¶1North America, I'm coming for you. We're doing a small tour, just six shows at some really cool venues. We're going to talk about philosophy. We're going to talk about God, about consciousness. We're going to talk about whatever you want to talk about because there will be an extensive Q&A at every show.
¶2The dates are on screen. The ticket link is in the description. Be there. Yanvest, welcome to the show. Thank you for having me.
¶3So, I get a lot of requests to talk about different religious traditions. And this happened before when people kept asking me talk about Hinduism. And I had to say to them, it's it's not quite as simple as that because firstly, Hinduism is of course an exm. It's not a word that they even would use to describe themselves. But also, it's it's too broad of a concept to sort of to do an episode on.
¶4And I think that the best way of approaching that is to kind of pick a particular tradition and begin to explore it. So, of course, I've had all kinds of requests to talk about Buddhism. And in researching Buddhism and looking at different Buddhist traditions, it won't take long before you come across a chap called Nagaraja who has the quite lofty title sometimes he's called the second Buddha. So who is Nagaraja and why do people call him the second Buddha. >> Mhm.
¶5Yeah. So Nagaraja lived in the first or second century of the common era. Um we don't know exactly when. Um he was an Indian Buddhist monk probably from southern India. Um and that is as much as we know in kind of hard facts about his biography.
¶6Um what we know more about are his works and how influential they were. So he um authored one very central text called the fundamental verses on the middle way um which really founded um a new uh section you might say or school of thinking about the Buddhist teaching and thinking about reality as a whole um that became very popular in India but then became even more popular later as uh Buddhism expanded into the rest of Asia particularly into Tibet and constituted more or less the the dominant or central form of Buddhist philosophy there. So in terms of its it's the place within the the Buddhist intellectual worldviews it has a very very central role and because of this c centrality you know the epithet the the second Buddha came about. H. So what was this new school?
¶7What was it that was so interesting and and revolutionary about his thought? >> Right. Okay. That's a that's an interesting point especially as it differs whether we look at it from the inside or from the outside. Of course, no Buddhist thinker in the history of Buddhist philosophy ever claimed that they would be doing something original.
¶8They would always at least have the view of themselves that that what they were explaining what the Buddha really meant. explaining the explaining accurately the the the thought of the of the founder of the tradition rather than saying okay guys I've got this completely new theory nobody have ever thought of it before um so this is uh so this is at least a self view but of course what happened throughout the history of Buddhist philosophy is that there a lot of thinkers put different emphases on different parts of what the Buddha taught and that resulted in very very different views and uh um uh theories and this is also true of Madyamaka. So um uh Miamaka so this this middleway school of of Nagarajuna um sees itself as explaining in particular a particular set of teachings of the Buddha the the so-called perfection of wisdom texts um which is a fairly large group of texts one very famous of these that some people might have uh heard of is the the famous heart sutra the pranya parameter Sutra. Um, and all of these uh perfection of wisdom texts uh focus on at least one key concept which is the concept of emptiness or shunyata. And um they describe it and explain it in in various ways within these uh uh sutras.
¶9But within these texts, you don't find much in terms of argumentative development for actually arguments for why things are empty, what that precisely means and so on. >> And so it is really that negro's works then and and those of his followers then take on that uh task and say, okay, so we're now going to provide arguments for what the Buddha taught in the perfection of wisdom sutras. And this is this notion of of emptiness is really the key notion that the the madamak has developed that that notion existed before. So this is not in any way in uh a new invention but it was really given center stage in this in this school. >> Yeah.
¶10It's like an emphasis thing in the same way that there are different branches of Christianity who don't exactly claim to be doing anything new, but rather properly interpreting or properly emphasizing the right parts of Jesus's teachings. >> People can do the same thing with with Buddhism too. >> Yeah, that's exactly right. And so that's what you would expect say from a scholastic tradition like the Indian scholastic tradition that they don't claim to be innovators but they claim to be explicators of what is really perhaps only implicitly there in the teaching. Um but that shouldn't let us think that well therefore they all saying the same thing or it is all it is all just the same me message um produced in different ways but it's rather the case that there are many different ideas we find in the original teachings of the Buddha um and depending on where you put the emphasis on and which ones you develop further you can come up with very very different perspectives on the teachings themselves.
¶11>> So this concept of of shinyata emptiness is probably the probably the the sort of central focus of Madyamaka Buddhism would you say? >> Yes, I think this is the certainly the the one concept the Madyamaka is known by and also the concept that that around which much else revolves. Yeah. >> And Miamaka means kind of middle way. This is this is the school you mentioned earlier that roughly speaking you could say Nagarajuna sort of founds or or brings about intentionally or unintentionally.
¶12>> Yeah, that's that's right. So they this that when when we usually talk about Naraja school and its followers, we we refer to it by the term Madyamaka which means means the middle way. [snorts] Again, this is an epithet that every Buddhist tradition claims to be the middle way. uh but it is in in Madama in particular that this is then elevated into the this actually the name for the school itself. >> Okay.
¶13So then a good place to start the middle way between what? >> Well yes that's a that is [snorts] a very good question. So um so the the um the Buddha himself of course uh um described his teachings as as a teaching of the of the middle way and um that could um uh be regarded as it could be spelled out in different ways. So it could be [snorts] the middle way between different forms of practice. So between you know hardcore aestheticism and a life of indulgence for example.
¶14So you have the middle [snorts] way which the the Buddha himself uh taught but also and more pertinently to the to the present discussion it can mean the difference or the middle way between two philosophical extremes. >> Sure. >> And the um two philosophical extremes that the um uh Miamakas distinguish and where they regard themselves as as following the middle path between them. uh on the one hand uh kind of um uh absolutism or foundationalism that assumes the ultimate reality of some entities within our ontology. That would be the one which is sometimes also rather [snorts] confusingly called eternalism but perhaps foundationalism is is is a better term in the present context.
¶15And then you have the other extreme um which you might want to uh label nihilism. And that can have both a a kind of a uh ethical or moral dimension where where the idea is that um uh no um moral values or in particular in the Buddhist context no karmic relation between the actions you do now and the consequences you experience later exists. M >> or it can be be read in a more logical manner where it just where it just assumes complete non-existence of anything whatsoever. And so so the middle way tries to find a position that is somewhat equidistant between the two. >> Mhm.
¶16So this view this ontological nihilism I I think people will be familiar with the concept of not believing in morality not thinking that your behaviors matter but >> ontologically that is ontology the nature of of being of of of reality. >> What does onlogical nihilism look like? I mean you said a second ago something like that that nothing really exists or something like that. >> It seems like a bit of an impossible view to hold. I mean you could you could believe that maybe the external world doesn't exist or maybe you're in a simulation but to say that nothing exists I mean you're having certain experiences you know Renee Deart thinks that he thinks therefore he is maybe he's taken it a step too far and should have said >> I think therefore thinking is happening but but something is there right but but >> is there this view of onlogical nihilism that really does just eliminate everything >> right so uh I the first question is of course to to which extent the The view that there is nothing is immediately self defeating because if I say okay so assume it's true that there is nothing then presumably there is at least a fact that makes it true that there is nothing so there is at least one fact so there is something so onlogical nihilism is false if true and that's about as good a reputation as you can get of any philosophical position so so that seems to be a non-starter.
¶17All right. So, uh so that that can't be what what what is meant by this. Um I think it's it's uh probably more helpful to think of um uh the the whole uh the the road to onlogical nihilism so to speak as being the consequence of accepting two distinct philosophical principles. Right? So the first principle would be to [snorts] say that if you um have say uh um a collection of entities that form a whole then it is only the entities that are real and the whole is not.
¶18Right? So that would be for example describing it as a as a form of marological nilism where you say okay so there's no aggregation. If you've got your Lego bricks and you put them all together to build a Lego car then the only thing that's actually real are the bricks and the car is just some sort of mental superimposition on the bricks. Sure. Right.
¶19Okay. So but this is you you can play it that way but you can also um think of it in a more general way in terms of things dependent depending on other things right and um so if you say for example something depends causally on something else then it's only the causal basis that is real but everything that is uh the effect is actually just a superimposition right so for example if you have a kind of one of epiphenomenalism right where you say okay So uh the uh you have you have some uh um something happening in your brain that causes mental states but the only thing that's really real uh is what is happening in your brain and the stuff that is hovering uh over it is just some sort of weird epiphenomenon. Um okay so you you you have that as a first principle. Okay. So it's the the parts are real but the whole is not right.
¶20And [snorts] the second principle that you need in order to get the ontological nihilism going is the idea that either this part relation or the dependence relation goes all the way down. Right? So there's no there's no nowhere that stops. Right? So to be clear um you know there's a table.
¶21It's so it's always the table whenever I'm doing a podcast there's always a table in front of me. I should pick another example. >> You know there's a there's a lamp. How about the lamp? you know, um, and the lamp is is made up of different parts.
¶22It's made up of the lamp shade. It's made up of the bowl. It's made up of the the wires going through it. And people who've listened to this show should be familiar with the idea that that myological nihilism suggests that the only thing that really exists are kind of the parts. And when we organize them into a different shape like a lampshade and a and a bulb, that's not any new material.
¶23The thing that really exists is the foundational stuff that we've just arranged. And often times the thought stops there. It's like, okay, the parts are real and the hole is not. But but what you're saying here is that the parts themselves are made up of parts. Like the bulb is made up of of a filament and and made up of glass and then the glass is made up of of fundamentally made up of atoms and atoms are made up of subatomic particles.
¶24And at some point, it's usually assumed you get down to what >> a myriologist might call myological symbols, just whatever happens to be the foundational stuff. >> But you could suppose in theory that actually this just keeps on going forever. This is what Lewis called uh gunk, right? That that it's sort of >> infinitely divisible all the way down and and and never ending. >> And this gives you a kind of ontological nihilism because the only thing you have all the way down is sort of part whole relations.
¶25It's a little bit like when people argue about God's existence and say, "Well, this needed a cause and this needed a cause and this needed a cause." And some people assume there must be some first cause and some people say, "Oh, maybe it's just sort of turtles all the way down." And that leaves you with this slightly nihilistic view of like there being nothing at the bottom. >> Yeah. Yeah. That's that's exactly right. So if you look at the at the marological case, the the problems start to arise once you combine marological nihilism.
¶26So the idea that there are no holes with a denial of atomism with the idea that there are no smallest parts, right? Because then what happens? So you start with your lamp and then you say okay well the lamp isn't real but all the different parts if you say you take it to a technician and he takes it aparts into different parts those are real right and then you say well but those parts have parts as well because there are sort of molecules that make up those okay so you take it apart even further and then you realize the atoms that make that up and at every time the level of the hole is thrown away and said okay well that's not really real and then because you continue indefinitely you are never going to reach anything that is real or exists. So in the end the whole thing sort of dissipates into thin air and then you're left with nothing, right? And this is um I mean this this kind of structure doesn't just apply to the to the case of matter and atoms.
¶27It it um applies much more general in in in the Madiama case because they consider various different dependence relations. So the the the part hole dependent relations is one and the cause effect uh dependent relations is another and then would so dependence uh probably most general form of dependence dependence on a conceptualizing mind right so if I say come up with the concept of the average man the average man has 2.4 four children. This is simply a mental amputation. There is no I can't go out on the streets and say okay so where is the you know where where is the average man and his fractional children um this is something which completely depends on um conceptualization conceptualizing enterprise that talks about the ratio between men and children. Yeah.
¶28>> And so if that is the case then you you get this kind of disappearance across the board. So whenever something depends on something if the dependence chain is infinitely downwards and if whenever you you have something dependent on something else the the thing that depends isn't really real but only the dependence basis is then it all dissipates right and that is um why certainly the opponents both the Buddhist and the non-bddhist opponents in ancient India described the madyamaka as a form of nihilism because you say if if they take those things on board. Well, in the end we we're left with nothing, right? So, how can you say this really is the middle way if it seems to be pretty much close to the extreme on the left, right? >> So, Majama sort of did take this this view sort of that that objects are kind of like dependent and that dependence goes all the way down.
¶29Just to be clear, you said that we were talking about the middle way. We talked about nihilism and and what was the opposite extreme of this? Like if we looked at the lamp, what would the sort of opposite view be of the nature of the lamp? >> Well, the opposite extreme would be a kind of foundationalism, right? Where you say there is something about the lamp that is ultimately real where the analysis stops and where I would say the the the onlogical dependent stops, right?
¶30So uh so either if you think that the hole is real or that the parts are real or something in between uh or even that you know the lamp isn't real and the parts aren't real but there is the platonic idea of the lamp in a third realm that is nonmaterial. That is also kind of foundationalism. It's just that the the foundation is somewhere up there in the third realm. Yeah. Now >> we'll get back to the show in just a moment but first where do you get your news?
¶31If you're like me and most people these days it probably comes from the internet. The internet is of course great in many ways. There is just an abundance of information, but sometimes there's a little bit too much information. It can be really difficult to navigate the online media landscape without constantly bumping up against bias and misrepresentation and misinformation. And of course, bias is something that will never go away.
¶32But by using today's sponsor, Ground News, you can help to mitigate that bias and objectively compare the way that different sources are reporting on the same story. Ground News is a news aggregation service which brings together thousands of local and international news outlets all in one place so you can compare reporting across the political spectrum. Try it out at ground.news/ alexoc. Take a look at this story about the Kennedy Center in Washington DC projecting a $23 million deficit following Donald Trump's renaming of the institution after himself. Using ground news, I can see that of all the sources reporting on this story, only 14% of them lean to the right.
¶33This means that if you only typically read from sources which lean to the right, you could easily just miss a story like this altogether. And Ground News even has a dedicated blind spot tab, which specifically seeks out stories that you would otherwise miss based on the news that you normally read. So, cut through media bias and get a better idea of what's really going on in the world by going to ground.news/ news/exoc or by scanning the QR code that's on your screen. Use my link to get 40% off their unlimited access Vantage plan. And with that said, back to the show.
¶34Okay. So, so you've got sort of the view that there's a strong foundation that there's something real and it doesn't need to be the lamp as a whole in the platonic sense. It could be that >> the myological symbols are real or that for some reason, you know, glass is real or or whatever. Um, and this other view that it's gunk that that it just sort of depends all the way down with with no basis, which seems to suggest that there could be no reality at all. >> Mediamaka sort of takes on board this this second view of dependence all the way down and therefore gets accused of this onlogical nihilism, this sort of baselessness.
¶35>> Uh, how do they defend themselves against that charge? >> Yeah, that's a that's a really good point. So because they they both accept the two principles that I've just mentioned namely um marriage nihilism and independence all the way down um and they also say well we are not nihilists. >> Yeah. And what exactly they mean by being not nihilists is um is actually fairly interesting point.
¶36So one case that is uh pretty clear is they say okay so we we we're not moral nihilists. So they for and for the Buddhist that always means they don't deny the uh efficacy of katana. Yeah. So that is that that is very important because another of of the accusations there. Okay.
¶37So if you if you say that you short circuit the entire nation of notion of karma which uh um at least according to some interpretations the entire Buddhist ethics is founded on and then people are going to do whatever they like and then that you have moral chaos. Yeah. Okay. So that is that is a fairly fairly straightforward point. So that doesn't touch karma.
¶38Um but I think what this is probably a good um place to introduce another one of the key uh madam notions apart from the notion of emptiness and that is the distinction between the two truth right again a notion that goes back all the way to the Buddha's own teachings but which is again then interpreted in different ways right so you have um there the idea that you have the truth or the the the way the world appears to unenlightened people like you and me to the ordinary guy on the street and you have the way the world appears to an enlightened mind like a Buddha right >> and then you say okay so it is not the case that this is a kind of illusion reality distinction it's not the case that we only see illusion and Buddha sees reality rather they are both described as both two realities or two truths Right? So it's not one truth and one falsity. They are both truth >> but they operate quite differently depending on who you are and where you are. Right? So as long as I am not an enlightened Buddha, they the I I I I live in this world of conventional reality and therefore the limits and restrictions of that conventional reality apply to me.
¶39For example, there the laws of causation and so on. So if I, you know, if I drop this glass on a hard floor, it's going to shatter. So that is remains true even though the Mariamakas will also say that ultimately there is no causation right because at the level of ultimate reality and given that the the kind of the arguments we just we've just went through um we can argue we we we can we can demonstrate if you regard these arguments as sound that there are there are no causal powers in the world because again you you can run the same thing for causal dependent Right. So um uh the effect isn't real only the cause is and then you know the causal power goes goes down the levels and because there's no there's no bottom level there where the causal power comes from it sort of drains away. >> Yeah.
¶40It's like uh you know the the cup is being held up by the table and the table's being held up by the ground and the ground is being held up by the earth and so on. And >> each of those sort of stages in the chain borrows the causal power from the thing below it. If you take away the floor, the table isn't going to hold up the cup on its own. >> And so if you sort of say that this just goes on forever, this causal chain of of holding things up or like a >> like a chain holding up a chandelier >> Yeah. >> link by link that just goes on infinitely.
¶41>> It kind of seems like you've you've removed the causal power altogether because there's nowhere from which it's all it's all borrowing. >> Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. I mean, but I think borrowing is is a good term here.
¶42Just if you if you imagine it another example if uh um uh you know I I owe you some money and I don't give you cash but I write you a check and then you go to the bank and the check bounces and then I'm saying okay no problem I'll just write you another one right and then uh that continues and if you then think well I mean you try to cash it at the bank and the bank gives you another checked by another bank and so you go on and on and on and on and there is never at any point anywhere you get any real value right so it's the same there with causation uh you get something that looks like it but if you actually think okay so what's the what's the first cause of that it all drains away yeah but that doesn't mean that if I now drop the glass it's not going to shatter >> yeah so so how do we make sense of that right because in other contexts somebody will say exactly what you've just said >> as a means to show why there must be some kind of causal principle why foundationalism must be true because >> if if this series of caus like the the cup on the table, if that if that series of causation of the the table holding up the the floor doesn't have any causal power of its own just keeps borrowing it, borrowing it, borrowing it, then if that borrowing goes on forever, >> there is no causal power. And if there's no cause, there should be no effect. And yet the t the cup is on the table. So in other context people say what we're showing here is that there must be some kind of foundational cause some kind of foundational um thing upon which everything else depends right it's a popular argument for God's existence >> but that's not what we're going for here is it >> no okay no and that is that is a that that I think brings us right right to to to the core of a where um much of the the the blade in Madamaka uh connect with much of the debate in in contemporary philosophy particularly in regarding question of grounding and uh and and dependence relations and so on. And um there the um uh one question that arises is first of all do we uh do we have an argument to show that there is something inherently problematic with non-foundational structures right [snorts] and so by non-foundational structure I mean a structure where there's no bottom level on which everything depends right now we've so far we've looked um uh basically the idea where it's where [snorts] it's turns all the way down, right?
¶43So it's it goes all the way down. But this is not the the only model that has been used in order to interpret Madyamaka. Another possibility is also that it turns all the way round. So sometimes that is described as onlogical coherentism. Yeah.
¶44[clears throat] So what that means is that you don't have A depends on B depends on C depends on D infinitely down but you rather have it set up in kind some kind of circle. So A depends on B depends on C depends on D depends on A. Yeah. Right. And the uh the idea is that if the circles get large enough it actually looks like a straight line because you don't see the end of it.
¶45So it's um uh it's it's you know if if you just imagine a really really large uh circle in space if you're standing on it might look to you as if it's just a straight line continuing because you don't see the curve. Yeah. So to that extent you can say well it might be the case that we are actually not living in a in a kind of turtles all the way down world but in turns all the way round world even though we rarely see the circles link up. >> Yeah. >> Yeah.
¶46We might have been confused before we knew the earth was a globe to sort of walk in a straight line and end up sort of getting back to where we started. >> Yeah. So it looks flat to us even though it is spherical. Right. >> And causation could potentially work the same way.
¶47>> Yes. And and all the dependence relations could be these kind of structures. They just look flat by which I mean straight to us uh even though they are not. Yeah. Okay.
¶48And so um now people have been have been exploring um the sort of formal aspects of of both this non-foundationalism in terms of turns all the way down and also of ontological coherentism in quite a bit more detailed over the last decades or so. And one of the interesting things that have have come out of it is the understanding that there is nothing logically wrong with any of these ideas. Right? So originally you you might have thought okay well this idea that is dependence all the way down or all the way around. At some point in time you hit a contradiction and that shows you that these kind of structures cannot be uh exemplified in reality if you assume that there are no contradictions exemplified in reality.
¶49We just make that assumption for the for the time being here. right? Otherwise things get get even more complicated. >> Um so it's but but now it actually it it seems quite clear as I know as far at least as far as things get clear in these these parts of philosophy that the the the you can have different consist internally consistent models of foundational structures. So you can either have the the common or garden variety where it stops somewhere and you've got your real stuff and then everything goes upwards from that or you can have it, you know, dependence all the way down or you can have dependence all the way around.
¶50Yeah. >> Um now that of course doesn't yet tell you which one of these is correct if any of them is. Right. But it tells you that the all of these are live options or live issues. Right.
¶51Well, that's well that's what I think that's where the pressure point's going to exist for some people because >> usually this debate is is settled by ruling out the possibility of certain options. And like a tomist for example, a a sort of classical theologian would just say that like if you have any understanding of what a cause and and and an effect is, then as long as you posit this infinite chain of causation, especially one that doesn't go back in time, but one that goes sort of, as you say, it's a dependence relation or what what a termist might call essentially ordered series >> that this just can't go on forever or into a loop because >> there would be nowhere where from the causal power which we observe to to originate, right? Like it's it >> we might look for a contradiction and struggle to find one. But of course, you can understand the >> the strong intuition that we have at the very least. I mean, it seems like there might be a way of of positing this as a contradiction if you say that there exists some effect.
¶52Effects only exist in so far as there are causes for those effects. Um, and you could define them in in various ways to say that if it doesn't have any causal power of its own, there's no cause yada yada. >> But like, is this just something that Miamaka just denies? Like how how can you defend, in other words, the plausibility of an infinite or looping causal chain when >> to most people's intuitions that seems really strange. Like if there was if there was a candle if there was a fire burning.
¶53>> Yeah. >> And somebody says, "Why is that fire burning?" And I say, "Well, because it was lit by a different fire." And someone says, "Why was that on fire?" and say, "Well, it was it was lit by the original fire." >> Mhm. >> It would just seem as though firstly I hadn't explained anything, and secondly, like I was probably missing something. >> Mhm. Right.
¶54Good. Yeah. I think that there two different uh things to look at here. One one is the the sort of more historical dimension of the question, and one is the more systematic one. So, on the historical side, the the Indians as a whole didn't have great problems with sequences going all the way back.
¶55Yeah. So this this idea that okay well it needs to be starting somewhere and you need a first cause to get the whole thing going and so on. So that was never regarded as a particular problematic issue. Um I mean this this is a good question why that is the case. I mean it's I mean one one of the uh potential explanation is a different understanding of time where within classical Indian text you get a kind of a cyclical understanding where it is not that you have as you have in Christianity a first beginning you know the book of Genesis it it starts with uh um uh let there be light and then of course the question what happened before before God created the world is of course also not not so easy to answer.
¶56>> But um so if we assume that there is some kind of starting point um then of course we need to solve that um um uh philosophically. But if you assume that there is this kind of um theories of world ages or kulpas which start out somewhere and then they develop and then they decline and then at the end of each each age then that leads to the beginning of a new age, right? Right. And then you've got the next world age and the whole thing happens again and this goes back indefinitely. Yeah.
¶57So to that extent you you can say okay well there is um uh it's uh going back all the way and um so this is uh I mean you find a manifestation of of the the kind of the refusal to really engage with that question um when you sometimes find the discussion within Buddhism. Okay. So where where did actually the cycle of of of reincarnation and rebirth which is the central >> the central problem within in Buddhist sociology how did that actually start right and then what what you would usually find a Buddhist teacher will say well this is beginningless ignorance anadia vidya right so ignorance about you know the way reality really works is a kind of a core problem but then the question is okay where does the ignorance comes from and they say you know it's beginningless whereas has always been there and like like samsara so to that extent you don't find it so surprising that within Indian uh scholastic text you don't find much engagement with this question that is very very central to western metaphysics right okay so that's the that's the kind of historical question yeah but then the question is of course um uh is that simply a historical artifact or is there simply nothing the madameas can say right >> um but I think here you you need to um ask yourself okay so on the one hand if you So you you you look down these um chains of infinitely backwards dependence and you get this kind of metaphysical vertigo and you think you know where the west is all going to go and it sort of looks kind of >> shifty but then uh also take into account there are other cases where it it looks comparable but you don't get that shiftiness say take the negative numbers right the number minus one the predecessor is the number minus2 I mean these are all as real as the numbers get, but there's no smallest negative number, right? So they they go all the way back the number line. Yeah.
¶58Um so we don't really have a problem here. Um and and why is that? Well, presumably because we don't think that each number sort of borrows its existence from the predecessor, right? But then the question is okay why do we actually think of existence or causation in that way either right? So why do we actually think that causation works on this kind of borrowing model where the the effect only has its own causal power because it's borrowed that from the from its own cause and that borrowed it from something else.
¶59And there has to be some sort of metaphysical central bank that holds the gold because otherwise all the the checks are going to collapse, right? But w within Madiama, you you don't have that causation that that notion of causation as this kind of substantially real relation at all. Yeah. And I mean, if you want to I can explain a little bit why that is the case. We I think it's it seems like the issue here is one of dependence in that like >> it's easy enough to say that the number line stretches on infinitely but I don't think there's a meaningful sense in which like the number minus one depends upon the existence of of minus2 except maybe conceptually like you might want to say that conceptually you need to have a minus2 to make sense of what minus one means.
¶60I mean, >> but in that sense, you've kind of turned these numbers into concepts rather than like real things in the world, right? And I feel as though >> when you have a a an existential dependence, that is something depends for its existence not not as a concept but like ontologically, right? >> Um like I've heard you talk about this before like say the the existence of of Northern England, right? Clearly the existence of Northern England depends conceptually on the existence of southern England. Wouldn't make sense to call it that otherwise.
¶61>> But the thing I'm I'm picking out with the phrase Northern England which is like a particular land mass that that actual existing mass obviously doesn't depend on the continued existence of southern England which could disappear and the north would still exist. Mhm. >> And I I I suppose I want to say that in the former case conceptually, yeah, that can that can just be an infinity of of of sort of groundless, whatever, that's fine. But when you have an existential relation >> where the existence of a particular land mass really does depend on, say, the the rocks that that land mass is made of, and the rocks really do depend on their sort of being gravitationally held together. that it does seem to me that that sort of see that that seems to me like borrowing that seems to me like borrowing its ontology, borrowing its existence.
¶62You know what I mean? >> Um, so I I would and I'm I'm saying that as if as if you don't know that. I'm sure you know that. But for the sake of our audience, um, and for the sake of myself, that's why I would like to ask maybe how the a Jamaica would would respond to this because I I suppose the the the the sort of functional takeaway from this because people might be listening to this like, oh, this is cool, interesting Buddhism. What can I do with this?
¶63Like >> all the time we're having debates on this channel about the existence of God. And so often they collapse into some kind of argument for the non-existence of an infinite regress of dependency of causal chains of time of whatever it may be. >> And this is like an interesting escape route for many people. It seems that you're offering a a sort of no, you don't need this. And I suppose I really want to pin down >> how that works.
¶64>> Right. Yeah. Good. there's a whole whole other uh chapter to talk about and and these are uh you know Buddhist arguments against the notion of a creator god. So that's that's because they they the Buddhists of course they engaged with theists quite a bit within uh >> uh classical India and so they also had had to had something to say on that question when when theist came along and said no no no this was all created by the great creator.
¶65Um but put that to the side for for the time being because I think what is important to to get clear about is how the Miamakas think about causation. Right? So um the the sort of intuitive idea presumably would be that causation is a force out there mind independent force that ticks along in the world and does stuff independent of our thinking about it wanting it to go a specific way right so if we you know if I set in motion a certain >> causal process say I I I light one part of the dry field the whole thing starts to blaze up and uh there's nothing I can do about it even if I said okay I wish I've never started this right okay so it goes goes like that >> um but in the in the the Buddhist conception well particularly the madiamica conception of causation um uh is actually quite distinct from that and one reason it is distinct from that is uh connected with their specific understanding of time. Yeah. And the the understanding of time that uh uh Madyamaka takes on board and they actually take that on board from from an earlier Buddhist school called Satrantica is a form of presentism, right?
¶66So it's the idea that only the present moment exists. The past isn't real and the future isn't real, but just the the the present moment. >> Yeah. what might be known in uh sort of modern academia as as the a theory of time. >> Um >> that only the present exists.
¶67>> Well, with I mean with the with the a theory of time, you have the specific contrast well between the A theory and the B theory about whether you've got anything that moves there. Yeah. Right. So in the B theory the the idea is okay you just have all these different temporal relations before after um uh um uh sorry you have the different relations in in terms of temporal distance you know one one day before one day after and so on and they they never change whereas if you talk in terms of present past and future what is present now was future yesterday and will be past tomorrow and so it seems to change its temporal attributes right and so this is what is happening in the a theory whereas in the B theory nothing nothing nothing moves. Yeah.
¶68Um but what I mean what what the the the essential bit here about the the the conception of time I've just mentioned is the the um ontological idea that it is only the present that exists. Right? So uh the for for the opposite picture imagine a kind of block universe. right? Where sort of the present is sort of in the middle and then there is at the left side of the block is everything that happened in the past in the future somehow frozen is what is going to happen in the future and we sort of move through that block.
¶69>> Yeah. But you would say well even though I can only influence the present uh the the past and the future they are still they still have onlogical status they still exist. Yeah. Okay. So the the sranticas and then also the the madamikas who follow that deny that they say there only the present moment is real.
¶70Right. And now you get into an interesting problem when you're talking about causation because causation uh is a relation that connects two points in time, right? Um and I mean there's a whole debate again about whether you can have simultaneous causation, whether cause and effect happen at the same time. But let's put that to one side at the moment. I think it's much more plausible to think of the cause happening first and the effect happening later.
¶71you know, I start smoking at a petrol station, then a second later there is a big explosion. Uh, so first there is me lighting the match. Later there is the big boom, right? So in in a closed sequence. Yeah.
¶72Okay. So, however, um, if you believe that only the present moment is real, how can you actually make sense of causation? because it seems you're always missing one part of the two latta that are related, right? So, you're either um if you if you locate yourself at the time when I light the match, then the explosion doesn't exist because that's future. Or if you say, "Okay, so now the petrol station blows up." Well, now the time when I lit the match doesn't exist anymore because that's past.
¶73Yeah. >> So, okay. So how can I still I presumably still want to say it is my stupid smoking that blew up the petrol station. So okay so how how can I say that? Well and the Mariamaka says okay so you only ever have one real relatum here because only the present is real and the other one is supplied either by memory or by anticipation.
¶74Yeah. So if I am uh uh at the petrol station lighting the match I should anticipate in my mind what is going to happen next. maybe the big explosion and at the time of the explosion I can probably remember the stupid thing I just did namely light a match right so that's how I can talk about causation yeah but now what that means is that we [snorts] can only talk about uh causation at the cause of relation because there is some essential mindmade ingredient in here right so you you can't have the relation without anticipation or memory And so you can't have the idea of causation ticking along at the background of [snorts] a world as it is anyway independent of mind's handiwork. >> Now I feel like I've heard this before. >> Well, you might have done from me.
¶75No, but I mean I feel I feel I feel like I've heard this kind of thinking before, but in a different context, which is and I I I know >> you you've talked about this at least a bit as a as a sort of point of historical interest, but >> if someone just tuned in, they might think that you were talking about a certain Emanuel Kant like it seems as though a lot of the concepts which uh are useful for Miamaka philosophy that is the nature of causation, the nature of time, the fact that they're not real features of the world, but rather something we kind of impose onto this sort of external world that kind of is is really there, but we don't have great access to. It sort of begins to sound a little bit like the cantion conception of there being this numina out there and that causation and time are are things that we map on to that instead. And so I don't know is this a sort of preempting of the philosophy of Kant or are there >> important distinctions just cuz that's where people's minds might might go and if there are important differences >> I want to make them sort of clear. >> Sure. Sure.
¶76So I I think two two two things that that might come to mind here. Uh you're right. I mean one one is K the second is of course right and and his his theory of of causation. Um so stick let's let's stick with the case of K for the time being because this is quite interesting [snorts] to the extent that um in the um early engagement of western thinkers with Madiama so in the from the 1920s 1930s onwards um Kant and Kantianism was of often used as a kind of uh explicatory paradigm in order to explain what the Madiamas are up to, right? And so um so this is this is historically quite important because it it it it provides a kind of a lens through which early interpreters try to understand that.
¶77And of course it's it's clear why they want to do that. Their readers would probably know a bit about Kant. They wouldn't know anything about Nagarajuna if you tell them Nagarajuna is a little bit like K in these respects at least the general idea. Yeah. Okay.
¶78And I mean you are perfectly right and they were perfectly right that they are interesting parallels. Um for example the idea that space and time are not features of the world out there but to certain extent mindm made projections onto it. Yeah. And the other important distinction that they drew between or the comparison they drew between between Madyamaka and Kant is the distinction between the two truths that I've mentioned early on where they said okay so the we've got the the conventional truth though that looks a little bit like the Kantian phenomena. So the stuff that appears to us and then there is the ultimate truth and that's the numina and that is sort of we can't really know anything about that unless we are enlightened Buddhas and then presumably you can see what the ultimate truth is like not from our perspective >> Ken makes this distinction between the the phenomena which is how things sort of appear to you like if you look at an object like the table there it is again um what I'm really experiencing is not the table but rather my perception of the table.
¶79It's how the table appears to me in sight, in sound, if I tap it, how it might feel. And I can never actually just directly access the table, I suppose, without being the table, you know, otherwise it's through perception. So what I experience is the so-called phenomena, but the thing in itself, the thing that's really there that I don't have any access to except through my sort of window of perception is what K calls the numina. >> Just to clarify that. >> Yeah.
¶80So and and of course there has been since the days of Kant there has been an endless debate about what the numinina actually are to from from the view is there you know is there actually one numinant for every phenomenon so is there sort of a numinal glass behind there or is it some kind of sort of morphous thing behind it or should we think about it in a completely different way of course that I mean that'll take us take us down the the route of of of Kant exogesis but it's probably worthwhile just to to have a some some brief ideas about where the discontinuities are between the Kantian picture and the gardener. So to see that they are they're not singing from the same sheet for the the the whole way. I think it is it is uh useful for to illustrate some contexts. >> Uh but the the the main diff difference um lies with um the Madiama theory of the emptiness of emptiness. So, so the as I said before, so so emptiness is a really sort of key concept for for mediamaka and it is just before we talk about the emptiness of emptiness.
¶81I feel like we haven't actually really explained what emptiness like is. We've kind of talked about the mediama is the middle way between these these two so-called extremes of there being some kind of foundational ontology, let's say, some some substance upon which everything else depends. some if you keep dividing like the cup in half you'll get to some foundational stuff and this other view that it just goes on forever but yamaka is the middle way and it proposes this view called >> emptiness okay >> emptiness of what empty like what are the things that that are empty and what is it that they're empty of and how does this help solve our problem >> right very good okay so I think this is a very important point because when when you you hear these uh the these statements in in in in the Madiama literature everything is empty and also of course You'll also find it in the earlier perfection of wisdom text. Of course, the question is, you know, empty empty of what? So the the notion it's it's not that it's, you know, it's like the glass is empty of water.
¶82So it's of course emptiness in a in a in a a metaphysical sense. >> And what it is empty of is the technical term that the the the Indians use is saba. >> Yes. >> Um which um if you if you take the the the term apart, it consists of two parts. Swah meaning something like its own and bara existence or being.
¶83So the whole thing is somewhat unhelpfully then translated as own being but doesn't really tell you what it is either. So I think a much better translation that has now been adopted is intrinsic nature. >> And the idea is that something has intrinsic nature if it doesn't borrow its existence uh sorry if if it doesn't bear existence in itself. Yeah. So um so so one way of thinking about this is if something is consists of parts then it cannot exist by sabava because what it is is actually not itself but it's something that is derived from the parts right so if I've got the lamp again the lamp itself can't do anything independent of the parts that make it up right so what is really doing the lighting are the are the parts not the lamp.
¶84Yeah. And uh so that is that is one one case where you say okay so there the the lamp itself is no baba. Um uh another uh um uh dimension of the same thing is that if you um can take something conceptually apart, right? So even if you say have an an in phys physically indivisible atom, it presumably has still specific qualities or properties that you can mentally distinguish. And so you can sort of mentally take it apart apart from even though you can't take it physically apart.
¶85That also is something which stops it from having intrinsic nature because its nature depends on all these different properties. Okay. So when the Miamaka says things are empty, they mean that they mean things are empty of their intrinsic nature and they mean that entities depend on other entities for their existence. They borrow it from other things. Yeah.
¶86So that is that is the um the key notion here. We can see immediately how that connects with the notion of foundationalism and nonfoundation that we talked about earlier on right because if you think okay so the table has no sabba because it consists of parts and then you say okay well what about the parts they surely have sabava right and there were earlier Buddhists who thought that okay so if you break it down to the final bits then those things actually have this intrinsic nature >> like the myological simples they they would Yeah, like the marology simples they identified that with particularized properties or what is sometimes called called tropes. So occurrences of properties at specific uh uh spatial temporal instance, right? I think these are really real. Um and so the table is just sort of made up of these things like an image on the screen is made up of pixels, right?
¶87The pixels are real and they're sort of difficult to make out because they move really fast and they're really small but they are really there and what we see is the table which is unreal but the pixels are real right and so the the the Mariamas of course objected and say no no no the pixels aren't real either right because they can again be either taken apart conceptually or marologically >> but by real you mean they don't have you mean they don't have intrinsic >> they don't have intrinsic they're real in the sense that you know The table is there. I can I can touch it and interact with it, but it doesn't have >> its own intrinsic nature. >> Very good. So, so when when we say real, we we in this context, we'll have to distinguish between conventionally real and ultimately real, right? None of these things are ultimately real, right?
¶88They are conventionally real in so far as, you know, there is a glass here and if I tap against it, it makes a sound. So, that is all that that is all happening. But if I analyze that in terms of where it all comes from in terms of what it's based on, I end up with nothing. And that is the that is the the fundamental notion of emptiness that we we find here. >> So so why not the these these foundational mological simples or whatever?
¶89Why not like you know somebody might say well whatever this suppose you're like some kind of atomist and you just you just posit that there there does exist some kind of unbreakable foundational unit of stuff and it's maybe it's an excitation of the quantum wave field at a particular point in spaceime or maybe it's a particular >> string that vibrates in a particular way and that's what gives it its essence. Can't we just say that that is a thing? It exists and that is the foundational intrinsic nature of reality. Why does emptiness go all the way down? Why why would why would those things themselves be empty?
¶90>> Yeah. So you'll have to um of course you have to look at the specific cases there and say okay so um um if you have you know your your your infinite sequence of decomposition then it's it's clear that you know none of these things can have intrinsic nature because they go all the way down. Um uh if you have some more sophisticated notions within modern physics, uh the the marological thing might not be so much of a problem because you think okay well what it really is is not reality is um um uh not made up of you know little sort of little billboards that are really small but say of a probability distribution >> of uh a particular for being at that place or that place, right? And then of course the what you think about that then depends on the details of well what you actually think a probability distribution is, right? So are probabilities things that are out there in the things objective probabilities or do you actually think that they are states of information or or or states of mind?
¶91And once you if if you go for the letter then of course you immediately bring the mind in and then of course you you you you get that dependence of the the stuff that you is fundamentally you think is fundamentally real on your conceptualization and so on. you can see where this is all going, right? >> But um I think perhaps we should sort of backtrack to because we we we were talking earlier about content causation, right? So we should probably come back to that. >> Um >> and um uh uh the the Okay, so I think we have now a fairly clear idea of what emptiness means.
¶92And now we'll get back to the notion of emptiness of emptiness. Yeah. And so this is this is um uh um where the the Miamakas really extend the notion of emptiness to the entire the the the entire intellectual system and also argue that emptiness itself is empty. Now what does that mean? Well, um, as we've discussed earlier on, they reject the existence of ultimately real things, right?
¶93The foundations of reality. Yeah. But the the arguments that they use for that will can also be easily turned into arguments for rejecting ultimately true theories, right? Because we'll get problems with those as well. Now if you think that there are no ultimately true theories then you also can't say that the theory of emptiness is an ultimately true theory and that's that's that is clear.
¶94Now that is that is certainly um um what is um what is the case in in Madiamaka and Negajuna is extremely explicit about that in saying that those who turn uh the theory of emptiness into a metaphysical view so a view that they think is ultimately real they are really beyond hope right so that's that that is a a level of uh a level of confusion that is that that is particularly problematic. Um and there you see the the an important difference say between uh the cananian picture and the madamea picture because for the the canion the distinction between the numinan and the and the phenomenon is the is the ultimate the ultimately true philosophical theory. Right? So this is if you if you think about things rightly and you follow all the arguments >> uh of content you think they are all sound then you'll end up with that view but that's that's it and then you then you've reached the truth right and uh you've you've sort of seen the ultimate structure of the world even though you can't really peak into the numan at least you know it's there. Yeah.
¶95Yeah. Okay. But the in Madiama this is not the case right. So the uh the idea is not that you'll you work through all the arguments and then you'll end up with an ultimately true theory, right? It's rather the case that this entire uh artifice [laughter] of Madiamaka is as conventionally real as other conventionally real theories, right?
¶96But it's not anything that is ultimately real or ultimately true. Yeah. And so I think this is this is an important point to get where where they add discontinuities between the Gantian picture and and the Madiama picture. >> So the theory of emptiness and the school of Majamaka Buddhism is not true. >> It's not ultimately true.
¶97[laughter] Right? So so okay. So let let me perhaps explain a little bit more what what what is what is meant by all of this. So um so we probably shouldn't and shouldn't um forget that Buddhism and and Buddhist philosophy is not just an in intellectual enterprise but a kind of sociological project right so it is supposed to it is something that is supposed to help you escape from existential suffering right the cycle of existential suffering of samsara of rebirth and so on And so the so so that is the that is the the the the the ultimate aim and that is the the Buddha himself was quite explicit when he said that all that I teach is suffering and and the end to suffering and that's it right so now whether a specific theory um is is is to be regarded as as true or not the the focus that the Buddhists put on it is to which extent does it facilitate this sociological goal? To which extent does it help you to escape the cycle of samsara?
¶98Right? And there they actually they within sort of Buddhist classification of different philosophical views they argue that that different views are more or less likely to help you succeed in that. Right? Um so um uh if you um look at sort of uh these classifications of different philosophical positions that you find in Madamaka text of course Madamea always comes out at top right so that's the that's the that's the the most sophisticated view you can have but then below that there are also various other theories like for example yoga idealism and abidama the views of the abidama and so on that are also sort of steps in the right direction, right? And so to that extent, none of these theories are ultimately true, including Madamea, right?
¶99But they provide better and better means for escape from uh existential suffering, right? And I think here it's important to be to be aware of kind of difference within the the Madyamaka project and a project that you often find in in in philosophical discussion. And that is the the question to whether the aim of philosophy is arriving at an ultimately true theory or whether you regard philosophy or philosophical practice as a kind of medicine or therapy for the diseases of the mind. Right? And this is not a particularly Buddhist idea.
¶100You'll also find that within western philosophy, you know, I find it in, you know, peronian skepticism. uh you also find it in the later vitkinstein you know showing the the fly the way out of the fly bottle and so on so you've got various parallels of that and if you if you have that percept that conception uh uh then of course you you you wouldn't say okay so which of which of these therapies is actually ultimately true right I mean that's not the point the point is which of these work >> right but then but then okay so you know I I have various ailments in my life I've had some chest pain recently and okay I'm looking at the cup. >> Yeah. >> And I think the cup is made out of glass. And I kind of think that the glass is made out of atoms of some sort.
¶101Maybe actually uh there are no fundamental atoms. Maybe it's gunk. Maybe it goes all the way down. There's infinite divisibility and nothing has barber. >> Um >> chest pain is still there, you know, like how how does this sort of revelation about the table or the chair or whatever help me?
¶102I mean, if if we can't say it's true, We can at least say it's helpful. But how is how is that supposed to help me escape samsara? >> Yeah, good good point. So um so what we are um um what we are talking about here is of course the the kind of the social sociological dimension of all of this. Yeah.
¶103And the um uh one one notion that we haven't talked about at all is the notion of selflessness or an atman or anata in Buddhism, right? Yes. And I I'm sure your >> viewers are probably familiar with some of that. So it's probably not necessary to go into that much detail. >> But by selflessness, you don't mean kindness there.
¶104>> No, no. By by selflessness I mean that there is no soul pellet right so there's no core to the mind or the personality that makes me me but it is just a causal connection of physical and uh psychological parts right and of course that that fits in very nicely with the marological realism marological nism that we've talked about earlier on because the of course person is made up of bits so there's my body that is made up all that all that material And there's my mind with all the ideas and memories and thoughts and so on and they all somehow hang together. >> But there's no hole. >> The parts are real. If even >> if anything is real, the parts are real.
¶105Of course, the madamakas don't think the parts are real. But let's let's ignore that for the time being. But there's certainly no >> atman, no self, no soul pellet, no core to my personality that makes me me. Yeah. Okay.
¶106So, we've we've got there. And that insight is regarded by the Buddhists as ex is absolutely essential for escaping existential suffering. Right? I mean because where does existential suffering come from? It comes from the misapprehension of this fact that there is no sub no substantial self or personality core.
¶107Um that we still try to hang on to it as if there was one. And this ability or this this this this mistaken tendency to hang on to something there isn't is cause is is fundamentally what causes the suffering. Right? Okay. So so now you can see how the notion of anata or selflessness which you on the one hand you think okay well this is just a theory within um uh philosophy of personal identity but now you can see how that has a kind of sociological dimension right?
¶108So if you see the world in this way, you might might suffer less because you think well there isn't actually anybody who suffers. Right? You get that idea, right? Okay. So now we when we're turning to all of this all of this uh metaphysical material then the Miamakus thought okay so with philosophical theories the the problem is not that you grasp at a substantial self that isn't there which is a fairly sort of crude form of grasping or first or tanha which is the the fundamental uh one of the fundamental forces that keeps you in samsara.
¶109But you can also grasp at theories and use them in a somewhat subtle way of as a way of propping up the illusion of a self that isn't really there. So of course only only really philosophers would would be uh people who who who do that you think. But the idea is that you have this idea. Okay. Well, so the world decide decides what is true and I figured it out now and it came down on my side, right?
¶110And the theory that U-Haul is wrong. And so you you can use that of course to prop up the idea that you know there is the me that is right and use that as a as a somewhat more subtle but still potent form of self-grasping that is causing all these problems right so to coming back to your chest pain of course no amount of thinking about philosophy is going to you know alleviate your chest pains and you'll probably better see a GP about those right but that is not the the only notion that the the Buddhists are talking about when they're talking about existential suffering, right? They I mean pains and aches and so on are parts of that physical suffering, but they can sort of cause manifestation of that and it goes a into a lot more subtle forms of existential, you know, unease and uh and dis dissatisfaction with the way things go and so on. And it's it's the suffering in all these forms that this this union of uh philosophical theorizing and a tradition of practice is supposed to alleviate. >> Yeah.
¶111>> Okay. So I mean I' I've got a >> a couple of thoughts and I suppose a couple of questions. One is is >> I I can understand how of course if if everything is empty then the self is empty. In fact, sometimes it can be helpful to think of uh I found it helpful to think of mediamaka and emptiness as kind of an extension of the well-known Buddhist idea of an ata of there being no self. You say that there appears to be this thing called myself.
¶112It it has perceptions and memories and all that kind of stuff. But the Buddhists will tell you actually what's really going on there is just a bunch of concepts that relate to each other. But there's no there's no stuff. there's no like intrinsic essence I suppose >> and then just to say that that's also true of you know the table and the chair and the world and everything and then ultimately of emptiness itself that's fine but then it's like >> if this is supposed to be kind of therapeutic so to speak you know and the Buddhist says the way to escape suffering is to recognize that there is no self and there's no one that suffering is happening to >> it's like that's all very well and good >> but that doesn't like switch off the suffering right So, I kind of want to ask in what way it is that a recognition of the non-existence of the self allows you to escape suffering if it doesn't actually get rid of the suffering. It just maybe makes you realize what it actually is.
¶113It's it's almost as if someone's come along and I'm feeling hungry >> and they've said, "I know you think that you've just got this this sort of feeling called hunger, but really what's going on there is your digestive system is connecting to your brain and sending neural signals and that's what's really happening. That's really interesting. >> Now, you know, where's where's the sandwich? you're still hungry, right? So, >> how does that help?
¶114>> Yeah. No, that that is that that's a it's a very good point. And you it's just like, you know, saying somebody stole your bicycle and so then I come along and say, "Well, there wasn't really ever a bicycle in the first place because they're only the parts, right? The hill is not real, so don't be sad." And then you think >> that doesn't really help, right? Okay.
¶115So, no, that's good. And that is that is it would indeed be an unsatisfactory um uh reply. And this is this is why why I I tried to to to to mention earlier that we we need to take into account that Buddhist philosophy is is part of kind of practice tradition. And so within within Buddhism you find a common classification of uh wisdom or paranya into uh three different uh types of increasing sophistication. So the one is the the the wisdom that you acquire from studying or hearing.
¶116This is just you know learning about philosophical theories. Then the second is the wisdom that results from contemplation. So you make these theories your own and you think about potential counter moves and counterarguments and basically what we've been doing here. Right? So this kind of exploration of of a philosophical theory.
¶117to think of what it says and uh where where the where the the breaking points are and you sort of fresh up test the whole thing and see does it really work. Um so that is that is the kind of wisdom that that you acquire from from contemplation or thinking and then there is the final one which is actually the one that you know gets you liberated and helps you to escape uh essential suffering and that is the um what is called bhavana pranya. Bavana is uh probably the best best translation of that is is cultivation. It's sometimes also translated as meditation but I think here it's probably better understood as as as cultivation or training. And so what what is meant by that here?
¶118Well, one important aspect of all of that is the idea that there is a difference between um having a specific philosophical view and seeing the world in that way. >> Yeah. And so you'll uh um uh Thomas Medinger he he came up with this with this interesting idea of phenomenal correlates. So he he argued that basically uh most important philosophical views also have uh uh have a correlate of the way the world appears to you if you have that way you have that view right so um say if you are uh on one hand you so you can believe things like you know solism there's only me or idealism everything is mental and so on and on the other And uh you can ask yourself, okay, so what would it actually be? >> What would the world looked like if I actually believed that and I've actually really thought that this was mental, right?
¶119Or if I really thought that you are just a figment in my imagination and this is this is I'm real but you're not. Yeah. >> And okay, so there I think we most people would agree that there is a difference between that, right? Between just holding a view, being convinced by a view and actually seeing the world in this way. Yeah.
¶120Okay. And now the the Buddhists believe that you cannot just reason yourself into seeing a world in a specific way. But that requires specific training and practice and sustained practice that sort of sits on top of having a particular view. Yeah. And so that so in in a way what what you want to say here is that um uh now uh coming coming back to the case of the bicycle of course it doesn't help me if somebody then just comes up with marological nihilism to comfort me when my bike has been stolen right but that is not the point the the point is rather that if I were to see the world in that particular way in terms of emptiness and uh nonself and so on, then that would automatically alleviate or potentially completely annihilate my suffering about the bicycle, right?
¶121Of course, in a way that doesn't really help to somebody who isn't there yet, right? But that is the >> that's like the promise of >> Yeah, that is that is yes and say, okay, so this is where this is this is the this is a goal, right? And you can do all that philosophical reasoning in order to show why that goal would be a good goal to get to. Right? But then the next thing is actually getting to that.
¶122And that is and I think this is probably one of the key differences between you know Buddhist philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy is that that is not the end of the project right it's an important step in the project but that's not that that's not what the aim of the whole thing is. This is why I mentioned earlier the difference between looking for an ultimately true theory and regarding it as as a kind of cure. >> So then like this concept of of emptiness then I mean we've literally explained what it is and we we've >> helpfully used this concept of myology the relation of parts and holes and said >> okay emptiness says that there just is no foundational essence to anything. >> So then like just naively I I want to help get like a picture of this in my head because I understand those words. I get what that means, but it hasn't quite sort of slotted into place for me in that like >> I'm sat on something right now.
¶123Like I'm I'm what is what is it that I'm sat on, right? And I kind of want like >> the best imagery you can think of to help think about this in that when I when I explain myological nihilism, I say to people, well, what you're really sad on is like kind of like a bunch of atoms in an arrangement that looks like a chair. And people go, that that makes sense to me. Or maybe for the idealist, they might say that what you call physical matter is really just experiential. You touch it, you feel it, you see it, it arises in mind.
¶124And people go, "Okay, that that kind of makes sense to me." So, how how would you sort of paint the picture of emptiness to make sense of the phenomena that I'm that I'm experiencing right now? >> What what am I sat on, you know? >> Yeah. Well, I I think the the the if we think of it in kind of metaphorical terms is that in the in the picture of of of the world with [snorts] intrinsic natures with fabas, you've got you with your substantial self and then you've got the world around it and it is permanently creating resistance to your wishes and desires and you sort of bump into it and that th those uh collisions between the self and the world create suffering. Yeah.
¶125And now on the picture of emptiness, of course, all the solidity both of the world and of the self go away in this way. I mean, first of all, conceptually, but then hopefully also experientially, right? >> And I mean, this is this is connected with with another key concept that we we we didn't really have time to talk about today. Dependent origination or so the the interdependence of things if you might want to turn turn it that way, right? And then um so uh metaphorically you might say okay well in that in that if you realize that view then you sort of it's it's no longer the self hitting the brick wall but it is actually no the the the causes and condition that create the one passing through it >> on the other because neither of them has any solidity.
¶126Right now, this is of course not meant to be literally passing through walls, but I'm trying to come up with an image here of seeing that what is causing the causing the existential suffering according to these theories is the mistakenly attributed rigidity both to yourself and to your others. And you think okay so all of this stuff changes you know we get owed we get sick we lose our faculties but in fact we want to hold on to this but the world is sort of conspiring against us and we can't do anything about that and that causes a lot of crisis but then if we realize that in fact there isn't anything there there right there there isn't any core such that we must hold on to it because it is sort of precious and it's me and it makes me me and uh if it goes away this is kind of terrible and so once you not just intellectually let that go but actually let that go in experience then you will end up with a position where the where you're still impermanent of course but the suffering dissipates yeah so um >> but I think you know I'm I'm just a sort of philosopher I think these are the kind of the questions that you need to talk to a meditation master about sure >> that's why that's why I want to know the philosophical view about like the the the nature of reality and >> I kind of want to say like oh like why why not why not just why can't I just posit that there is some foundational stuff like I you know I I when I when I speak to uh when I speak to a Hindu right that they will believe in >> the self but they'll think that the the idea that everyone has an individual self that sort of individuates and is is real is is a mistake like if you ask me to paint a picture of where I think is like the the middle metaphysical way I would say well on the one hand you got a bunch of people who think that objects really exist, that the lamp just has intrinsic existence, that you're a self, that I'm a self, that there are billions and billions of selves. >> Um, on the other hand, you've got these Buddhists who think that kind of like there is no self. Like there's literally no such thing as a self at all. And in the Majamaka school, >> everything is empty.
¶127There's there's no ground whatsoever. And I want to say that like a middle way to me seems like something you I've spoken to advise dentists on this show and they say >> yeah like like there is this thing called the self but there's only one of them and what you call your individual self is an illusion but there is something with intrinsic essence and that is the self and that is the same thing as Brahman and >> I kind of say like where where is it that they're going wrong for the for the Majamaka school at what point in their chain of of reasoning in saying there must be some foundational essence and I I know what that essence is cuz I'm experiencing it. >> Like take consciousness or experience itself. >> The one thing that most people will admit is truly undeniable. That is I am having an experience right now.
¶128>> Maybe I'm having an experience of redness. You know, I see like a a red light and it's shining in my eyes and that's that's that's real. It feels weird to me to say that say the experience of redness that smooth experience that I have >> is empty that there's no substance that there's no intrinsic nature that there's nothing actually >> really happening there. >> What would what would I suppose I want to break it down to the foundational sort of thing which I think is consciousness. >> What is that made out of?
¶129What is that dependent on? What is that like? What what what is non ultimately real about just the direct experience of of of redness or pain when you when you feel the pinch on your hand or something like that >> right okay so I mean one step back I mean in in case of advita vidanta uh I mean shankara was was also you know described as a as a crypto Buddhist so the the the where exactly the the the distinction between these schools is is uh probably a um topic for another podcast. It's it's certainly Shankara was very very >> adamant that his view was not Buddhism >> and the Buddhists are also very clear that their view is not advant >> uh but depending on how you spell them out. It's it's it's kind of difficult to see, you know, what what where this is going.
¶130But let's I mean, let's put that in a box for the for for the time being because what you you're really interesting, I think, is is in in the in the manifest undeniable reality of consciousness. >> Yeah. Right. Okay. So, um you I mean as as you know within the theory of mind, you also have this the the the illusionists, right?
¶131who think that consciousness is an illusion >> and um that strikes many people as extremely unintuitive because you know how can I be wrong about being wrong about something? Yeah. >> Um [snorts] there are there are interpreters who would so uh interpret yoga idealism. So another another form of Buddhist philosophy as a form of illusionism. So particularly the Marxerates he's defended that view.
¶132Um but um so you said okay so that we we have the experience of red and surely that is real right. Um uh right on first of all on on the one hand uh you would probably also you know you you look at some visual illusion right so two lines looking the same length but that they aren't. >> You look at them they seem to be of the same length but you know that they are not right. You cannot deny the fact that they are appearing to you in that way. But do you know that the way your visual processing works mistakes them for this way?
¶133So to that extent just the fact that something is given to you doesn't >> allow you to say that it's real, right? Because it might be that it's even though they they look they look the same length, they aren't, right? >> That's fine. >> Yeah. Yeah.
¶134So that is that's that's sort of one one issue where you should take into account. Just because something appears to you, it doesn't necessarily mean that therefore the appearance actually is unmistakably genuine as you can see from all kinds of illusions. But I think the more important point is that what what is um what is wrong with the from the Miamaka perspective with the view of taking consciousness as ultimately real. And of course the the Madiamas argue against other Buddhists who take a very similar view to that namely the Yogacharians who who some of which are interpreted as saying that conscience is is ultimately real and the Miamaka says no no no that they they've taken a wrong turn somewhere. >> Yeah.
¶135Yogachara is often thought of as an idealist school whe whether that's accurate is of course >> yeah that is that's again a debatable debatable question but it's certainly the case that this is the majority interpretation of the of the school and it's also that when the madameas character criticize yoga they criticize it as a school that thinks mind is ultimately real yeah okay so why do they think that's a problem well it's the the issue is again that that that as as soon Unless you've got something ultimately real somewhere, you've got yourself an object of grasping that you can use in order to hang on um your um uh uh uh process of subjectification of the self by connecting it to something that is ultimately real. Right? So it works in in kind of at once removed. Now the the problem is no no longer that you sort of believe in an art man but you've got something else and you think okay so that is that's actually the foundation of the universe and I've got that right and therefore I sort of have to share some of the ultimate realness of that that is in there. Yeah.
¶136But but >> firstly I mean does that actually make it make it false just because it's got this unfortunate implication that you you there's something which you're kind of grasping on to but also do you have to do that? I mean like like I think an advice of Adantis would be very careful to say that if you believe that you >> as an individual are having as a self are having an experience of redness then you're wrong >> that in fact there is just the experiencer and I also understand optical illusions. I think they're they're fascinating and they prove that the content of our experience can be mistaken but even the illusionist about about um >> about consciousness I just had Keith Frankish on my show. Yeah. Right.
¶137and and he will he will be the first to tell you like he's he's like I don't think consciousness is an illusion. I don't think that there is no experience happening. >> I think that what illusionists are really talking about is the self. I think that so much actually of our conversation about consciousness is really about the self without people realizing it. >> But consciousness itself isn't the redness.
¶138I mean that that redness is is one of the >> sort of is is the content of the conscious experience. And even if you're having an illusion, even if there's an optical illusion in front of you, there is some kind of experience happening. And I feel like I can admit of that without admitting of there being this thing called the self, >> without feeling as though I am using that as a way to grasp onto the sense of Alex that I can't let go of, but just rather to say that it it it strikes me clearly and distinctly as it were that that is a thing with nature with essence. And if there's if there's anything that I could sort of point to to found my metaphysics of of intrinsic existence or whatever, it would be experience. Not that particular experience, not that experience of redness or this experience of the chair, but experience itself.
¶139>> The the Buddhist emptiness idea would would have to say that actually that somehow decoheres >> that it's actually still no matter what you think it's still dependent on something more foundational. still or onlogically or myologically dependent. >> But I say that experience is happening >> doesn't seem causally dependent because it's not about particular conscious experiences. It's just that there is experience happening. It doesn't seem to be made up of parts.
¶140So it doesn't seem to have any myological dependence >> and ontological dependence. I wouldn't even know how to begin sort of addressing that. But it certainly feels >> very real in a way that doesn't seem to decoher like a table or even the self does. >> Yeah. So if you if you think you have an experience of redness or something like that.
¶141So you would not think that it depends on causes and conditions. >> Well, this is the thing. I I feel like that that experience of redness must do because there's something which is sort of causing that particular experience. But the thing that I think is real because of your optical illusions point in part is not >> the redness per se >> but that experience is happening that it's like the this is the thing like the the >> like the um the sanctu school within within Hindu philosophy which has this kind of dualism not between mind and body but between like >> the the seer and the scene if you like the the sort of the the self which sees and everything which it sees. And I feel like everything which is seen which includes internal things like like redness or or or hunger or whatever is separable from the thing that that that sees.
¶142And this is this the sort of Hindu intuition is that all along like with all of those experiences with the sightes that that you see with the with the sounds that you hear there's there's some kind of perceiving self >> and that's separate from the contents. I guess it's that perceiving self which I'm pointing to as the thing which strikes me as maybe having uh intrinsic existence that doesn't seem necessarily at least to require decohering into into parts or ontological dependence. And I feel like that's kind of what someone like an abidive dentist says. They say I totally agree with you that like everything is dependent on something else. Everything decohes.
¶143Everything is actually sort of grounded except >> apart from one thing >> for this this this self this perceiving self through which everything else that we're talking about everything the table the mological symbols the concept of mology all of it >> like like lands upon this this seeing self. >> Yeah. >> Yeah. I suppose one one of the questions is to which extent you think okay so you need this as a theor theoretical posit order to keep the whole system ticking along right you need some you need some fixed point to have everything revolving around it of course and that brings us back to the um to the discussion we had earlier on whether that is necessary not and so on so so that's that's one question the the other question is whether this um substantial self that you have in mind here is actually something that is experientially accessible to you in some way. Right?
¶144So on the one hand you could say well this is the so the absolute self and whatever that may be is pretty much like the you know the country numinon it we know that it's there for theoretical reasons but it is not a subject of our experience >> right and um so that of so if if you say that that's right so it is actually not a not a subject of our experience then you might wonder okay so what is all the fuss about because it looks then like an idle wheel that is not actually doing anything theoretically because we don't need it presumably if we can have this kind of foundationless metaphysics and it's also nothing that we can that shows up experientially so it's not even an appearance >> and then the question is okay so what is this actually doing here >> right >> and I suppose that the I mean the the the the madiamaka conception would Well, I they don't deny that conscious experiences are conventionally real, right? So that you have an experience of retinness and so on. So it's not that it's not the case that they would say that this is not happening, right? But this is all itself dependent on causes and condition that bring it about and is presumably itself causing other things, right? Causing your further experiences, causing experiences of other people and so on.
¶145So, and it's the the the the emptiness of the of the conscious experience is not that it's not there, but the the emptiness is that there is nothing there that stands on its own, a stands on its own independent of various dependence relations, part relations, causal dependence relations, superimposition by the mind and what have you, right? >> So, it's this kind of network of interdependence that is conventionally real and that appears to you and it's the insight that it is only conventionally real which is supposed to bring about the kind of sociological effects that we've talked about. >> Okay. So look, there's been a lot here today and but in in another sense there's been there's been nothing cuz we we've hardly scratched the surface as well as well as there being no intrinsic essence to anything we're saying. I mean, I guess to my my the picture I get in my head at the end of this is is that like when we talk about emptiness, we're saying that that reality whereas most people kind of imagine like layers, right?
¶146They imagine that you can kind of zoom out or zoom in and you can break stuff down. >> This is more of a picture of like I'm kind of picturing a bunch of nodes >> floating around in space and they've all got lines between them and that's what reality is. There is no there's no foundation. There's no totality. There's just a bunch of interrelated um sort of stuff that that is there >> but is only defined in relation to the other things that it sort of connects to and depends upon.
¶147I I I suppose it maybe functions a little bit like language in the way that if you open a dictionary, a dictionary is entirely self-referential, right? like every single word in the dictionary is defined in terms of other words in the dictionary. If you went looking, if you followed the chain of the dictionary, >> you could say, well, that word has to be defined by another word, and that word has to be defined by another word and so on and so on. And if you kept following those words in the dictionary, you'd end up sort of going in a circle, right? >> There would be no there's there's no like first word.
¶148There's no foundational word. There's no word which just stands on its own as a as a word. And I suppose reality would have to function a bit like that. That there's no foundational stuff, that there's no foundational substance, there's no foundational cause. It's just a sort of interconnected web of of >> like interdependent >> stuff, something like that.
¶149Cuz it's really difficult, I I have to admit, to kind of picture what it is that we're talking about here, you know, >> and that's sort of the best I've got. >> Yeah. Yeah, I mean this is I mean what you've mentioned there's this is called the symbol grounding problem in semantics which is I mean which is this is actually fairly fairly controversial issue because uh you might also think well there are certain words that you know [snorts] get their meaning just by direct pointing so because if you I mean if you I mean I'm very sympathetic to this you know it's it all floats in the air idea for obvious reasons um but I mean this is also I mean it has has also interesting interesting implications to with kinds of things. For example, with you know, if you think um there is something that an LLM is missing in being able to understand language and you think, well, it's a connection with the things they know the connection between the words, that's why they can generate text, but they don't actually have any sort of direct connection with any any of the reference. If you think that's not necessary, then you would probably think that you know what the the speech that is coming out from an LLM is is not fundamentally different from the one that comes out from a human, right?
¶150Let's okay let's put let's let's put that to one to one side. No what you described there is I think the this um very kind of contological coherentism right which is I think is is is a perfectly good model to have for much of what the Miamakas are saying. I think the the the important point just to just just to keep in mind here is that you've got this picture in your mind where you've got, you know, it's like the net of Indra or the nodes connected and hung up in the in empty space. The the important point is to to not then get to the conclusion and say I know I've got the structure of reality, right? So that's what it's really like.
¶151Yeah. Because that is that is exactly the the kind of step that the madamakas then want to make. You can say okay so the seeing the world in this way is helpful for achieving the effect that this is what's supposed to bring about namely the eradication of existential suffering and so on. But it is not an ultimately true theory of the world. It sound it sounds a little suspicious.
¶152No, like if for someone who's not heard of this before, it sounds a little like there's this idea >> that I've got, but if you press me on it, I'm going to tell you, no, well, I never said it was true. I only said it's going to help you. And >> is that is that where this bottoms out? Would it would it be no problem for someone of the school to say like, I mean, it's not it's not true. I'm not interested in truth.
¶153I'm just interested in whether it it helps you. Is it really can it really just be a a a sort of therapeutic thing? The in other words, is it even appropriate to call this a metaphysical worldview? >> Right. Yeah.
¶154I think I the the the differentiation we should not lose lose sight of here is the differentiation between conventional truth and ultimate truth. Right. So at the conventional level we have all the standards of reasoning and evidence that we use in philosophy and so on and then then then we can deci then we can debate whether you know is the preferable viewpoint for all kind of systematic reasons and so on right >> um but then the uh none of this has any implications for what is happening at the level of ultimate truth how the world looks from the for for the enlightened mind right so the the the the opponent that you have in mind here is probably not somebody who would say no I never told you it was true that because that's not the point there's the the madamaka still is able to differentiate between what is conventionally true and what is conventionally false. Right? So that is that is always the that's always the case.
¶155But there isn't anything there where you would say okay well this is this this is where the the buck stops ultimately. >> Yeah. >> Just difficult to imagine isn't it? Like like >> that the world is is just groundless. It begins to feel like what you're asking me to theoretically do is literally just remove the ground beneath my feet.
¶156Or say that the the the ground beneath my feet is being suspended by the ceiling >> and the ceiling is being held up by the ground or or something like that. Like there's a big pole connecting the ceiling and the ground. >> And if you ask, you know, >> what is the ground? It's the thing that's being held up by the ceiling. And what is the ceiling?
¶157Well, it's the thing that's being held up by the ground. They're just connected by this this poles. And it just feels to me that if that's all there is and there's nothing outside holding the room in place, there's no foundation that we've >> we've sort of lost any kind of onlogical grounding. And maybe that that is exactly the point. You get a similar a similar sort of vertigo effect if you ask yourself coming back to the the numinon, right?
¶158So what is that actually that you know supports the phenomena and you'll find some of the uh uh some of the later comments of of K on that when when he said well the the numinan is nation is a thought thing right so it's it's something that is thought up by the mind then you think okay now hang hang on a moment so how can it be both >> a thought thing and also the support of phenomena yeah and then you you get a similar I think you know kind of lost your bearings here now. Um I I think with Madiama this is actually the point. Yeah, that's that's why I like Schopenhau. I love Schopenhau's sort of response to Kant because he comes along and says, "Look, I mean, it's >> there's one thing which you experience both as a phenomena and a numinina, and that's your body." And and you know what it's internally like to to to >> to to have this thing which he calls will >> and it it just becomes this sort of form of idealism of saying that the numina is the same thing that I experience in in myself as the numina which is which is the will. And again, it seems satisfying to me >> like I think you're quite right.
¶159K has this open question which leaves you with a feeling of vertigo >> until someone like Schopenhauer comes along and says well you know that thing you've got inside of you called will >> that's what everything's made out of and suddenly my feet are back on the ground again you know maybe maybe you're more comfortable than I am sort of being suspended >> I suppose it is the question is we whether you you need this kind of metaphysical peg you need to hang yourself on or whether you are this kind of uh feeling of suspension is is less vertigoinducing than than the idea of having a foundation. Yeah, I must say at least for the time being, I know this is supposed to relieve me of suffering, but if anything, it's it's given me a bit of a headache and made me feel like I've got vertigo. Um, but but fascinating nonetheless. I I think um the the extent to which that's that's true of me. And of of course I'm joking.
¶160I don't really have a headache, but I think it maybe it does just portray how uncomfortable I am letting go of an onlogical foundation. And maybe if I spoke to some kind of Buddhist meditative expert, they would say, "Well, there's your problem. You need to learn learn to let go, my friend. And maybe I'll I'll get there one day. And I'm not sure if it'll be through metaphysics, but whatever the case, emptiness um has been the the the sort of name of the game today.
¶161You've got a couple of books which I point people to. We said before we started you you sort of wrote an exposition on on uh Nagarajuna's work which I'll link down below but you've also got a book called the non-existence of the real world >> which is not explicitly a Buddhist text but tries to approach the same issues from a sort of analytic philosophical perspective which >> is is well worth reading if people want to go go deeper on this. Um, so thank you so much for your time today and I look forward to seeing what people make of this cuz this will be the first time I imagine a lot of our listeners have been introduced to this concept of of emptiness and intrinsic nature and whatnot. So, who knows what they're going to think, but uh, thanks for your time. Thank you.
¶162If you enjoyed that, you might like my previous episode with Keith Frankish on illusionism about consciousness. You can watch it by clicking the link that's on your screen. To support the show and get early adree access to episodes, subscribe to my Substack at alexoconor.com.