¶1William Lane Craig and Alex O'Connor are household names in the God debate. Alex has hosted Craig before on his podcast Within Reason, but in this episode they go head-to-head at London's Royal Institution. A lot of the discussion focused on Craig's famous Kalam cosmological argument, does the universe need a cause, but they also discuss animal suffering and take audience questions. Hosted by Jack Symes after Johnny Thompson was unwell, and in partnership with Premier Unbelievable, I hope you enjoyed their discussion. On my right is a man who has for 40 years made the philosophical case for Christian theism, the central project of his life.
¶2He's debated more atheists in more universities than perhaps anyone alive, and somewhere in the middle of all that he's revived a medieval cosmological argument that has been gathering dust since the 12th century and turned it into one of the most discussed arguments in the contemporary philosophy of religion. He is now working on a five-volume systematic philosophical theology. Having settled the question of if God exists, he has turned to the question of what God is like. Please welcome William Lane Craig. >> [cheering] [applause] >> And on my left is a man who picked up some of those arguments as a teenager in Oxford and took them seriously, took them apart, and somewhere along the way became one of the most watched philosophers of his generation.
¶3He's the host of the Within Reason podcast where he has interviewed the likes of Richard Dawkins, Jordan Peterson, Sam Harris, Slavoj Zizek, and of course the man sitting opposite him tonight. He describes himself as an agnostic atheist, but a curious one, increasingly drawn to the figure of Jesus and increasingly suspicious of the idea that the truth of things can be exhausted by argument alone. He is the rare treat of someone who welcomes discussion and dialectic rather than point scoring and argument. Please welcome Alex O'Connor. >> [applause] [applause] >> So, without any more preamble, we're going to dive into the meat of the issue tonight.
¶4And the first question is a big one. It's for you, Dr. Craig. Should we believe in God and why? Okay.
¶5Well, I'd like to begin by explaining why I am so truly glad to be here this evening. This event comes midway through a speaking tour of England. And after the events on Saturday, I came down with severe laryngitis, completely lost my voice. And it looked like the rest of the tour was in jeopardy. In fact, the events in Durham had to be canceled.
¶6But I want to publicly express my gratitude to our dear friends, Dr. Peter and Heather May in Southampton, who were able to procure for us a doctor here in London who actually made a house call early Monday morning to our hotel and after looking at us, he wrote some prescriptions for medications that put me on the road to recovery, thereby certainly saving the event tonight. As well as hopefully the remainder of the tour. So, I am really glad to be with you. >> [clears throat] >> Now, with respect to our time this evening, this is not going to be a debate between Alex and me.
¶7Rather, this is going to be a conversation where we openly discuss >> [cough] >> and issues. Pardon [clears throat] me, I'll probably be coughing. Uh but I've got my tea, got my throat lozenges here, and so I think we're going to have a great time. And um philosophers like to make distinctions in answering questions. So, when Johnny asked what reasons are there to believe in God, it's important to distinguish between believing in God and believing that God exists.
¶8Believing in God means trusting in God, committing one's life to God in worship and love and obedience. And the reason you should do that is obvious because God is the supreme uh benefactor. He is the source of eternal life, the source of forgiveness and salvation. So, clearly, you should believe in God. But I think John's real question is, "Well, but why believe that God exists?" You can't believe in God if you don't believe that God exists.
¶9And in my philosophical work, I've defended both what I call exterior and interior ways of answering that question. Exterior arguments and evidences concern uh philosophical uh and scientific arguments that uh lead to the existence of God. For example, I've defended six of these in my work. First, that God is the best explanation of why anything at all exists rather than nothing. Second, that God is the best explanation for the absolute beginning of the universe at a point in the finite past.
¶10Thirdly, God is the best explanation for the uncanny applicability of mathematics to the physical phenomena. Fourth, God is the best explanation for the incomprehensible fine-tuning of the universe for embodied interactive life. Fifth, God is the best explanation for the objectivity of moral values and duties in the world. And finally, sixth, the very possibility of God's existence implies that God exists. Now, together, I think these six arguments constitute a powerful cumulative case that God exists.
¶11If you were to ask me why I believe the Christian God exists, then we would need to go beyond these arguments to examine the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Who was this man, Jesus of Nazareth? And I believe that he claimed to be the long-awaited Jewish Messiah, the son of God in a unique sense, and the divine human son of man prophesied by the prophet Daniel. And I think that God vindicated those radical personal claims by which he put himself in God's place by raising him from the dead. Now, I realize that most people think that the resurrection of Jesus is something you just believe in by faith or not.
¶12But, in fact, there are four well-established historical facts concerning the fate of Jesus of Nazareth that are agreed upon by the vast majority of New Testament scholars that have written on this subject. And these would include first uh his honorable internment by Joseph of Arimathea in a tomb following his crucifixion. Secondly, the tomb was discovered on the first day of the week following the crucifixion by a group of Jesus' female followers to be empty. Third, the uh uh rather various individuals and groups of people experienced appearances of Jesus alive after his death on various uh various occasions and under a variety of circumstances. And finally, number four is that the original disciples suddenly and sincerely came to believe that God had raised Jesus from the dead despite every predisposition to the contrary.
¶13And I think that when the alternative explanations for those facts are weighed by the usual criteria that historians use for evaluating historical hypotheses, then the superiority and plausibility of what I call the resurrection hypothesis emerges. That is that the original disciples were right that God had raised Jesus from the dead. And so for that reason, I am enthusiastically a Christian theist. Now, so much for the exterior way. Um down through history, most Christians haven't believed in God on that basis.
¶14The vast majority of Christians, like a medieval peasant farmer or uh someone working in the rice fields of Laos, uh don't have the education or the library resources or the leisure time to look into philosophical arguments for God's existence or the evidence for the New Testament. Rather, they believe in God on the basis of a personal experience of God himself. Uh in particular, they've experienced the risen Lord in their lives. The Easter hymn writer says, "Have you asked me how I know he lives? He lives within my heart." And I think that that is a perfectly valid way.
¶15So, even though I am an enthusiastic proponent of evidentiary exterior arguments for the truth of Christian faith, I don't think they're necessary. I think that it's perfectly rational to take belief in Christianity [clears throat] as a properly basic belief grounded in our personal experience of God himself. Thank you very much. There's a lot there to unpack, and we'll park for the moment, Alex, any arguments you might have against the existence of God, and we'll park also for the moment the the question of Jesus and of Christianity. I was wondering if you might be able to tackle first what Dr.
¶16Craig calls the exterior arguments for God, particularly what sounds like you said five ways? Six. Six. Particularly like a version of cosmological argument that he raised at the beginning of I think the five ways was somebody else. >> [laughter] >> Yeah, of course an atheist engaged in these discussions spends their time doing two things.
¶17Providing positive reasons not to believe in God. And And there's really only one popular version of that. But more often, for that reason, they spend their time responding to arguments that are that are put forward. So, Dr. Craig has put forward uh six of these.
¶18And the atheist's job is to see whether they think that the these arguments essentially hold. So, for example Dr. Craig says that God is the best explanation of the finite past of the universe, the fact that the universe had a beginning at a moment in time. And the questions that need to be asked in response to that are did the universe have a beginning? How would we know that it had a beginning?
¶19If it had a beginning, how do we know that it needs some kind of cause? Now, Dr. Craig is perhaps most famous for his Kalam cosmological argument, which seeks to establish these facts, that everything which begins to exist has a cause, that the universe had a beginning and that therefore the universe had some kind of cause. And if the universe is the totality of all space-time and matter, then the cause of the universe must be spaceless, timeless, immaterial, and so on. Most attention in this argument is given to the second premise.
¶20That is that the universe began to exist. Now, some of you may be under the apprehension that Big Bang cosmology tells us from a scientific perspective that the universe had a first moment. That is not true. The evidence for the Big Bang is evidence that sometime around 14 billion years ago all of space-time was condensed into a really hot, really dense state. In order to get to a first moment of the universe, you need to take the observations which show that the universe is expanding, reverse them to get to the hot dense state, and then keep going past the hot dense state.
¶21And this is what Hawking and Penrose, Stephen Hawking and and Roger Penrose did in the 20th century to show that the at the beginning of the universe there was what was called a singularity. This is a genuine first moment where density goes to infinity on some models. And this would be a first moment for the universe. I just want to point out for those who are scientifically minded here, um that Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking relied on some assumptions in order to extrapolate in that manner. Four assumptions in particular, all of which have been You okay?
¶22All of which I I I I have hay fever. I suppose we've all got something. Um all of which have been uh disputed by physicists including Penrose and Hawking themselves who've disputed who've since disputed the very assumptions they relied upon to point to a singularity. And in fact, my friend Phil Halper who is never far away from these discussions either intellectually or physically, hi Phil, uh conducted a survey recently. Two of them actually.
¶23Uh the most recent one I believe that the largest collection of physicists ever surveyed um or at least it was replicated. And the survey asked a number of questions to leading experts. And the only question that got majority consensus at about two-thirds, the only one was that the Big Bang is not the first moment of the universe. It is a hot dense state 14 billion years ago. We don't know if or what came before that hot >> [laughter] >> state.
¶24It's simply not something that we can measure. So, scientifically, we're not on sort of solid ground. But Dr. Craig is more fond, I think, of putting forward philosophical reasons why the universe must have had a beginning. And these rely on the impossibility of an actual infinite.
¶25That if the universe had an infinite past, that would mean that you would have had to traverse an infinite number of moments in order to get to the present. I think I'm fair in saying that this is one version of the of an argument you would give to say why we would say that the universe has a finite past. Is it Yeah, I mean, plausibly in order to get to the present, you have to complete the past. But if the past is infinite, you'd have to complete an infinite series. You can't do that.
¶26And so you would never arrive at the present. And yet here we are at the present. >> [cough] >> Therefore, the universe [clears throat] had to have had some kind of beginning. There are other reasons to think that infinities of this kind can't obtain in reality. Dr.
¶27Craig is famous for relying upon David Hilbert's famous analogy or or imagery of an infinite hotel, a hotel with an infinite number of rooms. And all of those rooms are full. And yet if somebody showed up to this infinite hotel and desired a room and we're told that every single room in the hotel was full. It's easy. All you have to do is tell the person in room number one to move to room number two.
¶28That one's occupied, so the person in room number two moves to moves to room number three and number three moves to four and four to five and so on. And everyone just moves up and since it's an infinite hotel, there's always a next number for them to move into. And then the new guest just moves into room number one. And so as Craig has sometimes put in the past, the hotel would have to have a sign outside that says "No vacancy, rooms available." >> [cough] >> Which of course seems like a contradiction. I think that that man is the one who needs the cup of tea.
¶29>> [laughter] >> He [clears throat] never he he he never likes me talking [cough] about this. My sympathies. >> [clears throat] >> It's it's um yeah, I mean it's it's it's horrific stuff. Losing your faith in real time, it can make anybody a bit sick. Um the the problem the problem I see with this is that it relies upon assumptions that might >> [laughter] >> Do we >> [laughter] >> Are we um As as much as I care about Johnny, can we put him on mute?
¶30>> [laughter] >> I'm sure and actually you could just leave him on mute for the for the rest of the evening. Um the problem is that these assumptions are based on intuition. It seems as though that this idea that the hotel would be full and also be able to accept new guests seems like a contradiction, but it's simply not a contradiction. I mean, there are two ways in which we can understand the hotel being full. Either full means that it can take no more guests.
¶31In which case Hilbert's hotel simply isn't full cuz it can take new guests. So, maybe by full what we mean is every room is occupied. That's fine. Okay, every room is occupied, but you can also acquire new guests. That's true even in non-infinite examples.
¶32Like if I had a finite hotel and every single room was full, but if a new guest came into the room into the hotel, I could just build a new room for them. I could say, "No vacancy." You know, at least every room is full, and yet new guests can be admitted. So, the idea that every room being full and it being impossible to admit new guests are the same thing is not true. Even trivially in the case of that finite hotel. But because we're so used to them coming together, it seems that when they don't, we're in some unintuitive contradiction.
¶33But I don't think idea like concepts like Hilbert's hotel are contradictory so much as they're simply unintuitive. And bear in mind that when we are forced into extreme philosophical circumstances, we are very often asked to give up some of our most foundational intuitions. The Christian asks us to believe that God is one and yet three at the same time, which many people find profoundly unintuitive. And most of the time is defended as a kind of mystery of faith that we'll never properly understand. We have to put our intuitions on the shelf and accept that this must be true.
¶34In the quantum realm, we're told that particles can be particles and waves at the same time that superposition is a thing. That superposition is a thing that that people that that things can be in the same place that two things can be in the the same place at one time. kinds of assumptions that don't seem to make sense. Now, I think that infinity is surely one of the kinds of pressures that we would expect to upset our intuitions in that in that regard. On the point of the finite universe, could the universe have an infinite past?
¶35I really like this thought about having to traverse an actually infinite number of moments in order to get to the present. All right, this is my favorite argument because it's just so it's just so intuitive. How could we arrive at the present if you had to complete an infinite to get to the present? My question is this, an infinite number of what? Because, of course, potential infinite, Jack Science, ladies and gentlemen.
¶36Oh. Hello. Hello. [cheering] >> [applause] >> I uh I'm I'm on all night. I uh I poisoned Johnny Thompson so I could get my seat back as host here.
¶37Well, it sound pretty well. And for the sake of the footage, Johnny Thompson's just aged about 10 years. Thank you. Sorry, Alex. You were saying?
¶38>> That's okay. Um an infinite number of what? Because it seems intuitive. You know, I I was writing about the Kalam Cosmological Argument recently and I was trying to defend it. And I found myself saying, "In order to get to the present, you would have to surpass an infinite number of And then I stopped and I thought, "Well, what what works there?" Events.
¶39>> Maybe events. What's an event? I mean, okay, so so I pick up this glass. That's an event. But that event can be subdivided.
¶40It's the event of my cognizing the glass and moving my arm and lifting it up and the the friction between the fingers and the and the cup. Okay, so so maybe just the event of, you know, the the the friction rubbing against the cup. But that event occurs across a period of time and it can be further subdivided into individual moments. Like events can always be subdivided into smaller events as long as they persist through time. You can keep dividing the time in half and say that it's made up of further moments.
¶41Okay. So maybe like moments, then. But what's a moment? Like, what are we actually talking about here? Are we talking about Maybe we're talking about some measure of time.
¶42Maybe we would say something like, "Well, um take seconds, you know, or hours." That's fine. Maybe maybe an infinite number of hours. What's an hour? Cuz an hour is ultimately based on our like orbiting around the sun. But, you could say, "Okay, but if the sun disappeared, we could still keep counting as if it were there and keep the timer going." Except for the fact that time doesn't work like that.
¶43And time doesn't flow at the same rate at every point in the universe. In fact, the people sat on the bottom row down here are aging more slowly than the people at the top. Congratulations. As Einstein showed us. And so, I'm actually not entirely sure what things we're talking about that would need to be infinite and therefore, um unable to obtain in reality in order to have an infinite past.
¶44Now, don't get me wrong. I understand the intuition. It It still seems like a hard pill to swallow that the universe might have been past infinite. But, it's a pill that many people swallow. Not Not discluding, by the way, a certain Greek marble sculpture you may have heard of called Aristotle, who himself made this important distinction between actual and potential infinities and thought that actual infinities were something that couldn't obtain in reality.
¶45And yet, Aristotle believed that the universe had an eternal past. He believed the part The past stretched infinitely. Um well, it stretched infinitely into the past that the universe did. And so, it seems to me unclear. I mean, that the two assumptions built into that particular point, in other words, are that actual infinities are impossible and that a past infinite universe would count as an actual infinity.
¶46Dr. Craig, I also know, is a proponent of the A-theory of time. And there are, broadly speaking, two, but there are more, but people talk about two. There's this A-theory of time. The present is all that exists.
¶47The past does not not The future does not exist. All that exists is the present moment. I also have some trouble with that because I don't know what the present moment like is. I don't know when it occurs or how long it lasts. It's very difficult to actually pin that down.
¶48It's like an infinitely thin barrier between the past and the present. It's very hard to pin down. The other theory is the B theory of time, which says that time is a dimension of space. Many people interpret Einstein's relativity in this way. I know that Dr.
¶49Craig does not um and in doing so is in the minority of interpreters of general relativity in um in supporting a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of of general relativity, right? Now >> neo-Lorentzian >> neo-Lorentzian, yes. Yes. Which which retains the idea of an absolute um an absolute time. Um I I'm not convinced, in other words, that Why did I bring up general relativity?
¶50Why was I just talking about it? I wanted to There's two things at the beginning what you were saying. >> Why was I talking about it? >> know. I've just I've just got here.
¶51Johnny would have known. Johnny, are you listening? I Johnny's not with us anymore. >> remember where I was going with that. >> Johnny's in the Johnny's in the cupboard somewhere.
¶52If I don't jump into this conversation soon, I'm going to forget Yeah. all that's been said. >> Can I remind you of just two things at the beginning? >> Sorry. A A theory and B theory Just really quickly.
¶53A theory and B theory. Very simple. Um if the past does not exist as Dr. Craig believes that it does not, the only thing that really exists is is the present moment, then to say that the past is an actual infinite seems at least not obvious to me. The future doesn't exist.
¶54The future is a potential infinite because you keep counting into the future on and on and on and on with no end. There's no point at which it's completed and exists as a whole. That would be an actual infinite and that would be paradoxical. But it doesn't exist yet. Now, it's complicated by the fact that the past sort of has already existed in the past, but it doesn't exist right now.
¶55If the past doesn't exist, it seems strange to me to suggest that we can count it as this sort of boxed off thing that we can point to and call an actually infinite sort of set of things. In other words, I don't know what a moment is. I don't know why an actual infinite infinity is necessarily contradictory, and even if it's deeply unintuitive, sometimes in unusual circumstances, we're asked to abandon our intuitions, and it wouldn't surprise me if in the case of the infinity, this would be one of them. It two things in there I think it important, Bill. One is Alex gave a sort of Zeno's paradox sort of thing when he was saying, "I don't know what a moment is." And you can sort of keep breaking it up into little parts.
¶56That's one sort of infinite infinity argument. The second one was does it make sense to have an infinite chain that expands the other way? And so, do you want to say something like it is time isn't infinitely divisible, and second, and how do you explain if there is an infinite chain? Do you want to say there's a first cause to that as well? How do you explain the infinite chain?
¶57>> Well, I think it's more important, uh, Jack, to back up and uh, assess the accuracy of Alex's summary of the arguments, uh, because I think a lot of the quibble here is merely semantic, uh, rather than substantive. Now, as [snorts] Alex correctly suggested, the most controversial premise of the Kalam cosmological argument is the premise the universe began to exist. And [snorts] in support of this premise, I offer two philosophical arguments, which Alex distinguished, but perhaps not clearly enough. The first one is based upon the impossibility of an actually infinite number of things. While the concept of actual infinity seems to be a perfectly consistent mathematical concept, once you try to instantiate that in the real world, it results in all sorts of, I think, truly intolerable uh situations that suggest that an actually infinite number of things can't uh act really exist.
¶58The second argument is independent of that first argument. It doesn't deny that an actually infinite number of things can exist, but rather says that an actually infinite number of things cannot be formed by successive addition. And this is the connection with the Zenob's paradoxes that you mentioned, Jack. The uh version of Zeno's paradoxes called the dichotomy says that before Achilles can cross the stadium, he has to cross halfway. But before he can cross halfway, he has to cross a quarter way.
¶59Before he can cross a quarter of the way, he has to cross an eighth of the way, and so on ad infinitum. The implication is that poor Achilles cannot even move because before he moved any distance, he would already have to have moved half of that distance. And therefore Zeno concluded that if reality is made up of these sorts of intervals, that motion is impossible, which is absurd because obviously motion exists. Now, this version of the Kalam cosmological argument is just like the dichotomy paradox, except you pull out the initial point because Achilles has a starting point. But an infinite past, as incomprehensible as this seems, has no starting point.
¶60So you just mathematically pluck out that initial point and push it back to infinity. Instead of descending intervals like 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, you make all the intervals equal. And they go back to infinity without beginning. And that does nothing to suggest how that infinite past could have been traversed one interval at a time. Now, Alex, you asked, "Well, what are those things that are traversed?" And I interjected, "They're events." And in my work, I discuss this.
¶61What is an event? It's a type of change. And to make sure that all of the events are actual and equal, we arbitrarily, conventionally specify some chosen event as our standard event, say 1 hour or 1 day. And then we ask, "How many standard intervals are there in a beginningless past?" And the answer can only be an actually infinite number of such events. And these events don't all have to exist at the same time.
¶62Um these events have been instantiated in reality like a falling series of dominoes. That's the analogy I also like. A falling series of dominoes, the last domino falls today, but there was never a first domino. It's been beginningless. And >> [clears throat] >> so you can you can specify a certain standard event arbitrarily and then ask how many have elapsed, and the answer will be actually infinite.
¶63So, um that would suggest that an actually infinite past cannot elapse. Now, you're quite right, Alex, in saying that Aristotle nevertheless believed in an eternal beginningless universe, but he said the past is not actually infinite, but potentially infinite. But here I think Aristotle was clearly conceptually mistaken. Um, an actual infinite is a collection which is complete. It all of its members are in that collection.
¶64But a potential infinite is a series that is at every point finite, but indefinitely increasing toward infinity as a limit which it endlessly approaches, but never arrives at. So, if the series of events in time is endless and will go on forever, the series of events later than any moment in time would clearly be merely potentially infinite. New events are added with each successive moment, uh, but you never arrive at an actual infinity of events. By contrast, if you look at the series of events in the earlier than direction, that cannot be potentially infinite because in that case the past would be finite, but growing toward infinity in a backward direction, which contradicts the forward uh, flow of time. So, I don't think that those answers to the Kalam cosmological argument are at all convincing.
¶65Now, in addition to these two philosophical arguments, I was stunned to discover in my work at the University of Birmingham, uh, in my doctoral work, that there are actually two scientific confirmations of the beginning of the universe. Uh, and notice the terminology I used there. Um, scientific results are always provisional. They're never certain. But we have these good philosophical metaphysical arguments for the finitude of the past.
¶66And what contemporary science does is it confirms those arguments. That is to say the the hypothesis that the universe began to exist is much more probable given the contemporary evidence of astrophysics than it was without it. And so this is not refuted, Alex, by the survey you mentioned >> Mhm. where the scientist said that the Big Bang refers to this early hot dense state, not to the initial singularity. That's a merely semantic point.
¶67That is just saying that the label the Big Bang, that label is given to this earlier hot dense state. It's not the label of the singularity. And that's quite true. But that isn't to deny the reality of the singularity or to say that it didn't occur. Hawking and Penrose, whom you mentioned uh in their 1996 book stated, and if I can quote from memory, today almost everyone believes that the universe and time itself had a beginning in the Big Bang.
¶68So um the finitude of the past, let me now add an additional point, doesn't require a singular beginning in the universe. Mhm. Hawking and Hartle, James Hartle of University of California, Santa Barbara offered a quantum physical model of the universe that resolved the singularity. They were able to round off that initial uh space-time uh segment of the universe so that there is no singular point like a cone has. A cone has a point in which it cannot be extended.
¶69That's where the point is. A cone can be extended in the other direction and the standard Big Bang model has the geometry of a cone. But the Hartle-Hawking model got rid of that initial point by rounding it off through the use of imaginary numbers for the time coordinate. So their model has a finite past, a beginning of the universe, but is singularity free. And so don't think that my argument for the finitude of the past, the beginning of the universe, on the basis of astrophysical cosmology or Big Bang theory assumes it has to be a singular beginning.
¶70There are plenty of non-singular models with beginnings. So that would be the first body of evidence is this astrophysical evidence from the expansion of the universe. But then very quickly the second scientific confirmation that I don't think you mentioned is the evidence stemming out of the thermodynamic properties of the universe. The universe on a large scale is simply a gigantic closed system because of naturalism, that's all there is and there isn't anything outside of it. So if it were infinite in the past um, its entropy production should have increased and increased and increased so that it would now be in a dark, dilute, uh, and lifeless state.
¶71And since we are not in such a state, we know that the universe must have had a beginning in which it was in a low entropy state, extraordinarily low, and has since been increasing in in entropy as it's endured. And this is called the past hypothesis. So, it would be in a state of heat death if it was the case it was if it was if it was >> In pre-relativistic physics, this was called the heat death of the universe. >> Yeah. Yeah.
¶72>> Yes. But, in relativistic physics, uh the heat death could be either cold or hot, depending on whether the universe will expand forever or will reach a >> It's death. If it's a hot or cold, it's not a good thing. Okay, that's good. And there's quite a bit for you to uh Yeah, I'll say I I find with these discussions >> Well, I got I got Well, you mentioned so much to respond to, but all right, we don't I do want to respond though to the point about metaphysical intuitions and the Trinity at some point.
¶73>> That's important. We'll we'll get to that perhaps. Um I I also want to make sure that we have time to talk about proactive case against God's existence, which is equally important to this discussion, but the the the Kalam is is is your ground, Dr. Craig. Um Yes.
¶74I I I was with a friend who was yesterday who who smokes cigarettes and and I realized that if you wanted to if you want to give up smoking, all you have to do is just take the remainder of your tobacco and just smoke half of the remaining tobacco every single day. And that way you'll never run out um because you'll never have to buy any more. Of course, constantly dividing in this sense has been problematic for thousands of years and has prompted lots of people to develop metaphysical positions on, for example, um time being discrete. You know, if you need, which is in fact true, to half the distance between here and here in order to clap, you have to half it first. You have to half it again.
¶75You have to half it again. Many people say that there therefore must must kind of ultimately small kind of distance. But for our discussion, this would be an example of a of a potential infinite. We're constantly dividing, dividing, dividing, dividing. And as we well know, that infinite series can just be completed.
¶76You can prove that just by clapping your hands. Dr. Craig said that in order to define what an event is, you just sort of arbitrarily pick a moment of uh sort of duration of time and just count how many of those there have been. For example, hours. But the point is that there is no such thing as an objective hour.
¶77There's no such thing as the length of an hour. I mean this seriously. If if you When when satellites were first sent into orbit around this planet, scientists of general relativity told the technicians and the companies that the clocks will literally run at a different rate because of the effects of uh Earth's mass on the ticking of time. And the government didn't believe them. And so the original satellites were sent up with two clocks.
¶78One which is in accordance with the general relativity and one which is in accordance with the sort of common sensical view that time ticks normally for everybody no matter where you are. And guess who was right. It was the government. I'm just kidding. It was the scientists.
¶79Time doesn't tick consistently in this way. And so to to sort of pick an arbitrary length of time like an hour and just say that that's something that will have gone on infinitely into the past, I just don't think that's how time works. And I and I don't think that like metaphysically speaking, to call that an event makes much sense. I mean like you just you said that the problem with Aristotle and his interpretation of the past as a potential infinite. This is a this is a a sticking point, I suppose.
¶80Um you can help me out here. I understand the idea that the future is a potential infinite because well, it hasn't happened yet. But the past is an actual infinite because it has happened. But neither of them exist on your view. I broadly speaking am a B theorist about time which and I know you've said in the past and I assume you still think it's the case if the B theory of time is true the Kalam cosmological argument doesn't work, right?
¶81I I think that it's more difficult to put through on a B theory of time. My Could we Could we remind the audience I'm not sure if you know what a B theory of time is. >> Oh. What Alex has put his finger on is a very profound metaphysical issue about the nature of time >> Mhm. that divides philosophers.
¶82The so-called A or as I prefer now the tensed theory of time says that tenses like past, present, and future are objective features of reality. And that temporal becoming is real. Things really do come into being over time and go out of being. Um the tenseless or B theory of time says that our experience of tense is illusory. There is no objective difference between past, present, and future.
¶83Rather this is a subjective feature of human consciousness. And similarly temporal becoming is unreal. It is an illusion uh of human consciousness. All events in time are stretched out like a spatial line and are ontologically on a par. Now in my original work on the Kalam cosmological argument I just assumed the truth of the A theory of time because it seemed so obvious to me.
¶84This is the common sense view of time. And while I was vaguely aware that there were some philosophers who held to the tenseless theory of time I discounted them as not really serious. And then I discovered that in fact this is an enormous debate. And so in my subsequent work I wrote two book-length treatments of these issues. The tense theory of time a critical examination and the tenseless theory of time a critical examination both published by Kluwer Academic Press.
¶85And available >> Yeah, in which I argue pardon me >> available at the bookshop outside the back. >> Oh, I doubt it. >> [laughter] >> Yeah, these highly academic books are too expensive get them at the library, you know, or on interlibrary loan. But anyhow, um Can I I I I tried then to give a robust philosophically deep um defense of the A theory of time and critique of the B theory of time. But the point I was going to make is that other proponents of the Kalam cosmological argument like the uh Singapore philosopher Andrew Loke Yeah.
¶86have uh defended the Kalam argument even given a B theory of time. >> Alex you want me to ask the question? >> Of course the the relevance of this is the difference between the future and the past on the A theory of time. In your view Dr. Craig neither of these things exist.
¶87They're not real. Right. Right. And the idea is that because the past is sort of already happened we can count it as an actual infinite. >> Right, it's part of the actual world.
¶88It's actualized. >> But not anymore, right? It's gone. It it's part of the actual world. Everything that has happened up to the present is part of actuality.
¶89It is complete. It is over. So but is the past actual? Yes, it's actual but it it doesn't exist. I'm using the word actual here in the way philosophers talk about actual worlds.
¶90>> Yeah. This actual world has been instantiated up to the present moment. >> Yeah. And those events can be counted. We can ask if every how many prime ministers have there been in a past that goes back forever and ever and no prime minister ever served an infinite number >> be an infinite number even in this universe.
¶91>> There would be an actually infinite number. >> But of course, but the the point is that the future doesn't exist either. And I think I I I suppose the problem is giving actuality to a past which doesn't exist and not giving that actuality to a future which doesn't exist, but will exist. I think doesn't make a lot of sense. And I'll tell you why.
¶92For example, you would agree that God knows everything that will happen in the future. Yes? He knows right now. And you believe that God is in time as well. So God right now, even though the future hasn't happened yet, he knows everything that will happen in the future.
¶93The future will happen. We can concept At least God could sort of conceptually, metaphysically, kind of put a box around it. In the same So God knows what's going to happen in the future exactly as much as he knows what has happened in the past. The idea that because the future hasn't happened yet, it therefore has this sort of non-actual status. I want to say that like if neither of them exist, the thing that matters is like to what extent can we say, well, these are like sets which like conceptually exist, which like we can sort of conceptually put a box around, and at least for God himself, he'd be able to do that just as equally, just as easily for the future as the past, right?
¶94It's it's a not quite sure if I'm finding the right words to say what I mean here, but you see what I'm saying, which is that the future does exist conceptually, is actual in the sense that God knows exactly what's going to happen. It's already there. And it is in fact going to occur infinitely. Could forever That all of that future is already like conceptually there in the mind of God and yet that's not actual. Can we have a response on this and I want to Even though neither of them exist?
¶95>> aware of time and I want Alex to give the the argument against God's existence as well. So maybe a reply on this in particular. Okay. Well, I think the keyword here is conceptually, Alex. Even if it is true that the set of events that will happen is actually infinite.
¶96The point is that the series of events, the concrete series of events in time Mhm. is not and never will be actually infinite. It is always finite and always increasing. Uh and the reason for that is that from any event you number and start going forward for any number n, n plus one is always a finite number. Mhm.
¶97So if you were to try to instantiate that set of future events in reality one member at a time, all you would do would be to generate a series that is potentially infinite, but you would never be able to instantiate all the members of that set. >> same is true of the past. If you were to instantiate past days one by one and keep going, you could go on potentially infinitely. The point is that if the only thing that exists is the present and we start counting into the future one by one, then yes, that's a Well, now look, I mean The problem with you that the set of past events cannot be instantiated one member at a time. That's the Zeno's argument.
¶98And but but it is instantiated in reality. But the point is that if it if it can't go backwards, why can it go forwards? If if the present is all that exists. Well, I I understand the B theory. question, the answer would be because this is the nature of temporal becoming.
¶99Mhm. It There are There is There are two directions in time. >> Mhm. Earlier than and later than. And so, even tenseless time theorists will say time is anisotropic.
¶100That is to say, it's not the same in all directions. There are two directions in time, and they are not the same. Yes. But, time is not only anisotropic, it's asymmetric. Mhm.
¶101In that there is one unique direction of temporal becoming, and that is later than. >> Mhm. When an event occurs, the next event that occurs will always be after it, not before it. Temporal becoming in a backward direction is metaphysically absurd. So, this is due to the asymmetry of time, and I think this is an asymmetry or symmetry breaker Mhm.
¶102that people like Alex Malpass and Wes Morriston, whom you know, are looking for between the past and future series of events that that allows you to say the arguments against a beginning was past are sound, but they do not imply that the future cannot be endless. So, let me ask the question more specifically then as pertaining to God's knowledge as I as I mentioned a moment ago. >> Yes. You said that God knows Yes. Let's say the contents of every hour into the future right now.
¶103Right. >> If the future has no end. Now, I understand if God is in time and finds out every hour what happens, that's potentially Yeah, I don't think that. But, God knows right now the contents of an infinite number Right. of future hours.
¶104So, God is currently apprehending an actually infinite number of physical, temporal things. Yes. Which means that God is in apprehension of an actually infinite number of physically instantiated things, even if they haven't been instantiated yet. This is a great question. Um It's a great objection.
¶105>> what what the critic of the argument do here >> [laughter] >> is to somehow import into God an actually infinite number of things. Yes. So as to contradict the argument. And so the idea is, well, maybe God has an actually infinite number of thoughts, or ideas, or something of that sort. And here I think that classical theism is quite correct in saying that even though the range of the things that God knows is limitless uh and infinite, that doesn't describe the mode of his knowledge.
¶106God's knowledge, I think, is non-propositional in character. He grasps the whole of reality as a seamless whole. He doesn't grasp it as fragmented into individual propositional bits. Rather, it is us, we finite knowers, who fragment God's undivided knowledge into these propositional bits so that we can understand them. But when we say things like God knows that tomorrow I will have pizza for lunch, that doesn't mean that God has this individual sort of thought in his mind.
¶107And so this is a kind of modified doctrine of divine simplicity. That though I'm critical of it in many other respects, I think it does provide a very attractive model of the mode of divine cognition. Sorry, Jack. I I'm I'm interested in then the specificity of God's knowledge. The specificity?
¶108>> Yes, and like what your theory of truth is because I I don't know what your theory of truth is. Mine is not the correspondence theory of truth, but it's the most popular theory of truth that for some kind of belief to be true, it must correspond with a fact in reality. I can understand the idea that God kind of intuits all truth all at once or something like that. That's fine. >> Okay.
¶109The truths that he knows, that he apprehends have to correspond to reference. They have to be things which they refer to. If if it's knowledge of the physical world that you talked about >> view of truth. Which means that >> So reality is as God knows it to be. >> So even if the mode of God's knowledge is instantaneous, the content of that knowledge consists in reference to an actually infinite number of physical things, something you said >> Well, now now you're not importing these into God's mind.
¶110It sounds to me like you're wanting to have an actually infinite number of propositions that God knows. And here again, I would say that that describes the range of God's knowledge, but not the mode of his knowledge, and as an anti-Platonist, Mhm. I don't think the propositions exist. Yeah. I I think they're just ideas that we have in our minds, but there isn't any such thing as the proposition Alex O'Connor is British that's out there.
¶111Uh But there is such thing as an hour in your view. Par- pardon me? >> There is such thing as an hour, an hour. A a a minute, a second. >> Well, I think an hour is a conventional unit of time.
¶112It's not as though hours and Wednesdays uh and January's actually exist. Those are conventional, and we might have lived in a uh a different like the ancient Babylonians had a sexagesimal system of time reckoning. >> Yeah. But but but earlier when I when I I this out and said that an hour is sort of arbitrarily defined by the sun. You say, "Well, we can just take that arbitrary measurement and use it as our sort of unit of events and say that if that went on into the past infinitely, there'd have to be an infinite number of them." And of course, if they go infinitely into the future, there would have to be an infinite number of them, but that's okay because they continue to obtain.
¶113It's a potential >> [clears throat] >> But God knows the contents of the right now. >> But let's go back to what I said. >> [clears throat] >> With respect to these past intervals, even though the interval we select is conventional, the number of those intervals that have occurred up to now has to be actually infinite. It cannot be finite. But the number of those hours that occur later than any event, if temporal becoming is real, >> Mhm.
¶114right? Is always finite and always increasing. Infinity is a limit which is endlessly approached but never arrived at. And that the sign of this kind of infinity is the lazy eight or lemniscate >> Yes. uh that's used in in calculus.
¶115And in in that case, as I said, even if we concede that the set Mhm. of all events that will happen has an actually infinite number of members, the point is that if you try to instantiate that one member at a time in reality, Yes. all you get is a concrete potentially infinite series of steps. >> I'm really enjoying this and I want you to be able to respond. I just want to remind you just for your own arguments.
¶116We're probably 15, 20 minutes from audience questions. So, we haven't got an actual infinite amount of time. So, if you Yes. Very very good. Thank you.
¶117That's all I wanted. I just wanted to get in with the quip. But um if you want to if you wanted to bring in your objection argument, just be aware of those that time. But it's it's how you want to set I wonder if I might get a a for my tea now, which is gone. >> I I I'm sure we can if uh producer Paul can hear us.
¶118>> Where's Johnny? He could make it. >> He might find one. >> [laughter] >> There we are. Thank you.
¶119Thank you. >> I I think I think you're all you're all I'd love a tea as well. >> [applause] >> I think you're quite right that we should um spend a little bit of time on the alternative. I suppose to wrap up here, maybe I can just try to say relatively uncontroversially this will depend on what on what you think, ladies and gentlemen, about the comparison between the past and the future. If the present is all that exists, and neither the past or the future exists, is there a relevant metaphysical dis- difference?
¶120Maybe it's the fact that the past has already happened. But from a sort of bird's-eye, god's-eye view, saying that the past has already happened, and the future will happen, and both can be known with equal apprehension and equal certitude, it seems to me that from that god's-eye perspective, both of these are sort of equally plausible. Now maybe there is some actually infinite number of future events that God knows of. In which case I would say there could be an actually infinite number of past events that God knows of, too. And of course, if you try to instantiate these one by one, you'll never get to the end.
¶121But that works in both directions. And as you say, Dr. Craig, that's not how God's knowledge works. He doesn't think through these propositions one by one. He knows them all at once.
¶122And you said, "Even if we say that the set of future events contains an infinite number of members, if you try to instantiate them one by one, you'd never get to the end." That's fine. But the set as it exists right now, that set as it exists in the mind of God, No, only on Platonism. As I've said, I don't believe in the reality of these abstract objects. I think they're like mathematical fictions. I agree.
¶123The only thing that exists is what they refer to. The thing that really exists I think which is a proposition is a set. Uh the set of all past presidents of the United States, that what what the members of that set don't all coexist. No, they don't coexist, but they they exist they they like exist as something What I mean to say is that the concept that itself has to refer to a thing in the physical world and in the real world that is not I shouldn't say the physical world. >> you know they that even that isn't true Alex because in set theory most members of sets are not concrete individuals like you and me and mountains and pebbles.
¶124Most sets have as their members other mathematical objects like numbers and curves and things of that sort so that the whole thing is I think a sort of exercise. >> but then you would just say that those those numbers being a set of don't exist. They're conceptual. Yeah. You'd say that everything that set theory sort of deals with that's purely mathematical is not real.
¶125It's purely conceptual. But when it comes to a set which contains reference to real physical things in the world, those physical things in the world have to exist. And if there's a set right now No no, I mean think of the set of past US presidents. They don't all exist right now and yet that's clearly a set and it can be numbered. You can say there have been 47 US presidents.
¶126>> clear 46 didn't Harris who was it that run twice? Well, I Yeah, some have served two terms, right? So I meant the 47th term. >> I know what you mean. >> [laughter] [snorts] >> And yes, but the set exists now is what I mean to say.
¶127What I mean to say is that the the Okay, the set of all US presidents as a as a concept exists right now in my mind. There it is. There's the set of all US presidents. Now, the the members of that set might not all physically exist right now, but every single reference of the members of that set is something which at some point exists in physical reality. Yes.
¶128And here is a very, very interesting, I think, >> Mhm. logical mistake that people like Malpass, who argues similarly, make. >> They infer that because each member of the set will be instantiated, that all the members of the set will be instantiated. And I think that Bertrand Russell exposed the fallacy of this thinking through his uh uh uh version of the Tristram Shandy paradox, where Tristram Shandy tries to write his own autobiography, but he does so so slowly that it takes him a whole year to record the events of one day. And he says, "At this rate, I'll never finish my autobiography." >> Yes.
¶129And Russell didn't disagree with that. All he said was that if Tristram Shandy is immortal, then no page of his autobiography will remain unwritten. >> Yes. So, each page will be written, but the autobiography will never be finished. Yeah.
¶130All the pages will never be written. This is incredibly mind-bending, but I I think is is relevant to this issue. >> Look, um Thank you. >> It's difficult here because I think we can keep going back and forth forever. Um but That wasn't even on purpose.
¶131That was an accident. Um Really, uh uh But I I think I would be remiss not to I and the thing is you know I had had intended to respond to various of the arguments that you proposed at the beginning. We didn't even do the other premise of the Kalam cosmological argument. Well and the conclusion too. >> And so a quiet so so I'm I'm a little bit I'm a little bit stuck for choice here.
¶132It's either trying to defend the proposition that things can begin to exist without a cause or it's asking you in the space of 10 minutes to tell me why God allows suffering. Um Perhaps for balance we should go with the we should go with the latter. Um I think the main reason that people have for not believing in God and we didn't of course the resurrection goodness. The main reason people have for not believing in God is the existence of evil or suffering. I prefer to say suffering cuz evil is a sort of morally laden term, right?
¶133And to me this argument is sort of endless and never makes very much progress in the sense that people suffer and theologians have theodicies for why they suffer. It's because of free will, it's because of it's because of so many other things. >> genuine advance was made by Alvin Plantinga and his discussion of the free will defense? >> But that what I mean to say is that No. You don't think he put the death nail to the logical version of the problem of evil?
¶134I'm not convinced in that like I'm not sure that the logical problem of evil ever really held up. Um but I I kind of I don't Oh well that's all right. >> of don't want to That's progress. But I I kind of don't want to talk about that because I think that there's a there is a a class of individuals who are usually completely ignored in the discussion of suffering. That's of course non-human animals.
¶135Yes. The theodicies that are provided for the for the for suffering the existence of suffering the fact that there's human free will the fact that there was a fall the fact that our souls will somehow be developed the fact that higher order goods like bravery and courage, can be achieved. are plausible. But, none of them apply to non-human animals. None of them apply to these animals who, for hundreds of millions of years Yeah.
¶136I've written quite a bit on the problem of animal suffering. I know. So, so perhaps we can rehash it. Because, I'd like to know why it is that you think that for these hundreds of millions of years suffering is the defining quality of the animal experience. To the extent that this is the mechanism God chose to bring about complexity of life on Earth.
¶137Survival of the fittest is the same thing as the death and destruction of the unfit. Disease, predation, starvation for hundreds of millions of years. And for some reason, when we get to humans, something kind of special happens. We're ensouled, whatever it might be. Such that our suffering gets to be redeemed.
¶138But, not theirs. We're talking I mean, if I were to go into the details of what happens to animals in the wild on a regular basis Mhm. >> [clears throat] >> I probably couldn't upload this footage to YouTube because it would get flagged for being too extreme. As you well know. So, perhaps in the time remaining, we could talk about why it is you think that God would not just allow this, but build it into the very mechanism by which life comes to um vary in its complexity on Earth.
¶139The question here is whether or not the existence of animal suffering in the world is more plausible given naturalism or atheism than it is given theism. And I would argue that animal suffering is vastly more improbable given naturalism Mhm. or atheism than theism. And therefore, even if our inability to penetrate divine psychology and say what reason would have God God would have for choosing an evolutionary process, >> [snorts] >> uh which I think we can speculate about, nevertheless, the balance of probability is overwhelmingly in favor of theism. Animal suffering is more plausible probable on theism.
¶140Now, why do I say that? Well, the reason is because if naturalism were true, Mhm. then it is incomprehensibly more probable that there wouldn't even be life, Mhm. much less sentient life Right. that could experience suffering.
¶141And of course, we're back here to the old fine-tuning argument, aren't we? That given the fine-tuning of the universe, this is vastly more probable given theism than given naturalism. And so, in a sense, the existence of animal suffering, as well as human suffering, is actually evidence for theism because if naturalism were true, it's overwhelmingly more probable there wouldn't be any sentient life and hence no suffering. >> Yes, I understand this line of argument. Pardon me?
¶142I I understand this this line of argument. I understand what you're getting at. The issue is I feel like it kind of side steps the concern. It side steps >> steps the concern. >> does.
¶143It doesn't >> people There are many people who believe, for example, that there is some kind of naturalistic explanation for fine-tuning, even if we don't know what it is. There are people here who who disagree with you, Dr. Craig, that that think that those arguments aren't sound, aren't strong, at least to the point where they remain agnostic about the existence of a God, such that the only data that they can really touch and feel that really sort of strikes them as the most sort of important and plausible is the existence of animal suffering. So, I suppose I could frame it this way. Suppose it were the case that all else were equal.
¶144Then what? >> That all else were equal. That the That That otherwise, apart from this piece of data >> Oh. Oh. Apart from this piece of data.
¶145Oh, but why why should we make such a hypothesis that all else were equal when it's not? >> So, that we can isolate this particular point of data and see if it at the very least decreases the probability of God's existence. Uh-huh. >> [clears throat] >> So, you're saying what if animal suffering were just as probable on naturalism as on theism? Then what?
¶146>> I'm saying let's grant the existence of animal suffering and say given that fact about the universe like Okay, let's grant that there is a universe that exists. Let's grant that there's a universe exists that abides by physical laws. Now, if If you want to say that we can't have the conversation about why animals would be allowed to suffer until we've addressed the fine-tuning argument, then we'll probably need a bit more time, but also I don't think that that functions for people who simply are willing to say, "Well, I just don't agree with the fine-tuning argument." I still want to know why it is that God would allow animals to suffer. >> that's to be more than just an opinion or psychological >> Mhm. autobiographical comment, they need to give some good arguments against the fine-tuning argument.
¶147And my impression um from reading the literature is that today this fine-tuning argument is the argument for the existence of God that is taken most seriously by non-theists. Can you Can you take uh that Alex is just looking at the systemic problem of evil, the problem of evil against theism from evolution by natural selection, ignoring the others? Does that argument itself count against it? >> Alex, because I did say I think we can speculate about God's reasons for allowing an evolutionary history to the world. Um it seems to me that God's overall purpose for creating life on Earth um is for the purpose of human salvation.
¶148And that his goal is to create a world in which the optimal number of people would freely come to know and embrace eternal salvation, which is an incommensurable good to which the suffering in this world cannot even be compared. And I don't think it is at all improbable, not in a whit improbable, that only in a world suffused with natural and moral evil that the optimal number of people would freely come to embrace God and his salvation and so find eternal life. And that could well be the reason for creating the world with an evolutionary history that involved, as you say, a lot of animal suffering. So the suggestion would be that an animal like a zebra which gets its windpipe caught in the jaws of a lion, which is how they're often predated upon, that no human ever sees, that no humans ever aware of, that no other animal is even ever aware of, is somehow necessary, the conditions under which that occurred are somehow necessary to bring people to salvation in Christ. You know, this is the interesting thing about >> [clears throat] >> uh the natural world.
¶149The tiniest perturbations can over time have a kind of ripple effect such that enormous consequences can follow from seemingly trivial incidents like a zebra's having its trachea collapsed. This is called the butterfly effect and it's illustrated in chaos theory and in quantum theory as well. So that I think we're in no position at all to say when we see some instance of evil that God probably doesn't have a good reason for permitting that to occur. >> expect it to believe that that God is somehow bound by this precarious butterfly effect from a particular instantiation of animal suffering that somehow brings about salvation. That without which God could have found no way to bring about the same salvation.
¶150Well, we don't know. I mean, see this is again where we're we're into the realm of pure speculation, but I'm saying it's not implausible that only in a world suffused with natural and moral evil that the optimal number of people would find eternal salvation. I mean, think of the the results of that evolutionary history of the earth. The primeval forests that were laid down now form the basis for the fossil fuels that have made modern civilization possible. Should God have instead created what's called an omphalos world with the mere appearance of age rather than having an actual evolutionary history?
¶151That would be intolerable. We'd have to regard most of our empirical beliefs about the past. >> Two two minutes to go now. >> as if those are the only two options. I mean, the idea that, you know, because we rely on fossil fuels temporarily at a point in our sort of human technological trajectory Yeah.
¶152that relied on animals becoming fossilized and the only way that God could have provided us the fuel to bring about the industrial revolution would have been to to create fossils which look like they're ancient animals but actually what or we could have just used a different fuel. Uh >> [snorts] >> pardon me? >> You could have just used a different fuel. A different fuel you said. Well, see then you're totally into pure speculation, you know, about worlds operating according to different laws of nature and so forth.
¶153We have no idea what that's like. So, remember this is supposed to be an argument for atheism. It's the atheist who's bears the burden of proof of showing that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons for creating a world with an evolutionary history and I think that's a burden of proof the atheist cannot bear. >> I find it difficult I find it difficult to believe that God is somehow constrained by these like environmental conditions such that he can't bring about the world he wants which is a a flourishing world of humans who freely choose to come to know him without the existence of fossil fuels. It's it's a matter of whether or not it's plausible that in order to create a world in which the optimal number of people come to freely know him and embrace salvation that that world would involve a very considerable degree of natural and moral evil.
¶154Possible. And I don't know how the atheist could show that such a thing is improbable. >> By saying it's impossible but seemingly implausible. I mean it it just seems to you can understand how it seems on the surface extremely implausible to say that God could not maximize salvation without fossil fuels. Well, we we don't know.
¶155We don't know what would happen in such a world. As I I give one alternative that God created an unfallen world that has coal beds and oil fields and so forth. Never were the result of decayed vegetation and eons and eons of primeval forest. And that would force us to regard the past as largely illusory. Now, then you could say, "Well, maybe God could have created different laws of nature and things." No.
¶156Right? But then we don't know how many people in those worlds embrace different laws of nature. >> salvation. I mean, what about an What about a world in which animals exist and function in the same way, but they're not sentient? But what?
¶157But they're not sentient. They're not sentient? Sentient, yeah. Well, the question it could you have [snorts] a dog or a horse or a sheep that functions and isn't sentient? It wouldn't have any pain awareness.
¶158It would be no consciousness. Of course you could. You think so? >> Absolutely, yeah. Like Why Why Why not?
¶159You could have if the reason why these animals exist are for things like laying down the ecosystem, there's absolutely no reason to suggest that there couldn't be an animal which mechanically functions in exactly the same way as an animal that has sentience, but is not in fact sentient. It still moves away from certain inputs in the way that, you know, metal can react to environment by rusting. An animal can react to an environment in extremely complex ways just sans consciousness. I mean, I struggle to believe that God can be sat around with his angels saying, "I want to create an animal that doesn't feel pain." And the angels saying, "Do you really think that's possible?" It's the atheist who needs to show that a morally perfect God should have chosen a world like that if it's even possible, rather than a world like this. And I I It's not clear to me that that is obligatory.
¶160The the atheist seems to know more about divine psychology than I think he really does. >> I I really wish Johnny was still here so he can interrupt you because I don't want to end this conversation. I really I really really don't. I can't ignore the sentience of the people who are here who have brought their questions along this evening. And we're opening up to questions from the floor.
¶161We'll start from the left. Big raised hand. Thank you both. Alex, um I've seen seagulls float on air and they clearly seem to be delighting in it. Dogs, animals, I I think you put too much emphasis on suffering where I think the animals can delight in their life and play.
¶162Um and Bill, I remember last event you mentioned that the purpose of of life is of salvation and that it was to behold God and to glorify in him. Don't you think God could be more like an artist and all of creation is this beautiful thing that he's creating? Alex? Um yeah, I mean, animals can surely take delight in things, too. But I think if you look at the totality of the natural world, particularly historically, and add up pleasure and the suffering involved in animals' existence, I think there's good reason to think that the suffering outweighs it.
¶163I mean, the number of the number of vertebrates who are even alive on the planet today is so large that we can only possibly estimate it. And if you think about what the average day must be like for one of these animals, constant threat of They might enjoy their life. They might enjoy their life. It it it might well be. But what I would recommend is there's a there's a chap called um I think his name is Brian Tomasik and he has a website called something like wildanimalsuffering.org or something.
¶164And he recounts he talks about this stuff. He talks about what life is actually like for a wild animal, what kind of experiences they can expect to go through, what kind of suffering they can expect to go through, and I think that you're mistaken. But even if you weren't, even if you weren't, even if there was lots of pleasure in the life of an animal and then a bunch of intolerable suffering as well, you would still be left to explain why that suffering exists. It's not as simple as just compensating an animal by saying, "You're going to have a good life and you're going to suffer seemingly completely unnecessarily in ways that you will certainly never understand cuz it is an animal, definitely not. And yet this seemingly could have been avoided, but I'm also going to give you some pleasure and so I guess it's kind of fine." It In other words, it doesn't actually do away with the problem of evil even if the pleasure kind of balances it out or even exceeds it.
¶165You'd still be left with the unexpectedness of suffering, at least that kind of suffering. And I think that if you look into the to the experiences that these wild animals go through, it it's not as as as, you know, high-flying as you as you say it is. Superstitious. Um can Can I ask for another question, Senator? >> Well, I'd like to respond.
¶166>> one if we can. >> I'll be brief. I think the questioner makes a really good point. And that is uh that animals live basically very happy lives that typically end suddenly because of animal predation. So, I was talking to one evolutionary biologist, Jeffrey Schloss, who uh thinks that animals are basically very content and happy with the lives uh that they live and that this isn't really the enormous problem that atheists would like to claim.
¶167Uh this results from anthropopathism where we project human feelings onto animals like Bambi and and Thumper and and so forth. Uh and that's actually wrong as Michael Murray shows in his book Nature Red in Tooth and Claw Tooth and Claw, even sentient animals like sheep and goats and dogs and cats, while they have pain awareness, they do not have that second-order awareness of knowing that they are themselves in pain. Which human beings as self-conscious subjects do. And that makes human pain and suffering qualitatively distinct from animal suffering. >> I'm sorry.
¶168I'm I have to put my foot Can you Can I get two Can I have quick brief reply cuz there's and we're taking the question from the lady in the cool jeans full full back. >> You this idea that animals suffer, but they're not aware that they're suffering is to me a self-contradictory statement. To suffer is to be aware that you are suffering. You cannot be in pain without knowing you're in pain. That is the same thing as not being in pain.
¶169And [clears throat] if it is not the same thing if it turns out if it turns out that it's fine because these animals although they suffer, they don't know that they're suffering, so it doesn't really matter. I don't know if any of you are pet owners. You believe that your animal when it's in pain doesn't somehow know that it's in pain, but good news because it doesn't matter too much. >> It's a great I'm going to put my foot down. Take your question over here.
¶170Question from this young lady. When you I miss Johnny so much. I'd like to jump in. >> Why not break their legs? You just need Why not You need I'm sorry.
¶171Uh leg breaking would be sweet relief for me at this point in time. It's Your Your Your question and if you can direct it to Bill or Alex. I'm sorry. It like if If somebody else If somebody else asks a question, I will take the time to say what I'm about to say, which is this. Why not break the legs of your animals?
¶172Why not rip off their tails? Yes, they may suffer, but they don't know that they're suffering, so it doesn't really matter. >> command to steward the earth and to care for the earth. But how How does that make >> divine command? [clears throat] Why not pollute the oceans?
¶173Why not destroy forests? It's not because they suffer. It's because we have a stewardship from God. >> bring about suffering. The reason why we steward the earth is because if we don't, then creatures who inhabit the earth will go on to suffer.
¶174That's why we don't worry about environmentally polluting Mars because nobody lives there. Well, I I I I I don't think that's correct, but I do want to get to other questions. >> What are the grounds for saying >> Your Your question here. Thank you. Hello.
¶175Hi. >> [laughter] >> Sorry. Um I was noticing a lot of your rebuttals to his arguments were that I found it implausible to believe that a God would allow that. And I was just wondering why we should expect him to put our human knowledge and our human morals on a being that quite frankly isn't human. Because we're also told at the same time that this God imputed us with moral intuitions.
¶176In fact, one of the the arguments that Dr. Craig gave in his original six was a moral argument where he says often times that since objective morals exist and objective morals can only exist insofar as they're grounded by God, we therefore know that God must exist. Now, how do we know that objective morals exist? How do we know that? Because God has placed within us He's written the law on our hearts.
¶177He's placed within us extremely strong intuitions about the nature of right and wrong, about the idea that there are right and wrong things, and some apprehension of what those things are. And yet, in the face of animal suffering, in the face of biblical slavery, in the face of biblical genocide, I'm told to abandon these intuitions, the very intuitions that I'm supposed to rely upon to prove the existence of the God who ordained that scripture in the first place. So, maybe you might be quite right to say that I shouldn't be able to take my moral intuitions and trust them and say that they're real and that they're accurate. But if that's the case, then you've undermined one of the reasons why we believe in the existence of God as the grounding of of morality because that relies on the intuition that objective morals exist. And the intuition that animals don't know that they're suffering is one of the strongest intuitions that I think that I I I would like to know what the grounds are for thinking that the suffering is different.
¶178I'm serious. I really like to know what the grounds are. Because because Dr. Craig said that that animals don't have this kind of self-awareness. How do we know that?
¶179There are This is a whole new field of scientific study called animal consciousness. In uh 2016, I believe, a new journal was founded on animal consciousness. And most animals, most organisms, are not in any way conscious. They have no sentient states. Spiders and insects and worms and algae and so forth aren't sentient beings.
¶180When you get to vertebrates >> Yes. uh then scientists begin to detect states of mental awareness that would be shown like pain awareness. Um but there doesn't seem to be a self-consciousness in the sense that human beings have it. But what's the test to be aware that one is oneself in pain, one has to be self-conscious. conscious.
¶181And that that that Alex is just you know, pretty common property that apart from the great apes, there's no evidence of self-consciousness in the >> That's actually not true. That's absolutely not true. Yeah. Yes. What the test of that was.
¶182How you know. Well, like they use like the mirror test where a chimpanzee has a white streak on his face and they put a mirror in front of him and he sees a chimpanzee with a white streak and he reaches up to wipe it off. This seems to show a sort of >> And the mirror test has been passed by animals who don't have who who are supposed to not have the self-awareness that you say they This is a great field of ongoing study. Every single every single test of self-awareness that we've ever devised has been passed by animals who according to your theory should not pass it. No, I don't think that's that's the case.
¶183The The point is that the mirror test is a very primitive way of testing self-consciousness. So, if you're interested in this, in my systematic philosophical theology, I believe it's in volume three on the doctrine of creation, I have a fairly extended discussion of this topic and show that there are even degrees of self-consciousness from primitive intuitions like the mirror test and the chimpanzee to full agency of being a self-conscious first-person perspective. No animal has that first-person perspective that can say, "I think that." But that's That's not what pain is. That's not what pain is. That's not what pain is.
¶184It It is. It does involve self-consciousness that I am myself in pain. >> Knowing that you were in pain is the same thing as being in pain. No, that's clearly wrong. How is it Can you Can you describe to me what it would be like to be in pain and not know you're in pain?
¶185Imagine that you were really worried about your taxes, but you didn't know that you were really worried about your taxes. That just doesn't make any sense. To be worried about something is to worry about it. >> And if an animal lacks self-consciousness, it would feel that it would have a pain awareness, but it it wouldn't be aware that it is itself in pain because it doesn't have a first-person perspective. So, so who is the pain happening to?
¶186It's happening to the animal. And that pain is either relevant morally relevant or it's not. If the idea is that not having self-awareness >> saying it's morally irrelevant. That you're you're making strong distinctions there. What I said was that animal pain is qualitatively different than human suffering.
¶187And therefore, we shouldn't assume too readily Of course it's different, but but in the same way, I mean, pain is an experienced phenomenon. We we cannot get into the heads of other people and other animals to know what their pain is like. But we do know, for example, that other animals are far more driven by their sensory inputs than any kind of rationality, which they simply don't have. So, for example, no one has a trouble No one has trouble accepting that a dog's sense of smell is so much more intense and acute than we could ever possibly imagine. An eagle's eyesight is so much more intense and acute than we could ever possibly imagine.
¶188Why? Because evolutionarily, they rely upon those more than other animals do. Animals, having no rationality, rely upon their immediate sense data and their reaction to the world of pain. We have better reason, I think, to think that these animals experience more pain, not less. And so, at the very least, I think we need to be equal.
¶189I've heard you say in the past, Dr. Craig, that like this Look, you've got to do more than just give your opinion on this, Alex. You need to cite scientific literature that supports that because the material I've read and cited says something quite different. >> So, can you tell me what what it is about an animal's brain, specifically, that's different to a human's, which means that they're not in in self-awareness? In Michael Murray's book that I cited before, he says that some people speculate about the development of the frontal cortex Yeah.
¶190in the human brain that helps to give this first-person perspective. But in talking with Michael about this, he says this is very speculative. But it's it's not just speculative. No, but there there could be that final word plan. No, I think we're getting distracted here by No, yeah, we'll jump on to the next question But the thing is, it's not just speculative.
¶191You said I could have a quick reply. It's not just speculative. It's not just speculative. I think it's incorrect. I think it's false.
¶192There are human beings who have lost their prefrontal cortex, who still have a sense of self, who report that they are in pain and know that they are in pain. We literally have There is a There's a famous patient, well, patient R, sometimes affectionately known as Roger, who lost his prefrontal cortex due to the herpes virus. They then do They run tests on him. They put his hand in ice cold water, and he tells them, "I'm in pain. I'm aware that I'm in pain." So, we know for a fact it cannot be Well, that would suggest that Michael Murray's speculation is incorrect.
¶193>> It's incorrect, and I think it is. of No, no, what is different about the brain that would mean that they don't brought a library of books and has been holding that microphone far too long. Hello. I'm sorry. Um as a vegan, this is a very sensitive topic for me, so I'm very happy that I get to to say my word in this.
¶194Um firstly, I would like to say quickly that um I've read the Bible, and there's a lot of animal suffering in it. I think we're all familiar of that, especially with animal sacrifices that go on. Um so, I would like to cite Peter Singer, who you know, is a founder of preference utilitarianism, who says that animals are capable of having preferences to not be in pain. Um and to bring it back to what I heard growing up a lot as a Christian, um uh nothing is everything is capable with God or something. Um so, if God is capable of doing everything, and every possible world is capable with God, why would God create a world where animals can experience pain and suffering, um but maybe if you believe they can't reason, why would they Why would God create animals only to experience suffering?
¶195Bill, a question straight to you there. And as you're answering, can we have a have a question from somebody on the balcony if possible? So, I can't see up there that far, but if you can find someone, then we'll take that question next. Bill, your answer. So, [snorts] help me to understand The question was they cited Peter Singer, told us he Well, he used to be a preference utilitarian.
¶196Now, he's a hedonistic utilitarian again. So, the morally relevant feature is pain and suffering. Why would God allow so much pain and suffering? It's in scripture, it's there. Is is that the essence of >> we've already addressed this question extensively.
¶197It's It's not implausible that only in a world suffused with natural and moral evil that the optimal persons would optimal number of persons would freely come to know God and his salvation. So, what the atheist has to show is that there's some other world feasible for God in which a more optimal balance of people freely come to embrace God and his salvation than this world. And there's no way the atheist could prove such a speculation. >> find Can we make sure the next question it just just cuz I think it was a different question. She asked about She asked about the the Bible being full of animal suffering.
¶198It's not just the existence of animal suffering which God permits. It's the animal suffering that God commands throughout the Bible. In the book of Joshua, he tells the Israelites to to hamstring horses when he's just when he's committing a genocide against them. To hamstring the horses, which seems completely unnecessary. Jesus sends demons into a flock of pigs who then go and drown themselves in the ocean.
¶199It seems that if there's any kind of like care for animals and stewardship over the earth that we're supposed to have, it seems that God isn't setting a very good example in the Bible. Uh question from the top there if we can find one. Uh there we go. Your question. Um so, I think a lot of this has boiled down to some kind of argument from fine-tuning, whether that be about moral properties and all physical properties or whatever, right?
¶200And Craig has rejected the idea that all of these physical or moral constants could just exist out there, right? We have to have some explanation for them, and that explanation flows from the nature of God. But, one thing I've always been confused about is if, say, the physical quant qualities that make up our universe are necessarily explained by God's existence. How is this any different from them just existing as a brute fact out there? If they necessarily follow from God's existence, why is that different from the universe like just existing without a personal creator?
¶201Yeah. So, if the question the constants laws of nature fine-tuning then necessary to God's nature, why is that more probable to say they're part of God's nature rather than merely just a part of the world? Why positive fine-tuning is part of the thing God created? Now, so the question I I thought the question was about moral values and duties. You say it's about the fine-tuning.
¶202>> the blend was that so we had the world is organized as such that it allows for beings such as us that can engage with each other morally. Let's >> It was about fine-tuning. Well, the the reason is that within the parameter of universes governed by the observed laws of nature, in order for intelligent interactive life to exist, the fundamental constants and quantities of nature have to be fine-tuned to an incomprehensible precision, otherwise the universe would be life-permitting and not just life-prohibiting. Uh there wouldn't even be chemistry. There wouldn't even be matter in the absence of this fine-tuning.
¶203So, it is next to impossible that all of these life-permitting constants and quantities should fall by accident into the infinitesimal life-permitting range. It is vastly more plausible that there is an intelligent creator of the universe who has determined the fundamental quantities and constants of the universe to be life-permitting uh so that the so that life will exist. >> The question is specifically asked what the difference is between saying that these constants flow necessarily out of God's nature or just sort of flow necessarily out of some kind of brute fact. And I think the answer is will. Like if God has a will, he would will that the that the constants were a certain way, whereas some brute fact, just the universe itself would not have that kind of will.
¶204But the question there to ask is why is it that the meta conditions are set up to make it so difficult to bring about a material world? There's a really interesting argument for Gnosticism in here, by the way, ladies and gentlemen. Which is that the creator of all things doesn't want a material world to exist and so sets up the conditions such that it is infinitesimally difficult. Yeah, I think that's his formulation of the fine-tuning argument. And yet it happens anyway.
¶205[snorts] So the intention is explained [clears throat] by an intentional agent who brings about the material world, but the meta conditions making it really difficult to bring about material world means that the creator of all things doesn't actually want that material world. Question from the man with the gray beard and the longest conceivable arm. That's you, yeah. That's him. Right, the back is two is a few gray beard.
¶206See that one there, too. Two up. One with the gray beard. Uh two two to your right. Yeah, that's the one.
¶207Him. He's got a massive arm. You can't miss him. I don't I don't have so much about the beard, but you know You don't have a You don't have a beard? The evening's quite young.
¶208Uh the light the light is there. Sorry. I'm filling in the blanks. >> When this session started all those units of time ago, >> [laughter] >> I thought Alex O'Connor was going to give us arguments against the existence of God. And it seems to me that what he has said is a loving God could not allow human suffering.
¶209A loving God could not allow animal suffering. I'm sorry, animal suffering or human suffering is not evidence for the existence of God one way or another. What you do start with a proposition, is it more likely that God exists or not? And speaking for myself and for the reasons which Dr. Craig advanced, I think the balance of the argument God exists.
¶210And if we then try and say, "Why does he do this? Why does he do that?" I don't know. I'm not God, and neither does Alex O'Connor. Alex. Was [applause] Was that a question?
¶211>> [laughter] >> Joining in the debate at this point. >> Well, if I might just make a comment on that. Go on. The questioner I think is actually making a very good point. It's been said that one man's modus tollens is another man's modus ponens.
¶212>> That's right. Uh that is to say, theist can agree that if God exists, then gratuitous, that is unnecessary, purposeless suffering does not exist. If God does not exist, uh or rather if God exists, I'm sorry, if God exists, then gratuitous suffering does not exist. But then the theist can say, "We have very good arguments and evidence that God exists. And therefore follows that gratuitous suffering does not exist.
¶213That's the logical consequence. And so Dan Howard Snyder in his anthology on the problem of evil says, "The problem of evil is really only a problem for theists who have lousy grounds for theism. But if you've got good grounds for theism, the problem of evil isn't a problem." As the questioner said, "We don't know why God permits We spent most >> uh the suffering in the world, but that's irrelevant to the fact that if we have good grounds for believing God exists, then that gives good grounds for thinking that the suffering in the world really isn't gratuitous, but serves some greater good. We spent most of our time this evening discussing one premise of the Kalam cosmological argument, which I I don't think is sound. Um I think that there are lots of very good arguments for the existence of God.
¶214It's why I'm an agnostic. I think there are good reasons to believe in God. I think there are good reasons to doubt those reasons. I think there are as good reason to doubt that we can even fully understand what we mean when we use a word like God. It would depend on what you mean.
¶215We've been talking about the Kalam. I found it unsound. That's all. I gave you one reason to suspect that the God that William Lane Craig is suggesting, which is an all-loving God, which by the way many arguments for the existence of God conclude that God must be loving. And so, in the case of those arguments, the problem of evil does actually provide a good reason not to believe in that God.
¶216Of course, we haven't had time to get into that. And when it comes to talking about even this one argument, which I don't even think is the strongest argument, by the way, I just think it's probably the most popular. I feel as though I I I It It's up to you to decide if you think that I've even had the time to explain my case properly, but of course we didn't. It was 10 minutes long. We didn't even begin to talk about the concept of animal suffering.
¶217And I think that if you if you want to just sort of dismiss that as well, I know God exists, so God must have some kind of reason, then fine, but that's not the conversation we're having over here. No, the conversation we're having here He's coming back. Suffering with animals exist. It's suffering through a being Can we get a Can we get a microphone on for the recording? Can you just state his reply back?
¶218Can you give your reply brief? And then Alex with the reply. I'll jump over here for a might be our final question if this is The point that you've been making is that animal suffering and human suffering is evidence against the existence of a creator God. What I am saying is it's neither evidence for or evidence against. A creator God is decided on other criteria completely.
¶219So, would you say that the existence the existence of suffering is more or less expected on the hypothesis of theism or atheism? Or do you think they're genuinely equal? Accepted by whom? What do you mean accepted by you? It is irrelevant.
¶220Accepted by you? >> That's like saying I believe in Father Christmas because he's a nice man and he brings my kids presents, but I don't believe in God because he allows suffering in animals. I mean, that just doesn't make sense. The two arguments are completely different. >> Tell me what you think you would expect to find if there were a God who were invigilating?
¶221I I am not God, and neither are you. You're going about it the wrong way. The first thing you've got to say to yourself, what is the evidence for a creator God? And as you've been fairly conceded just now, there are arguments for and against. But the idea that suffering in animals All right.
¶222Doesn't it We're going to move to a question over here. You get three replies. Alex, a brief reply. >> If your If your vision of God If your vision of God >> We're not No, we're not doing this. We're not doing this.
¶223If your vision of God If your vision of God is some kind of impersonal entity which creates the universe at some first moment in time due to the impossibility of an actual infinite regress, and then just doesn't give a squat about suffering. If that's the God that you believe in, then then fine. But that's not the God that most people are worshipping in church. That's not the God who supposedly resurrects Jesus from the dead for the purpose, by the way, of human salvation. Meaning that actually, at least in the case of human beings, their mental states do actually matter quite a bit.
¶224Which I mean Which means that if there is some unexpected aspect of that mental existence that needs to be explained and is less expected on the hypothesis of theism. Of course, Christian theism. Of course, Christian theism. Then it is on naturalism. Which is not to say We're going to take We're going to take this question over here from the gentleman in the back.
¶225>> Which is not to say that naturalism is true. >> can state your question briefly, that would be greatly appreciated. Thank you. You don't You don't You don't get to respond >> microphone away from that gentleman. >> to shout It'll be a bloody riot.
¶226Jesus. You don't get to respond You don't get to respond by shouting out, and then when I respond to you, point over there for the next question. That's not how this works. That's not how this works. >> [applause] >> If If you want to keep shout If you want to keep shouting responses, >> [applause] >> that's fine.
¶227If you want to keep shouting responses, that is absolutely fine. I'm going to do the same thing. Are we done now? You've got another one, Shauzia. Your question, please.
¶228Thank you. >> [laughter] >> Yes, sir. You You said your belief is formed partly on personal experience and partly on these arguments you make. And I I can't understand how it would be fair that a loving God would allow some of us to be here in London in this year hearing these arguments and and some people would have been very isolated hundreds of years ago and not not get this chance to I know people who whose belief is formed largely on these kind of these kind of arguments. So, I can't see a world in which a loving fair God allows people hundreds of years ago to to not hear this side this side and they have to rely purely on personal experience.
¶229I need some help with this. >> Yeah, so is it fair so got only now we're hearing about your great philosophical work and the arguments for existence of God. People 200 years ago didn't get that privilege. How can we expect them to believe? Is it fair that they had to do so only on faith?
¶230Well, I made that point myself, didn't I? That the vast majority of Christians down through history have not believed in God on the basis of philosophical arguments or historical evidence for the Gospels which wasn't even accessible for most of them. But rather they had an interior way of knowing God through the witness of God's own Holy Spirit to their hearts. The Bible says that God hasn't left us to our own devices to figure out whether he exists based on our own cleverness and ingenuity. Rather he convicts every person and draws every person to himself uh in repentance and faith and to salvation.
¶231And those who will respond to this drawing of God's Spirit on their hearts with an open mind and an open heart, I think can know that God exists. He can know that truth wholly apart from arguments and evidence. It's too bad that we can't hear without the microphone. I apologize. And just cuz we're we are short.
¶232>> But the point is about the arbitrariness of the suffering. It's not just the existence of suffering. It's not just the the that suffering exists somewhere. If every single person experienced some net level of suffering, then then fine. Maybe there's some sort of universal reason for that.
¶233It's the seeming arbitrariness of it. It's the fact that depending on where you're born, depending on what species you're born as, your life will be vastly different. I think that's the point. Is it it's not about the existence of suffering per se. >> Now, I can relieve you of that worry, Alex, because that's not an argument for atheism.
¶234That's an argument for universalism. And that's a quite different question. This is a question about the accessibility of salvation. And here there's a wide range of views from universalism to narrow particularism and inclusivism along the way. And this is an in-house >> that people will have trains, ways of getting out of it.
¶235I I can't I do have to jump to the next question just because it might it might change someone's entire evening and weekend, but so please, can we have the B? You have the final question. >> to leave, ladies and No one is [laughter and clears throat] holding you captive as far as I know. I don't know I don't know I don't know how they get out apart from through these doors. So, your final question up there, let's uh let's see what it is.
¶236>> for this very spirited discussion. I'm aware that I have the coveted last question spot, and I I'm arguing from or observing this conversation from an intuition informed by theories of relativity. And so, I couldn't help but noticed inconsistencies and distinctions between both of your points of reference in the discussion on the theories of time. And so, Alex, you tend to argue from this God's eye perspective or bird's eye perspective, and [clears throat] that contrast or does that lead to different metaphysical implications than arguing from the human perspective? And could it just be that the core of this issue is whether relation precedes relata?
¶237And if it is down to this point of observation that we have to agree on to shape future conversations. Um yes, I think it makes a massive difference. I sort of also agree with with this um this idea that relation uh precedes for a lot of that. That's a little bit sort of complicated. Um, on the point about God's eye, bird's eye, holy dove's eye, if you like, versus mine, um of course it makes a difference because if there were no God and there were only the present and the only thing which existed was the present moment, then we might be able to say that, you know, in in theory at least, somebody who had lived forever could have perfect knowledge of the past, but they wouldn't have perfect knowledge of the future, which would give us some epistemological difference between these two and maybe even a metaphysical one.
¶238If there were in fact no God's eye perspective, but as long as there is one, as long as that perspective does exist, which of course you have to believe as a theist, then it seems to me that provides a metaphysical reason for thinking that these are at least comparable, at least in the in the case of the impossibility of it being actually infinite. I think it makes a huge huge difference. And so if we were only relegated to our own to our own um sort of human's eye view, that would yeah, that would totally change matters. I don't mean epistemologically, I mean metaphysically. If that were the only view that existed, then that would make a huge difference, yeah.
¶239Thank you all for your wonderful questions. I'm really sorry that we >> if it would be there's a non-relative uh point. This is No non-relative point from which to to measure it all. >> I was I was thinking before we time, the length of distances and time, there'd be no objective point at which to even measure them from. >> thinking I'm going to really miss hosting tonight.
¶240I thought I had a bit of FOMO, as you know, I I I wish I'd, you know, thrown myself in there, but um no, I did really enjoy the discussion. So thank you both so much for a spirited discussion. Um, [music] please join me in thanking everybody, especially Bill and Alex, for being part of the show. Thank you both. What an incredible debate.
¶241If you enjoyed that discussion and would like to see more shows like it, both William Lane Craig and Alex O'Connor have recently been on Unbelievable. Craig talked with Alex Malpass about the Kalam and Alex debated Tren Horn on Jesus' resurrection. To see those shows, go to premierunbelievable.com and do follow us on YouTube for more shows like it.