well, I call myself a methodological naturalist.
¶75So, I don't go with your common or garden naturalism. I think that we have to have, you know, investigative standards. For for my sort of naturalism. But, um What did What did you just postulate? Well, I was asking you what your direct observational evidence is for the metaphysical necessity of the apparent fine-tuning.
¶76Well, I see myself as an ant staring up at the sky wondering what's going on. And when I get my antennae twitching because some information's coming in, then I've got something to work on. Right? Until then, I don't. I don't have anything to work on.
¶77So, I'm reduced to plucking ideas out of my head. And I'm not sure how how far we can go down there. Yeah. So, I I I think um in in a sense, I see you as um raising the bar on evidence, on what counts as a good explanation, too high. Whereas, you perhaps see me as lowering the bar too low, right?
¶78And so, for our audience to think through is where do they think that kind of bar should be? What kind of suite of kind of methodological as you were saying approaches should we have to this kind of question? Okay, so I I can make a I can contend that we should put the bar where the outcome gives us results that work. You know? I mean, so for example uh earlier uh no, later last night a a Artemis 2 rocket was launched.
¶79It based on science, based on investigation and observations. It worked. You know? So that's a solid foundation to be going on. Um And and any anything else is a bit pie in the sky by comparison.
¶80So I would throw this back at Peter and say uh can you suggest how you might investigate that fine-tuning is the result of somebody twiddling the knobs? How would you investigate that? Yeah, well, I think that um what you were doing there is is basically kind of invoking a kind of pragmatist uh theory of truth almost. Um and the problem with that is I think there'd be lots of of areas of things that we um rationally believe in that wouldn't be included within that. So I I I don't uh reject that kind of criteria except to say I don't think that can be the the the only one.
¶81There's going to be lots of things uh for which, you know, does it work it is not going to be applicable, but that we can still rationally believe in. Uh including I think we can rationally believe that there uh that we should seek an explanation for uh why is, you know why or how come the universe had the amount of entropy it did when it started, you know? There's nothing wrong with seeking an explanation, right? We're curious animals. >> we should do that in the most principled way in which we can.
¶82Um and of course, you know, if observations are relevant to that, we should but we can also have explanations of our observational data. Mhm. Uh right? Uh and I think um the kind of principled methodologies that we're talking about you know, Bayesian analysis, this specified complexity uh criteria that I that I gave the illustration of with with the cards earlier. Um even at a very intuitive level, if we apply what's called the principle of credulity where basically you know, if it looks like a duck and walks like a duck and sounds like a duck, maybe it's a duck.
¶83Um if the universe as Fred Hoyle once uh kind of complained, looks like a put-up job, looks like somebody's been monkeying with physics as as Hoyle said then maybe someone's been monkeying with physics, right? And you know, that's no, I would say not a particularly strong argument. I agree with the comments you made earlier about when we're not looking at kind of deductive proof here. We're looking at probabilities and what's the best explanation. But even at that intuitive principle of credulity level, I think that then puts the burden of of disproof on the skeptic.
¶84Well, Peter, I want to probe further the nature of your explanation, but first we do need to go to another short break. So, if you're enjoying the podcast, please do follow us on social media. That's @unbelievablefe on X and premierunbelievable on Instagram and YouTube if you're watching rather than just listening. We'll be back in just a moment. I I would ask Tom this and this is the a surprising question maybe to nominate for me one thing just one thing that Christianity has introduced that doesn't have some source, some parallel, some analogy in in previous and in other civilizations.
¶85The ideal of of lifelong matrimony. I think that's a a very distinctive Christian concept. I think the the category of of what by the 19th century is coming to be categorized as as homosexuality and heterosexuality. I think they have no precedence. I think the notion of secularism, the idea of there being religions, I think all these are entirely exclusive to Christian civilization.
¶86I think the concept of science as it emerges in the 19th century, I think is entirely exclusive to to to to Christian civilization. I think the idea that um human beings are created in the image of God. That is obviously something Christian share with with Jews. It gives a degree of dignity to human beings that no other cultural tradition that I'm aware of even remotely approximates. Welcome back to the final part of this unbelievable show where I'm discussing fine-tuning with John Richards and Peter Williams.
¶87John, did you want to just pick up on some of what Peter was saying there? Yes. Yes, Peter was using the words proof and disproof Mhm. in his last uh contribution and I I don't like those words. Mhm.
¶88Because proof can be absolute. It's a concept which we can decide to make 100% true. Mhm. Nothing is. Mhm.
¶89There's no such thing. There is no absoluteness. Everything is relative. So far as we've observed. Right?
¶90So, scientists don't tend to use the word proof. Mhm. They tend to use the word evidence. Because of course that's a uh progressive measure. That is a proportional thing not ever becoming 100%.
¶91Mhm. And and if you listen to back in 2020 when we had the COVID epidemic, if you watch the scientists who were frequently on screen Mhm. describing what we knew and what we didn't know about, you know, how how to avoid catching COVID and how and what the best prospects of getting the vaccines were and so on, they didn't use the word proof. Mhm. They talked about the evidence shows that or they would say quite honestly, "We don't know yet.
¶92That experiment is ongoing. Mhm. The results aren't haven't arrived." Mhm. I'm with them. Yeah, I wanted to ask you about >> so I cuz I was I was saying in that last section that I I was agreeing with you that this kind of argument we're looking at is not not a proof.
¶93Not science. Well, and and as you say, science doesn't always doesn't generally deal with proof at least in the in the mathematical uh sense or the occasional philosophical kind of logical sense. But I think both philosophy and science can still have rational arguments for conclusion including rational arguments from data like this. Mhm. I'm not denying that philosophy is useful Mhm.
¶94and that thought is useful because how would we begin to do our science if we hadn't got some >> Yeah. We hadn't come up with some question that we wanted We thought we up a question that we wanted to get answered and then thought up an investigation that might lead to an answer. Yeah. We need that sort of mental contribution. Yeah.
¶95But it grieves me that uh commonly people do not delineate sufficiently between what goes on inside here and what is out there. I'm an epistemological dualist. I think >> Yeah. It's great, isn't it? Good It trips off the tongue.
¶96It's It's the the view that uh we we have uh a a different realm and which is isolated. There is no transfer between thinking and the real world. There If you I mean, it's interesting to speculate that people can move objects with their thoughts, you know, psychokinesis. And it's interesting to speculate that I can penetrate your mind, you know, like um Captain Spock in you know, with his mind meld in in Star Trek. Telepathy.
¶97But those things don't exist. They're not real. You can think of them. You can think of God. None of it's evidential.
¶98Peter, I want to I want to come mostly to the the sort of the nature of your explanation as well. Um because I suppose you can have this sort of fine-tuning of the universe and I'm I'm intrigued as to how this would be a sort of a stepping stone to sort of quote one of your most recent books to something like Christianity because you could have, you know, a a deistic God who creates the world or something like, you know, Plato's demiurge, his his master workman who sort of shapes the world and creates it and maybe in some respects doesn't even do a very good job. Yeah. You know, why why why a personal, um, you know, hyper-intelligent powerful deity? Why why do you invoke that?
¶99Right. Well, I I agree with you that it's a step on from saying this is evidence of of design. All that as David Hume, uh, the great skeptical Scottish philosopher, uh, from the Enlightenment would have argued, um, there's, you know, a big difference between saying something is a product of design and then specifying more about the nature of that designer. All you can tell from saying something is designed is that designer must have had the wherewithal to produce that design. Yeah.
¶100Right? So, that would seem to indicate that whatever that designer is, it is intelligent. Right? Uh, it it would seem to be powerful if it created the universe. But, can you you can't jump from that to saying, "Well, therefore it must be all powerful or omniscient or what about its moral character?" Design doesn't you know, you can tell a thing is designed that doesn't tell necessarily tell you about the moral character of the Or is it even Or is it even Jesus?
¶101Right, exactly. It doesn't say anything about specifying Christianity rather than Judaism or Islam or some sort of generic theism. >> Or Cloacina, my favorite goddess, who kept the sewers of Rome flowing freely. But, for example, with Plato's demiurge, who imposes design upon a pre-existing material reality, that demiurge by hypothesis can't explain the nature of that pre-existing material reality that's supposed to be there. So, it can't account for the the form, the initial conditions Yeah.
¶102that it then imposes more order upon. But there's an initial order there that is left unexplained. Um if you're invoking design for the initial conditions of the universe, then you need to have a designer that's capable of explaining those initial conditions. So, I you know, that is ill at ease with the demiurge or or with polytheistic explanations because within polytheism um the gods arise within a pre-existing universe. And then the gods may go on to like create humans, whatever, to be their servants, right?
¶103>> Invented by man. Yeah. Well, the you know, the the polytheistic theory is there are these gods, the gods created humans, but the gods themselves within the polytheistic theory just emerged. The you know, if you look at Hesiod's Hesiod's uh cosmogony, it it's a kind of generative explanation of reality in terms of like family tree of the gods and so on. Um but there's this pre-existing context.
¶104So, actually I I I think a better explanation is a is a broader explanation that has a better explanatory scope, therefore. Um and also a theistic explanation, I think, um is favored because of its uh kind of simplicity, the fact that there are other arguments pointing in the same direction to some sort of theism. You could look at you know, cosmological arguments, moral arguments, etc., etc. Um Uh and and so there's a kind of confluence of data uh and arguments that that point in that kind of theistic uh direction. Now, none of that is going to get you to Jesus, right?
¶105That's a whole other step as well. That's why my most recent book that you were mentioning mentioning Steppingstones to Christianity has a a chapter on intelligent design. Mhm. Uh which is arguments for there is design. Then there's a chapter on natural theology, which are arguments for theism as the best um metaphysical interpretation of reality.
¶106Mhm. Um but as you were saying, you know, that there can be various types of theism and different religious traditions that that all agree on, well, there's some kind of a god, but we have slightly different ideas about that god. Well, Christianity has a very specific different idea about that god. Uh the god who is trinitarian and incarnated in the person of Jesus Christ. And to get there, you need some sort of historically grounded evidential uh argument in order to make an evidential case uh for that conclusion.
¶107So, these these can kind of build as steps on on each other. Um but you're you're not even directly going to get to the a generic theism just from looking at design. Mhm. Um but it can be a step along the way. Uh and I think that that can be you know, evidentially and um theoretically motivated steps, philosophically motivated steps.
¶108You you mentioned um deism and the the demiurge and polytheism. I wonder though whether, you know, maybe the sort of theistic alternative that would be maybe closer to your position, John Richards, would be the a kind of um a kind of stoicism or a kind of pantheism in which the universe itself kind of sort of necessarily exists and has sort of certain principles baked into it which are kind of like the Stoic idea of the logos that there is a sort of divine structure and harmony to the universe. But we don't look to anything outside of the universe to explain it. It sort of just is. Um do you think those could be sort of sensible alternatives, maybe?
¶109Uh well, there's certainly um alternatives that one needs to seriously consider, right? That kind of pantheistic or panentheistic. There there's and then they identify pantheism identifies God and the world in some sense. Um but it tends to say actually the the the the physical reality is is an illusion because all is all is one with the deity. Um panentheism uh adds to that identification that there is more to God than the world, although the the world and God are are also identical.
¶110So, the world is kind of part part of God. Mhm. As it were in panentheism. Um but as I look again at referring to that book I just mentioned, um when you do I think particularly a philosophical analysis level, there there are deep difficulties with the the the metaphysics and the epistemology of a of a pantheistic kind of view of things where all is identical with God. Um and we we get into you know, deep problems with um the realities of apparent distinctions in in reality, including distinctions that we need for using logic and language and argumentation, um which seem to be undercut by a pantheistic worldview.
¶111John, you know, if we were to sort of come up with an explanation for fine-tuning, um are there philosophical problems you have with positing theism specifically as an explanation. Fine words, but they no pass lips. I want evidence. Okay? So, I I'll again challenge Peter how he might construct an investigation into discovering the existence or otherwise of his God.
¶112Yeah, well, um to briefly recap the kind of case that I would put, um we could start with this kind of fine-tuning argument, as I say, but we need to then look at, well, um what is the best candidate for being the designer? Um uh and there are range of explanatory virtues that we could look at to tell the difference between competing candidate explanations. Right? A including, as I mentioned earlier, like explanatory scope. I want an experiment.
¶113Uh explanatory power, uh simplicity. You were talking We were talking about Occam's razor uh earlier, so I want observations. Well, again, that goes back to the issue that we were looking at earlier of, you know, he he he is restricting uh evidence to uh observation, and particularly direct observation, and and excluding all the other kind of explanatory >> Indirect, good. So, we Okay, we can have i- i- indirect So, the situation we're in here is one Oh, person A is saying, "My garlic is keeping the zombies away." And person B is saying, "Don't be silly, there's no zombies here." And person A says, "See, it's working." Mhm. That's the situation we're in.
¶114Do you think that's an appropriate analogy for this situation in which we find ourselves? Uh well, it may be that uh if John is denying that the root of the argument here and saying actually that there isn't any fine-tuning because it's just metaphysically necessary. Mhm. Uh that's kind of he's denying that there are any zombies to be explained, right? For those people who think that there is fine-tuning, that there are zombies There's in this analogy, uh we can then have an argument about what best explains them.
¶115Mhm. Um and it's not just that, you know, well, you have your explanation and I have mine and each to each to his own. Actually, there are principled rational ways of of of telling the difference between what a good explanation of data is and what a bad explanation is. Yeah. And there would be a whole range of arguments.
¶116I think there would be that would would go into a case, a philosophical case for theism. Fine words. And and that would depend upon, again, whether or not John would buy into the existence of the reality that's being explained. As most arguments are going to go, here's a thing like, you exist. Or um objective morality is a real thing or um you have uh you have consciousness which has the quality of aboutness.
¶117Mhm. Uh can you explain that in uh metaphysically naturalistic terms or does that need to uh go outside of that? Uh and if we have these kind of finite conscious consciousnesses uh which can't be reduced to the the physical world that suddenly appear on the scene, what's the best explanation for that? Well, an aboriginal mind uh that isn't the sort of thing that comes from anywhere and need need explaining, so the mind of God would be uh an explanation for that. Mhm.
¶118Um are there any better ones, etc. So, you would get into, you know, here's some kind of some sort of reality that we we experience or that we observe uh directly or indirectly, and then what is the best explanation for that? And you put a whole bunch of these things together. Uh and I think you can you gradually work your up kind of identikit photo style to uh building up the jigsaw uh and stepping back and saying, oh, the jigsaw that we've built up actually, you know, that's a picture of something that we can justifiably call God. Mhm.
¶119I mean, the the the force of your zombie analogy is that, you know, presumably none of us sitting at this table believe in zombies. I think, you know, the challenge that Peter has raised is many scientists do look at this thing and and say there is fine-tuning in the universe. However, however you want to explain that. >> Constants. Yeah.
¶120Constants. Yeah, the fine-tuning of the constants. So, um No, constants can't be tuned. They're constant. So, I suppose they that Peter would argue that uh to say that they are uh to say that they are constants does not necessarily mean that they cannot be tuned.
¶121Um it's only on the assumption that they're metaphysically necessary that one would say that. Is that would that be your general response? >> that's that's that's right. Uh observing that the radio dial is tuned to radio 4 or to Premier Christian Radio as it as it may be uh and that it that is consistent does not in itself prove that it must be tuned that way, right? >> are I suppose they are constants for us now.
¶122Uh they are the sort of the underpinning laws that we see. That So, so they haven't changed in as many hundreds of years as we've been observing them and living on this planet. So, when were they tuned? Are you saying that your God twiddled the knobs at the beginning of the universe, Peter? And hasn't done any twiddling lately?
¶123I mean, what's the matter with him? Have they not gone out of tune like a piano? Don't they need retuning sometimes? If they're tunable, get on with it. I think that's pushing the this kind of tuning metaphor and analogy a little far.
¶124It saying that there are certain conditions, certain strengths of these fundamental forces in our best physical theories of reality. The question of why do we have these strengths of these forces? And that that question arises, you know, whether you're looking at it right to the the beginning of the universe in in the theory. But it's not I think an objection to kind of say, "Well, I need to see them change in order to rationally believe that they could have been different." A thing doesn't have to be dynamically changeable or changing in reality for the question of why why is it that way rather than another way that it could have been to be a justifiable question. I just want to press you there a bit further on this idea that sort of maybe the theistic explanation or something like the Christian God is going to ultimately be a a good explanation because there's a philosopher at Princeton, Hans Halvorson.
¶125Have you come across his work? Um, and he he believes in God, he's a Christian, but he doesn't think fine-tuning is a good argument for God. Um and I think his argument runs something like if we have the Christian God as our sort of prediction or our >> pre-supposition. As our Yeah, as our ex- as our proposed explanation, then we have a God who loves life. And this God is the God who is setting the constants, but the constants seem to suggest that life is extremely improbable.
¶126So, I wonder, you know, what what do you make of his argument? >> Mhm. Yeah, life the constants are precondition for life. >> Mhm. They're a they're a necessary condition for life.
¶127They're not necessarily a sufficient condition for life. That would get us into the whole discussion that I was in last time I was on the show when I was discussing with Professor Keith Fox about design in biology. Mhm. All right. So, it you may or may not think it's the case that these preconditions are sufficient preconditions for life.
¶128Um but the fact that um we have a specific tuning of these laws that allow for life and that other tunings of these these laws wouldn't allow for life. Mhm. Uh I don't think you can infer anything from saying, "Well, if the laws had been different then life wouldn't have been possible using these laws if they had been different." >> Mhm. Um therefore, because God likes life, he wouldn't have used those laws. >> Mhm.
¶129Um well, he wouldn't have used different tunings of those laws. Fine. And yeah, you could say there may be other ways. Perhaps, you know, who knows? Maybe there are other ways in which God could have created life, right?
¶130But the under a Bayesian type analysis, which is what this is kind of directed at Halverson here. You're not saying that um the hypothesis of God makes the fine-tuning of the laws of the universe likely. You're just saying it makes it more likely than those laws being tuned this way on a non-design hypothesis. So, it may be the case you could say if there was a God, it is unlikely that that God would design things this way. But, so long as it's more likely that it's even more likely that the universe would just randomly happen to hit upon this life-permitting specification.
¶131>> Yeah. You know, on under a kind of physicalistic or naturalistic description of these laws, you know, that has no interest in anything, including life. And on the vast majority of the tunings, it is not going to produce life. Which is why it raises the question of, well, how come that it does have this life-permitting specification exhibited. Uh and what explains that?
¶132Well, Peter, if you don't mind, I'm going to let John have >> Sure. the final word in this conversation. >> Thank >> Thank you. So, Peter used the word hypothesis. Technically, to be a hypothesis, a proposition has to be investigable.
¶133And yet, he has failed to show us how he might investigate the contention that there is some tuner who is tweaking our knobs. And thanks to Renaissance philosophers, we know that observations trump arguments. And unfortunately, some people still not do not give that principle the importance it deserves. Of course, thought is useful. But it's subordinate to observation.
¶134And it grieves me greatly, worries me that the general public doesn't understand this. And when they see scientists discussing things like this, they think they're doing science and take that as some sort of gospel truth. When in fact, all they're doing is speculating before they start doing science. Well, gentlemen, it's been so interesting partly because, you know, we've come into not just the the issue of fine-tuning, but you know, the very nature of a good explanation. You're both big writers and thinkers in this in this philosophy of religion landscape.
¶135I wondered before we go, if you could tell us maybe about what you're working on or what you've recently been working on. Um and Peter, you mentioned your book Stepping Stones to Christianity. Can you tell us a bit about that first? >> Yeah, that came out just at the end of of last year. I'd recently done a series of book with my publisher on collected essays on different topics and I kind of collected together and revised the introductory material from three of those books so that you get a kind of rounded apologetic for Christianity.
¶136With a chapter looking at design arguments in cosmology and biology. A chapter looking at natural theology, so things like the cosmological argument on the moral argument or the argument from consciousness. And then an argument looking at the historical foundations of Christianity and the question of what historically can we argue about who Jesus was. Fantastic. And John, what have you been working on?
¶137Well, before I became president of Atheism UK, I was the publications director of Atheist Atheist Atheist Alliance International, AAI. Right. And during my tenure there, I read a book written by Andy Bannister, who is frequently on this show. >> Mhm. And he wrote a book called The Atheist Who Didn't Exist.
¶138Can I show that to the camera? >> Yeah, sure. This is the back page of my book and that's the front page of Andy's book. And I read his book and I took exception to it and I wrote this book, my book, as a response to his book. And at the time, this is in 2017, it's some time ago now, but at the time I was in a family of devout Christians.
¶139Mhm. And I didn't want to alienate them because of course religious people are famous for their shunning ability. And so I wrote this book under a pseudonym. Mhm. And the pseudonym I chose, and and you spotted this earlier when we were talking, Tom, Mhm.
¶140was Elliot George, Mhm. which is a reversal Mhm. of George Eliot, who was actually a woman Mhm. who realized that she wouldn't get published under her name of Mary Evans. So she adopted this male persona.
¶141Anyway, I wrote this book. It's full of illustrations. Almost one page in three or four has got a cartoon on it. I'm down as Elliot George It's a a release of information. What do they call it?
¶142Um full disclosure. Mhm. >> I'm Elliot George. Okay, you heard it here first. And and the forward to my book, which is called The Dreadful Consequences of Thinking Like a Theist, the forward was written by Alex O'Connor.
¶143Mhm. It's available on Amazon and all good bookstores, but it's quite difficult to find because um uh the the uh the search algorithm reverses Elliot George to George Elliot. Oh dear. Oh dear. Oh no.
¶144So that was a shot in the foot, but I will put a link to you that you can add to the the the uh uh comments underneath. Fantastic. So if you want to get a hold of John's book, do look at the comments. John, Peter, thank you so much for uh joining me on Unbelievable, and to all of our listeners, I've been John Nelson, and you've been watching Unbelievable.