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radar · Filosofia & teologia

Let's Go Livestream! #1

¶1Okay, it says I'm live. Hopefully that worked. Hello, Steve. I'll also say it in the chat. Delay ads during an important moment.

¶2You can insert ads during a transition period or when you need to take a break. Oh, cool. I can put it in ad break when I got to go to the toilet. That's pretty cool. Okay.

¶3Well, it's just you and me, Steve, right now anyway. Or maybe it's not even you, Steve. I think I have a little number here that tells me how many likes and then how many people. Okay. Hi, sample text 7323.

¶4Are you real? Sample text doesn't sound like a convincing name. [snorts] That sounds like a fake. Okay, cool. Cool.

¶5Glad you're real. Well, what's up, sample? What can I do for you? It definitely sounds AI. Okay.

¶6Shoot. I'm so easy to convince otherwise. Thank you. Thanks. Thanks for saying nice earrings.

¶7Hi, Lemon. Lemonwolf, it's a cool name. What is its origin? Hello. You did well in the debate.

¶8What are your thoughts on it? Yeah. Uh, I agree. I thought the debate went really well. I was very very happy for my like I've done the online debates right but this was my first proper recorded in a studio went to London.

¶9They paid for the ticket. It felt very professional and real and I was very happy with how it went. I think I then recorded a debate with Dan Lynford like a week and a half later and Lynford was tougher. He was he was a lot more like technically well-versed and Alex did great. I love Alex, but Lynford was bringing in the heavy ammunition.

¶10Um, but I thought I did well in both. So anyway, yeah, the debate with um, Alex was so much fun. I had so much fun. The time just flew by and I realized like I was talking with Nathan Nathan Bray a few a few days ago and he said, uh, I think you like me when I'm debating I get into like a flow state. I was like, yes, that's that's how I feel.

¶11I feel like I'm in a flow state when I get into a proper debate that when I feel prepared. I'm sure if you asked me to debate on something that I had no preparation for, I wouldn't feel very good. But when I'm prepared, there's nothing quite like it. What's the plan for the stream, Modern War? Yeah.

¶12No, no plan. No plan. We're just vibing. You can ask me whatever you'd like, and if I want to answer, I will. He took debate.

¶13I did take debate. [laughter] Yeah. No, I never took debate as a class, but I may have taken debate. Was there something entirely new that you were not ready for? No, I prepared so very hard for the malpass debate.

¶14I I think like 95% of the points raised I had anticipated. There was a bit on divine psychology where I felt like he raised some good points I hadn't considered before and so I really had to think on my feet. But besides that, very little of the debate was me thinking on my feet. I prepared extensively. Um, congrats on your talk with Malpass.

¶15I like your approach to ID. Okay. I don't I don't really like the label intelligent design. That's rather fraught, but I'll take it. Did you see Phil Halper's comment in your debate with Malpass?

¶16Would you respond? Yes. And I replied to it. Uh, with Phil, I said that I think you've misunderstood what it means to say that fine-tuning is a brute fact. And I hope I hope he raises this in our debate.

¶17Phil and I are going on the uncert or the uh not uncertainty podcast the premier unbelievable to debate the topic has science buried God and I hope he raises that point because I think I can I can respond to it. The debate got me thinking oh wait I will forever believe that this was a pre-recorded stream. How I'm replying to you right now. How could how could it be pre-recorded? [snorts] Um the debate got me thinking.

¶18exposed finetuning is independent of naturalism and non-theistic supernaturalism. This seems plausible unless I'm missing something. That implies it's independent of theism. I don't get it. I do not understand what you're saying.

¶19So, please expand sample text from another culture. I will have this question. How do you think your cultural intuitions and attitudes influence your approach to philosophy? That's a really good question which I'm not prepared to answer. uh largely because I think I've insufficiently reflected upon the way that my cultural context influences me in general.

¶20But I I think maybe experimental philosophy is a good way to proceed to see like what intuitions really are widely regarded or had or held across cultures. And so I'm sure there are many such things that are a consequence of the culture within which I was born, but currently I'm not aware specifically of what they are. Okay. Uh, what are some of your weirdest ethical views? Me.

¶21Me. Veganism. Oh, I see you. Veganism, loyalty isn't a virtue and responsibility. Skepticism.

¶22Amos. Amos, my boy. What's up, Amos? That's my guy right there. I'm I'm happy you're here.

¶23Amos is also the worst, but I also love him. He's the He's the best. He's the best. Um, okay. What are some of your weirdest ethical views?

¶24Veganism, loyalty isn't a virtue and responsibility, skepticism. Um, yeah, loyalty isn't a virtue all the time. That's That's right. Loyalty to an evil cause. It's bad.

¶25Uh, veganism, is that like a weird ethical view these days? I think it's just true. And I'm seriously considering becoming vegan. So, if you've got any argument on the other side of the scale showing that veganism or that meat consumption isn't actually bad, love to hear it. Or factory farming, I should say.

¶26But I can't see it. So that means I'm gonna have to go vegan soon. Oh, Amos, I'm so glad you're here. Ask some questions, Amos. Get chatting.

¶27Okay. So, what about the Catholic miracles? Oh, right. I have no pro listen. Uh, at present, I have no profound thoughts or responses to that.

¶28I have thoughts. Listen, I have some thoughts, but nothing I'd want on the record. So, um, what is your opinion of a non-identity theodysy? Oh, I don't I don't know what that is. So, Steve, if you could if you could expand, that would be fabulous.

¶29O, might message you about it later. Okay, good. Yeah, thanks. Uh, yeah, I did I just didn't understand the comment you made, Sample, about fine-tuning. Um, and a more existential question.

¶30If you were forbidden to study philosophy [snorts] in any form, what other science would you take up and why? Have a nice stream. Okay. Uh, physics. Yeah, that's easy.

¶31I wish I had taken up physics during my undergrad and actually had some formal training in it. Part of my undergrad degree was math. That was my minor. But I wish I had picked physics. I attempted to do a math and philosophy double major [snorts] and then found by my final year of undergrad the math was just terribly difficult and I had no passion for it at all.

¶32So, I didn't want to do it. So, I I took the minor. But if I could go back, I would do physics. I love physics, hence fine-tuning cosmology, blah blah blah. Why I'm trying to become a philosopher of cosmology.

¶33It all fits together. Wool in the king. Yes. Yes, he's still here. Um, this will not happen.

¶34Time to change your ways. Um, okay. I'm not sure if you're talking to me, Amos, but I still want questions. Uh, how do you respond to the objections that fine-tuning is based on an anthropocentrical bias and the universe being fine-tuned allows something else different to human life is not so unlikely? I I think my basic reply is that it as far as I can tell uh the parameters are fine-tuned for complex structure complexity of any kind at all.

¶35Not like humanoid carbon-based life. So, if that's right, if you change the cosmological constant and the universe collapses immediately, then it's not fine-tuned for human beings per se, or it is, but it's not just fine-tuned for them. It's fine-tuned for anything interesting. So, no anthropocentrism. Uh, great work on debate with Malpass.

¶36He wanted to get drunk at the end of it. How do you know that? How do you know that? [laughter] Uh, God bless you. I'll pray for you.

¶37Need to go do this more. Okay, thank you. Hey, Miles, do you think the problem of induction is solved? Depends on what you mean. Oh, yeah.

¶38In reference to defenses of factory farming thing. Sorry. Sorry, I'm a little scattered here. Amos. Yes.

¶39Yeah, there's no good argument on the other side. You're right. Okay. Problem of induction. I mean, it depends on what you mean by solved.

¶40Like, I'm not an inductive skeptic and so I think induction works. So, in that sense, it's solved. But it's kind of like, do you think external world skepticism is solved? Well, I believe in an external world. I think that's the only rational belief.

¶41But do I have a like a really airtight explanation of what grounds our belief in external world? Well, I might have something and like intimations. I've read epistemology, but I just don't feel the need to have that in order to have a rational belief in the external world. Some things are just you begin inquiry with induction is one of those too. But I've been reading about Michael Humer's explanationist articulation of the principle of indifference and how he applies that to the problem of induction.

¶42I've I started reading that today. So just get ready. Just wait. Uh the anthropic principle only explains why we see a universe that is fine tuned if it already exists. Doesn't explain why fine-tuning occurs in the first.

¶43Yep. Good. Plato or Aristotle? Plato. Plato.

¶44Although Aristotle is very good. Plato is the one that got me into philosophy. We read him in high school. The Republic. Very good.

¶45Good stuff. That Plato guy is smart. The nonidentity theodysy holds that our unique existence depends on past evils. God allows suffering out of grace so these specific individuals can exist. Okay.

¶46Interesting. Yeah. I mean, uh, here's my instinct. It doesn't work. This [snorts] is does this seems like way too high flutin abstract philosophy that you're trying to pigeon hole into theodysy.

¶47Maybe our unique exist. Yeah, but like why should my existence be a morally sufficient reason if God could have gotten the existence of many other people with less suffering? I don't see how grace is supposed to supposed to get that. Okay. The debate with Alex was very controversial.

¶48That seems to be the trend with him, which I like. Was it? Oh, conversational. Oh, yes. Yes, it [snorts] was.

¶49It was very conversational. Genuinely picking apart each other's arguments rather than SC. Yeah. love Alex. I think him and I will be friends for a long time.

¶50Uh he's he's a good man and we're on a similar wavelength about these things. We're we're personally invested, right? But you know me, I'm not I haven't like built my identity around the success of the fine-tuning argument. You might think I have, but truth be told, you know, I I have a paper under review where I essentially defend the deeper physics objection from the I defend the objection as an objection to the usual formulation of the fine-tuning argument. I say it works.

¶51So, you know, I'm perfectly happy to entertain the fact that maybe the fine-tuning argument fails. I just at present don't think that it does. But anyway, Alex and I are kind of cut from the same cloth. We don't take things too personally. Um, when for veganism, visit an animal sanctuary if you have the chance.

¶52Those are always much more convincing to people in arguments. That's true. Thoughts on the argument from beauty? All right, Amos, you know. So, is this supposed to be like the analog of the the moral argument for God?

¶53So, [clears throat] instead of talking about objective moral facts, we talk about objective aesthetic facts and then God is Yeah, good ammo. Yeah, I'm so smart. Um, yeah. I mean, I think that it will be pretty isomorphic to the moral argument, right? And but the the trouble is in motivating the view that on an atheistic scheme there are no objective moral or aesthetic facts.

¶54And that's hard to do. I mean I know William Lane Craig thinks he can do it. He can thinks he can do it. That's grammar. But I I just suspect there are many models and theories in the literature.

¶55And in order to like get behind that claim that atheism or naturalism just can't do it, I feel like I'd have to canvas a range of options and possibilities. And I've never done that. So that would be my reserv. I mean, I think that in a basian scheme, aesthetic and moral facts provide some oomph or confirmation for theism. But could I say more than just a a modest amount?

¶56No. No. I couldn't defend like the strong thesis that there are like no non-negligible or non-negligibly likely accounts of moral and aesthetic value on atheism. Just don't don't see it. Now pass wanted to get drunk because at the end we should discuss over a pint.

¶57I need some mental stimula. Oh yeah, he did say that. Okay. [snorts] Wait, no. the version that goes moral realism and true is true and the universe is really beautiful and this is evidence for theism but good to hear your thoughts on the other version too it thanks thank you okay so Amos as best you can get me up to speed here I mean I know we talked we talked about your argument the fine-tuning argument for beauty or from be no for beauty is that what we mean the version that goes moral realism is true and the universe is really beautiful yeah uh Say more, Ramos.

¶58I'm eagerly No. Okay. [laughter] Oh, [snorts] maybe you're not replying to me. Maybe you're replying to the comment. Does it use the fact that the universe is full of beauty as the evidence?

¶59Not aesthetic. Really? Yeah. Okay. Say more, Emos.

¶60Say more. Right. Okay. Keep uh keep chatting away. Keep talking.

¶61Um what did I do today, you ask? Even though you didn't. I [snorts] went up to my favorite college. And it's not actually the college I'm affiliated with, but it's the one that all of my friends are at. And I worked there for several hours.

¶62And I had a great time. Okay. Another question. Thoughts on fine-tuning reasoning can be run against localized planetary conditions like our distance from the sun. Okay.

¶63Uh when we can already explain those conditions with selection effects and exoplanets. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, the thing about the fine-tuned conditions of like our planet in relation to the sun, conditions on our planet, the the fact that we have a moon that has tides that helps with life, yada yada yada. You can explain that, I think, pretty uncontroversially by the fact that we know that a gigantic universe exists with lots and lots of planet sun, not not planet sun, planet star systems.

¶64And so, it's not at all unlikely that at least one of those would have these conditions. and we could only exist on it. I I think it would be a bit technical to get into here, but I think that's just analogous to how we infer a multiverse from cosmic fine-tuning because we we already know that we have this gigantic universe with lots of different planet star systems. We can see them with the telescope and that evidence is independent of planetary finetuning. So [snorts] I think in that case once you have a like in the analog here of a multiverse once you have a large expanse of ranging conditions in the background knowledge and just take that as given then that removes the need for any further explanation.

¶65But if you mean no no no if all we could we could only see to the edge of our solar system and we had no knowledge about the universe outside of it then I don't think you could infer a ginormous universe from the fact that our planet is fine-tuned. I say a bit about this in uh my book chapter in the Blackwell companion to philosophy in the multiverse and I've got a paper under review where I really go hard on the this universe objection which is what all of this is kind of related to. Do you plan to stream regularly or no? I'm having a great time. So this I'm going to go with yes.

¶66I don't know how regularly but yes. Thoughts on conceptual analysis? Do you think analyzing concepts can help us uh help us progress on philosophical questions? Yeah, I've I've seen some some discontent lately about the idea of philosophical analysis. Like they're like, "Oh, no philosophical terms have ever been successfully analyzed." I mean, that's just kind of like saying no philosophical questions have ever been successfully answered.

¶67Like at a certain level of generality, that's true, but there's lots of subquests that have been answered. And I think the same thing with conceptual analysis. We might not have a universally agreed upon answer to what is science, what's causation, what's another basic the good and so on and so forth. But I think conceptual analysis is very helpful at lower levels kind of defaying the dialectic understanding each other and making progress that way. So baby steps in conceptual analysis I guess is my thought.

¶68Just [snorts] as evil is evidence against theism, the thought Oh, thank you, Emily. The thought is that the kinds and quantities of objective beauty in the world is evidence for theism because God is more likely than indifference to like beauty. Sure. Okay. Yes.

¶69Yes. Yes. Emil, uh, I think that's good. It's very related to the argument from the applicability of mathematics, right? To the the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematical framing in our scientific investigation of the world and physics and the universe.

¶70It seems that the universe and physics has this mathematical structure. I think the reason that that would be evidence for theism is if you thought that this kind of beauty and elegance and simplicity are things that a perfectly good being like God would not be that unlikely to create. That if God creates a universe, it's probably going to be one with rich mathematical structure. I think that's that's very similar to what you're saying. And I like it.

¶71I like it. I I think that it's not as strong as the evidence that like the existence of life and conscious agency gives to theism because I think as I said in my debate with Malpass, life is and people are a like pinnacle kind of value. They're a prerequisite for moral value. Whereas here you have to zero in on very specific aesthetic goods like you know the beauty of galactic structures and say that that is not very unlikely if God is exists and and that's harder to motivate because that kind of value is just not as foundational. But it's still it's still something.

¶72If Mexico someday wins the World Cup, it'd be evidence for theism. No thoughts. No thoughts. Uh where wait oh no I think I'm way behind here. Am I way be?

¶73Oh yeah, I am. Okay. Uh, hey Miles, what do you believe about Jesus and what is your current credence to Christianity and what is your favorite response to problem evil? No comments um at the present moment. I have no comment on Christianity and Jesus specifically.

¶74I just I'm not wanting and prepared to discuss that. [snorts] Uh favorite response to the problem of evil probably a mitigated skeptical theism and thank you for your compliment. Yeah. So that's how I address the problem of evil, but that's a it's a bigger conversation and I I don't have a profound response to the problem of evil. I would like to do a deep dive of it uh in the future, give it the justice it deserves, but I think like a a more modest formulation of skeptical theism would help.

¶75Combined with strong confirmation for theism from other arguments is probably our our best hope, but the problem of evil bothers me. So I get it. Um my concern is only that we have precedent for being wrong about fine-tuning on local scale. Not that we do have the background. Well, yeah.

¶76Right. I mean, so if if we're returning to the solar system thing, yeah. Uh there was an instance where like multiverse type reasoning works and we can and we appeal to it all the time, selection effects and stuff like that, but that does nothing to show that in this specific case of the multiverse of of the cosmic fine-tuning in the multiverse that it would go through. So I think you know there's there's no successful argument from analogy if that's kind of what is being gotten at thoughts on the gap problem bridging natural theology like the FDA and revealed theology like specific religious doctrine. Yeah.

¶77Um I mean my my paper looking at diff the kind of more exotic naturalistic explanations was part of a broader project to answer the gap problem with respect to fine-tuning to get us a really strong connection between fine-tuning and the omniod specifically. But it seems like you mean specific religious doctrine. And for that, I think the only way you're going to get that is something like a miracles argument from historical cited historical cases of purportedly miraculous activity. Whether that's the resurrection of Jesus or the leg low-le leg, but that's kind of I think how you would hope to get to a specific religion by way of like evidential considerations. Hi Miles.

¶78Hope you're doing well. I am. Thank you. Do you did you also talk to Dan about fine-tuning and scientific realism? I don't we did not talk about scientific realism per se, but we did in obviously in our debate on fine-tuning.

¶79We talked about fine-tuning, but [snorts] we didn't talk about scientific realism. I I I've just always taken it for granted that like a modest form of scientific realism is true. The theory of evolution is true. it's not just empirically adequate. And then the same would go for quantum mechanics, quantum field theory, general relativity.

¶80We we know they're incomplete, but we also know that within their [snorts] scope as effective field theories, the energy scales that physicists take them to apply to, I take it, they apply there. They actually truly really do in a realist sense. Uh but but the argument for anti-realism is sophisticated so a fuller response would need to be given. Um okay. [clears throat] Do you think fine-tuning is equally just as much evidence for an evil deed as a good deed?

¶81Why and why not? You know, Alex Okconor asked me that at uh the at the pub after my debate with Alex. And I think yes. I think that the mirror image of omnitheism, like anti-theism, an all powerful, all- knowing, perfectly evil being, is primmaaccia on a par. It's very hard to come up with a principled reason to think that maximal goodness is coherent, possible, but maximal evil is not.

¶82And if so, then all of the usual arguments for kind of a non-negligible intrinsic probability to theism involving simplicity, omnipropies, unlimited attributes will also apply to the anti-God, the anti-theism where these properties are unlimited as well. So, I tried to email Oh, who's the David Ba Bagot? Is he is he the guy that uh Craig wrote co-wrote a book on the moral argument with that that guy? And uh the email bounced back twice and I found two different emails and it bounced back each time. So I was like, "All right, I'm not meant to contact you, but I was going to ask him about this and see what he thought." Uh so so yes, at the present moment, I think finetuning is equally just as much evidence for an evil deity as a good deity because an evil deity would want to create conscious agents to bring about the worst kinds of evil and torture and pain.

¶83So yeah. Do you think epistemic consider Oh, do you think Oh, I went too far down. Do you think epistemic considerations help diminish the force of the problem of evil? Like, like, do you mean our epistemic limitations like our cognitive limitations? In which case, I want to say yes, but not in the full-blown skeptical theistic way where evil is no evidence at all.

¶84That's that's what we want to do is walk that line between no it's evil is no evidence and then on the other side our cognitive limitations do nothing to diminish the force of evil. I think there is a middle way [snorts] but that's really just a promisatory note. I find it hard to justify using current physics and premises and arguments for God since we know so little about how the universe works and what theories we do have and we know are ultimately wrong. Yeah. Yeah.

¶85I mean I I agree with you and that and I think that is what I say in the deeper physics paper that is under review. But I think that a more modest formulation of the fine-tuning argument can proceed. We don't need exhaustive knowledge of the space of future physics in order to ground reasonable probabilities about the likelihood of like a life permitting ultimate physics given naturalism. And if I'm right about that, then like I think the confirmation theism receives from the life permitting nature of the universe uh is something like 10,000 to1. So no, that's not the same as the usual figures of like 10 to the 90 to1 just ultimately destructively overpowering, but it's more within the range of like the usual strength of evidence in life.

¶86[snorts] Okay. Okay. Do you don't think the problem of evil is self-refuting by a problem of goodness? When we compare both, there's much much more good than evil in Well, I mean, that is the question, right? If there's more good than evil in the world, then the good the actual god hypothesis gains traction over the anti- good.

¶87But I just I don't know how I would demonstrate that. I think it's true, but I don't know how I'd argue for that rigorously. What do you think of the atheist answer [snorts] as to [clears throat] why anything exists at all as the is just a brute fact? I think you can say that and you can always say that. You can always just say this is a brute fact and that makes me just less threatened by that option in any specific case.

¶88I want to see a reason to think that we should conclude the existence of the universe is a brute fact. >> [snorts] >> The burden I think in any for any given existing thing the burden is on the one who says there is no explanation. That doesn't mean you have to think every single thing ever has an explanation. It just means for any specific thing in our inquiry we should assume it has an explanation until we have some reason to think it doesn't or can't. So the mere possibility of a brute fact just doesn't bother me.

¶89Do you think Okay, we already read that. Um, have you decided on an outro phrase for the end of your video, your vids? I like I'll think about it because philosophy and stuff, you know. I like that. I like that.

¶90I kind of liked um what somebody said. No, I haven't decided on one, but I liked what somebody said that they were like you should say something like crap, I don't remember. [laughter] It was like, you're awesome. Something like really positive. And it it felt more genuine than just you're awesome.

¶91But I thought, oh, that's cute. I kind of like that. Uh, but I'll think about it is also nice. What's your favorite soccer team? Oh, I don't have one.

¶92Could not care less about most sports. Basically any sports. That's not It's not me. Uh, will you have DBH on again to discuss universalism? Uh, maybe maybe if DBH would like that's what I first asked him to come on to talk about, but he said that it was quote old hat, whatever that means.

¶93So, I mean, he might, but he uh the stuff with um Well, I'm going to end my answer there. Yeah. So, motivate these two things. First, that there is an objective probabil. All right.

¶94All right. Mo uh motivate these two there. First, that there's an objective probability distribution prior over what naturalism predicts. Right. So, just to be clear, I would say that there's an objective epistemic probability distribution over what naturalism predicts.

¶95And the reason for that is that uh there has to be if you think there's a posterior probability of naturalism based on the evidence and surely if you are a naturalist you'd want to say that the epistemic probability of naturalism is high given all our evidence but by bay theorem that implies that there is a prior probability and this is something Michael humor says if you have a determinant or defined posterior probability where you say given everything we know naturalism has a high probability then you have to be able to supply prior probabilities for the prior probability of naturalism and likelihoods the likelihood of the evidence given naturalism. And if you can't have probabilities there, you can't have posterior probabilities. So if you think that any of these hypotheses like naturalism, theism, whatever are highly likely to be true, you can't avoid objective probab or if you think it's all subjective, maybe you just say your subjective degree of credence in naturalism is high, but there's no objective way to state it. Fine. Fine.

¶96But I think that's highly implausible. [snorts] Okay, that was the first thing. Second, sorry, one sec. Second, that even if there is such an objective probability distribution prior, that you have the right philosoph philosophical method to figure what it is. Oh, uh I I don't know.

¶97I don't know that I have the right philosophical method to figure out what it is, but we just do our best. And if I propose a probability distribution that seems plausible to me, say based on the principle of indifference, then I'm open to hearing about why one would think that's not the right method for determining or uh fixing objective probability distributions. It's not just the principle of indifference, but I do think there's a case to be made that that's often something that helps to ground an objective probability. Um, okay, in between here, thanks for the answer on the gap problem. I think I agree.

¶98Fun fact, I asked this on a flight. Perfect. I love it. Are you planning to converse some more with traditional Christians on the substantial disagreements? What do you mean like the substantial disagreements among Christians?

¶99Was that or with me at the present moment? No. But I'm I'm curious what you mean. So go ahead and expand. Can we ask qu Oh crap.

¶100I keep scrolling and then things disappear. Oh man, I'm okay. I'm I'm far behind. Can we ask questions about Christianity? Oh, we'll see.

¶101Go ahead and ask and then I'll decide if I'm comfortable answering. If you consent to being born and believe in universalism, then given origin essentialism, why can't suffering in the causal history that led up to your birth against God's goodness? [sighs] Right. Right. I think this is something.

¶102Are you Amos in disguise? Because Amos said this something like this to me a long time ago. that maybe before we're born we consent to being born along with all the suffering that we're gonna get. Um oh then why count suffering in the causal well but you didn't consent for the suffering in the causal history that led up to your birth by the time you're consenting to be born. It's too late.

¶103All the suffering has happened. So, I don't see why consenting makes that suffering any less disisconfirmatory of God's existence. Unless someone else that was implicated in all of the previous suffering, if they consented to it, then the idea of consent might negate somewhat the evidential force of evil. But normally, even if I consent to being tortured, it's still a great evil if I am tortured, for example. So, I don't know, maybe I'm not understanding.

¶104How do you make skeptical theism not imply skepticism proper? Right. Right. It's to advocate for like a more mitigated skeptical theism. I mean, Matthew Adelstein made the point that like, yes, it doesn't seem that unreasonable to suppose that with respect to an infinite god, we're going to be a lot less likely to predict what that being would do than like, you know, your your best friend Frank for example.

¶105And so that sort of thing seems plausible to me. the the the key is to try and make it rigorous, which I haven't done yet, but I would like to. Any progress towards getting Shelley Kagan on the show? I asked him a couple years ago a few times, and he never replied to my emails, so I just gave up. Uh, wouldn't the evil god hypothesis be ruled out if moral realism, motivational internalism is plausible?

¶106Oh, that might be the way to do it. Yes, that is the way to do it. Okay, I forgot about that to be honest with you. Even me we can slip up sometimes. Um so the idea is if some if a being is omnisient they will know all the moral facts and unless they have some level of irrationality combined with motivational internalism it will the the moral facts are inherently motivating.

¶107Recognizing them as moral facts means you recognize you have a reason to do them I think is the idea. And so it does follow quite plausibly that a being who's truly omnisient knows everything that morality requires will be perfectly good. I think I think that is a way to establish an asymmetry. Good. I'll continue thinking more about that.

¶108Hate from France. [laughter] I love you too. Uh leg no leg. Go and figure out why you were wrong. Oh, this is in pre question your previous question, but I already forgot what your previous question was.

¶109It's hard to keep track of all these things. I'm sorry. I inri 33 AD. Isn't it troubling how similar the case for antitheism is to theism given antitheism is something only someone in an insane asylum would believe. Right?

¶110That is troubling. That is troubling. But I'm I'm seeing now that there might be some asymmetries here. And there are other arguments. And as I've always said, the reasons I believe in God, a loving God at core, is not because of the arguments.

¶111So it doesn't doesn't bother me that much if ultimately the arguments can't decide between them. Thank you. You're welcome. Are you ever going to get Joe Schmidt back in the podcast? I'm sure I will.

¶112I'm sure I will. Just letting I mean wait for things to kind of die down, you know. Do you think a scientific anti-realist can consistently accept fine-tuning as a genuine phenomenon? Use it as an argument for a designer. See, I I actually asked chat GPT this the other day.

¶113I try not to use it for my philosophizing, but I was just curious what it would say. The answer was not helpful. It was a bunch of blah. Uh but I don't see how I think Robin Collins in his chapter on the fine-tuning argument um tries to show how even a constructive empiricist which is a kind of anti-realist can also utilize the fine-tuning argument. But I was very skeptical at the time.

¶114Thought well how is that making any sense? So if someone can make the fine-tuning argument work for scientific anti-realism please do it, publish it and then send me the paper. Okay. [snorts] DBH would be a good pick yet or it does the fine tuning. Yeah.

¶115So I think it does presuppose scientific realism as best I can tell tell what do you think of oh what do you think of Alstein's enthropic argument right I I don't think I can summarize this well but the idea is the self-indication assumption which is a principle for updating on self-locating evidence provides infinite confirmation to the hypothesis that all possible well not maybe not all possible but that the highest number of possible people exist which is an absurdly high order infinity number of people and that that fact once we have it established is much more likely under theism than naturalism. I think the logic of that is fine as far as I can tell. Theism, God creates lots of people. That's not that unlikely or all people. Naturalism, atheism, that's harder to see.

¶116Okay. The tricky thing, the the most vulnerable step is is in justifying the claim that my existence is like infinitely strong evidence for the existence of all possible people. that involves some very suspect philosophical machinery and some of it I explored in a paper currently under review where I look at the multiverse and the kind of cosmological arguments for a multiverse which say that the very existence of our universe shows that lots of universes exist because it's more likely our universe would exist if lots of universes exist. I think that kind of reasoning is highly problematic and that makes me skeptical of the principles at work in Adelstein's argument. What do you think of the objection fine-tuning that states out of the infinite minds God could create vast majority non-physical right so I think that that's very similar to James Fodor's argument which I have been meaning to think about and provide a robust response to I was going to have him on to debate him on fine-tuning but then my PhD started several months back and it just fell by the wayside but I'd like to get back to it so I don't have a profound response to it at for the moment, but I will I will just you wait.

¶117Hey, Miles, I don't really understand the psychophysical harmony argument. I watched your clip with Opie, but I'm still unsure I understand it. Can you please explain it to me like I'm a child? I don't I don't know that I can, but the idea is that there's a harmonious alignment between our mental states and the resultant physical states. So the one that is clearest to me I think is like the uh epistemic harmony examples they give.

¶118When I see an iPhone, I'm a peer to iPhone Lee. When I have that experience, I naturally form the belief there is an iPhone in front of me. So there there's an epistemic alignment between the physical state of there being an iPhone and my forming a belief that there is an iPhone. That's a harmony. I could have I could have had an experience of the color gray every time I looked at an iPhone, in which case there wouldn't be the alignment.

¶119And then the claim is that it's a very good thing that these things align. That makes intelligible life possible. That's much more likely under theism than naturalism. So I I think that's I don't know that a child would have followed that. But there you go.

¶120Do you think it's fair for a theist to present his view simply as lack of belief in emergence of life by random chance? I I don't know if it's fair or not. I don't really care to have debates about semantics in that case. Just tell me what you mean by atheism or tell me what you think about the world and we'll discuss the whether there are good reasons for what you think or not. I don't I don't really care what you decide to call your view.

¶121I need not claim that naturalism has high probability because I deny there's such probability at all because we need not ground comp. Yeah, I know. Well, now you sound like uh John Norton. And we went we Anyway, I have an interview with him coming out next week and you can see how productive that was. I think the relations of confirmation that are not grounded in probability are utterly opaque and obscure, bordering on just meaningless.

¶122I think that they are probability talk masquerading as nonprobabilistic talk. That's my hot take. uh but the I I I I I do think I need to look into non-probabilistic theories of evidence for example more deeply but it at the present moment it's just so inherently plausible to say to to to think this way so there you go there you go you you deserve a fuller response I I'll give you that but but at the present moment that's kind of what I think [snorts] um Okay, let's Okay, I'm not too I'm not too Well, I might be far behind. I might be. Okay, we're going to skip around and how you how you'll respond to the awesome atheistic evidence.

¶123Well, I don't think we have it. Like this is the kind of evidence like the universe is filled with nothing but suffering and infinite lives of unending torture. That would be evidence for atheism, but we don't have that evidence. Um, would classical theism be compatible with an eternal universe? I'm not a classical theist, so I really I don't know.

¶124I'd leave it up to them to talk about that. How do you respond to the popular argument that fine-tuning is pointless because there's no evidence that the content constants could have been different? Ah, I mean, it really depends on what you mean by this claim. Under current physics, these are in fact free parameters. The values are just put in by hand.

¶125So as long as you can talk about different possible universes where the form of the laws are fixed but the values of the constants are different then it makes sense to ask given that the universe that exists falls within this subset of possible universes that have this form of the laws of nature how likely is it that the specific universe whose values allow for life that possible universe would exist? That's a perfectly intelligible question and you don't have to think that there's any sort of actual dials within the universe that somebody could turn wherein the values would be different. I mean these things are called physical constants because they're taken to be constant in time and place. If you show that they can vary generally that suggests that now you're dealing with like a dynamical field rather than a constant. But that doesn't do anything to affect like the epistemic probability of this particular possible universe within this subset of possible universes.

¶126under naturalism, under under theism, as long as they're metaphysically possible, then you can then God can create that particular universe and or not. And it wouldn't do anything to affect the epistemic probabilities, but it gets it gets a bit nuanced, but I think that's right. Amos talked about proactive consent. I'm talking about retroactive consent, like how a child could regret being born when life gets so tough, but later retroactive consents to being born. Okay, I don't I don't really have a lot of thoughts on retroactive consent and its moral properties, so I'll have to think about that more.

¶127The anthropic argument seems to hinge on knowing God's motivations. Well, they all hinge on some grasp of divine psychology, right? [snorts] Do you think miracles can happen? And if so, do you think they still do today? Yeah, if there's a God, miracles can happen.

¶128Do they happen? I'm very very skeptical of any specific miracle claim or in the general hypothesis that at least one of these miracle claims is true. I I just think the evidence for the sufficiency of naturalistic explanations is very high and whether this is a pure like a really rational consideration or not. I've never seen a miracle and that'd be going a far away from my lack of belief in them. And before you're like, have you ever seen a proton?

¶129Like, yeah, you know, there's experts that are like, here's the evidence for a proton. Uh, so if I I know that if I saw a miracle, that would be that would be fantastic. That would be astounding. I don't think I'd have any of these reservations anymore or say, "Oh, this is a hallucination." But it's just so foreign. It's like people who believe in demons and angels and stuff.

¶130It's just so foreign to my view of the world and the way I experience the world. It's very hard for me to take that hypothesis hypothesis seriously. That being said, near-death experience evidence I think is quite fascinating. And if that proves to be cogent, that could really soften my views about these sorts of things. Um, okay, we're going to skip that stuff on SIA.

¶131Gets too complicated. Um, given that they've always dominated life on Earth and appear capable of surviving in space, why isn't it more reasonable to think that the universe is designed to benefit bacteria? Well, because it's less clear why we would give a higher probability to bacteria under theism than naturalism. The reason that fine-tuning is evidence for theism is because theism has some predictive power with respect to the existence of conscious agents. Whereas if you then plug in the relevant datim as the existence of bacteria, that might be some evidence for theism, but far far far less because it's not clear that they have any sort of moral or aesthetic value.

¶132Maybe I'm offending someone with that, but I think that's why we may only be able to exist in one particular way. Okay. The worry I have with religious experience favoring theism over anti-theism is that once we see contrary religious experience and the violence it leads to, it seems like evidence for anti-theism. Okay. Yeah.

¶133I mean, I don't know. I would I I would like to see that made more rigorous, giving a historically grounded, empirically grounded argument about the effects of religious experience upon the moral conduct of people that have it and then see what that reveals. It's possible that it's just not evidence either way that these experiences aren't authentic and that if theism is true, we shouldn't think it's very likely that there would be lots of authentic religious experiences. If if if theism, for example, predicted robust religious experience to the same extent as naturalism, well then it the the fact that all of these experiences are inauthentic wouldn't cut either way. It wouldn't wouldn't do anything to reduce our credence in theism.

¶134[snorts] Um, yeah. What do you think about electrons in love? Uh, right. That's a great paper. I [snorts] talk about it briefly in like the final paragraph or second to last paragraph in my paper divine psychology and cosmic fine-tuning.

¶135I think that there are two facts. We have these particular psychophysical laws which state the the connections between physical states and mental states. So in our universe there's a psychophysical law roughly like conscious experience can only happen when there's a sufficiently complex physical substratum like a brain in place and like if you destroy the brain and dismantle the system there's no conscious states that's a psychophysical law so there's two facts that there are these psychophysical laws and then that the universe is fine-tuned for life and I think that you update on one and then the other so we first we ask how likely are these psychophysical laws unless Unless you buy the psychophysical harmony argument, I think their their likelihood is just the same on theism and naturalism. So that you update on it and that doesn't shift our credences either way. That goes in the background.

¶136And then the question is given that these psychophysical laws obtain, how likely is it that the constants would take on life permitting values if theism is true versus naturalism? And then it follows right away that if God wants life, he can't change the psychophysical laws to get it. They're already in the background. uh he's got to fine-tune the universe for life. So I think that sinhabu just doesn't appreciate that you don't have to show that our psychophysical laws somehow have a high likelihood under theism as long as it's equally as low on naturalism or the alternatives.

¶137You update on it and you get no disisconfirmation and then it goes into the background. So yeah. [clears throat] Okay. Feel free to ask any more personal questions if you have them. I mean, not not too personal, but just, you know, less less big brain time ones.

¶138I feel my I feel my brain getting tired. [snorts] Okay. And the red ball example Obby gave, some people see color differently or are color blind. So, the harmony is off. Yeah.

¶139I I don't I I am not prepared to defend the psychophysical harmony argument. I'm not sure it's good. Not sure it's a good one. So um I don't understand how a disharmonious state could arise. How could it have been possible to see anything other than an iPhone?

¶140Well, suppose you think that the psychophysical connections are contingent. Then it's very easy to see that you could have had any sort of linking up between certain mental states and certain physical states and the vast majority of those would result in just meaningless gibberish so to speak, unintelligible experiences. only a relatively narrow range. Get it right where what I see corresponds to what's there and my belief forming mechanisms correspond to the right sort of things, the objects in the world. And then you can see how this might motivate a theistic argument.

¶141Um, right. Okay. [clears throat] How would you go about ruling out axiarchcism, formal and substantial anesthetic theism? Well, I have a whole section of my paper that looks at formal and substantial axiarchcism as competitors to theism. So, it's it's the paper is uh of simulations and conscious universes explaining fine-tuning without God.

¶142I don't think axiarchism is a very plausible explanation for anything at all ever, much less the universe itself. It's so opaque to be told that the reason anything exists, much less the universe, is that it's good that it should. Like that just that just sounds like an incomplete answer. It's kind of like saying the reason the universe exists is that it's possible that it exists. What does that even mean?

¶143So, for more detail, check out check out the paper. Um, okay. Do you think substance dualism entails consciousness survives death? Seems to be an extra step to show that the Yeah, I agree with you. Substance dualism does not entail that consciousness can survive death by itself.

¶144And I think it's an you have to take on this ad hocness to an extent to say that well you know the soul only requires the brain to think while it's embodied but then once it deconnects disconnects entirely then it can have conscious experiences all on its own. That feels very ad hoc. So and this worries me. This is something I talked to Max Baker Hitch about. I thought I I raised exactly this concern and he's had some things to say.

¶145Hey, he's a smart guy, but I didn't didn't fully resolve my worries. So, I think you're well taken. It's well taken there. What is a controversial philosophical view? You have a high credence in.

¶146I mean, yeah, everything is controversial in philosophy in a sense. Moral realism, I think, is the dominant position in philosophy though, if I recall from the Chmer's Bourge. So, I guess more specifically like robust moral realism is what I have a very high credence in. Very, very high. So maybe what's controversial is not just that I believe it, but that I believe it quite strongly.

¶147More strongly than I believe in God, believe it or not. So why don't you grow a beard? I did have one, [clears throat] or at least I had stubble, but I like this version of my face more. philosopher Dungeons and Dragons stream win. You know, I've never played Dungeons and Dragons.

¶148So, I it would, you know, and it looks fun. It It is the kind of thing that I mean, when I was a kid, I did a lot of LAR [laughter] back in my day. We're talking like fourth and fifth grade. So, I imagine I would like the idea of Dungeons and Dragons, but I just never had friends that did it, so I never did it. Okay.

¶149[cough] Are you looking forward to the release of GTA 6? Not at all. Not at all. Hi, Bordeaux. Boude.

¶150Not Not sure how to pronounce your name. I'm doing well. Doing well. This is a lot of fun. So, thank you all for joining me.

¶151Uh, did talking to JC Beiel and Grand Priest change the way you see dialtheism? At the very least, did it make you realize it's actually possible for some? Certainly. that it's psychologically possible for someone to believe it. And they're very intelligent.

¶152I think I probably got more, if I'm being honest, out of my discussion with JC Beal and with Graham Priest. He seemed to be more willing to actually have like a substantive back and forth about these things, whereas Graham Priest just felt very like resolute in, you know, asserting these things, which is good. It helps challenge your assumptions that what you take to be obvious or too something you can assume is actually something you can assume. But anyway, yeah. Yeah.

¶153So, it it moved the the dial the needle a little bit, but I I still think dialtheism is highly highly highly implausible. Uh, and I think honestly, if you recall from the dialogue with JC Beiel, I think he conceded that some of my questions were well taken and that he would need to think more about these things. So, I'll I'll take that. What's your favorite video game if you play? I I don't play anymore.

¶154I used to. I used to in middle school and high school. My best friend played video games and I would go over to his house all the time and we'd play video games. Played Call of Duty of various kinds. Call of Duty Modern Warfare 3 I think was our favorite.

¶155I miss those days, man. That was a good game. Played Destiny 1 and two. We played Halo. Skyrim.

¶156Oh, it's all coming back to Minecraft. Loved Minecraft. That's Minecraft might take the cake as my all-time favorite video game. So, there was also this like one Spongebob game I used to play on. my sister's Xbox.

¶157I don't remember what it's called anymore. Oh, and then there was a computer game called UB Funkies. Does anyone remember those? I think I need to have more than 35 people watching in order for that someone in the audience to likely know what I'm talking about there. So, one day when I'm big and famous, somebody will be like, "Oh my god, yeah, you be funky's." They were very fun.

¶158And there are these little plastic figurines that you plug into this like a bigger figurine that then plugged into the desktop and you each figurine gave you the access to different worlds. It's very cool. Very cool. Do you think that you get better philosophy when you like, dislike or are indifferent to your interlocutor? Get better philos So maybe like what do you mean like the quality of the philosophical conversation?

¶159Maybe. So I'm going to interpret you to mean that uh if I like them I get well that's I might have said so my initial reply was to say if I like them then I get better quality philosophical exchanges like Michael Hugh and I I think we have great conversations and I like him a lot think he's really cool and genuine and smart and uh we we get along famously but I also think I've come to come to think that in light of several recent dialogue where not that I dislike them, but we've had a very heated exchange. I think that is uniquely productive in its own way. I I don't think you can get all of the same benefits to philosophical conversation with someone when it's heated and like emotionally charged. But but on the flip side, you can't get the same sorts of things from a conversation with someone you really like.

¶160It's not going to push you in the same sorts of ways with someone who really disagrees with you. when things start to get not personal but charged intense some conversations are just hard to have and you still have to have them. So I have an I have a discussion next week coming out on probability of all things with John Norton. This was my hundth interview 100th episode and it was the most heated conversation I've ever had on this channel. one of the most heated in my life [laughter] and I still think it was productive and and good.

¶161So yeah, you'll have to tell me you'll have to tell me what you think about that. [snorts] Um let's see here. I wonder I'm assuming you guys can hear me, but it it has a tiny like it's only got one dot for me on the green bar of like sound. So, if I if you can't hear me, tell me. If I've been silent this whole time, that would suck.

¶162Did you hear about how AI agents uh solved the millennium pro? Yes. And the flood of LMS and agents solving open problems across many math fields on the world. Worries in the mathematics community. Yeah.

¶163Yeah. Um, what do you Oops, I keep scrolling down and then everything disappears. What do you think of the field of philosophy and philosophy religion would look like if a swarm of reasoning AI agents attack some of the deepest problems? Uh, never say never, but I I really skeptical that the problems of philosophy can be solved in that same sort of way because you can solve a mathematical conjecture. I off the top of my head what my thought is that it's easy enough to verify that there is an actual proof of some mathematical conjecture or a disproof even if an AI agent gave you the right answer to a perennial philosophical question.

¶164How would you go about verifying to every philosopher's satisfaction that the answer was correct? I I just don't see the the same sort of method would work. So even if it gave you the big book of answers, I this came up in my something similar came up in my discussion with Lance Bush. I just don't see how you would end philosophy by being given the book of answers because you'd still have to go in and try to better through them and figure out how to justify those answers and whether they are correct. And in that case, you're just involved in the exact same space of doing philosophy.

¶165So we'll see though. Um, how long until you go Catholic? Probably a very long time. But, uh, you know, never say never. We ever invite DBH for an interview?

¶166Well, I did. I did. And, uh, if he would like to come on to discuss, say, universalism, that would be that would be nice. Why would an all powerful God need to find tune the universe? God could simply make any conditions compatible with life.

¶167Humans could live on the surface of the sun. need no food and so on, right? They could they could I I talked about this briefly in my paper uh is cosmic fine-tuning evidence against the ev no is cosmic fine-tuning evidence against design and one of the considerations there is this objection to the effect that you know theism doesn't predict fine-tuning because God could perform miracles. Um and I think that theism can just take the probabilistic hit. That's the first response I developed.

¶168There's not a lot of options available to God, right? You can create miraculously. You can create life immater immaterial life, unembodied life like angels, or you can create life naturally. So on that way of thinking, you just sort of build into the hypothesis that God creates life naturally. And it doesn't seem to me that theism would thereby take a substantial probabilistic hit.

¶169It's not like there's billions and billions of possible methods and we distribute probability among all the different possible methods. The way I see it, there's just three. Now, if someone can come along and give a more principled analysis of the possible space, the possibility space, then I'm I'm open to it. But that seems right to me. And I also think that under the purported scenario, God just looks irrational, creating natural laws and capacities and dispositions and then immediately miraculously contravening them all the time so that people could live on the sun.

¶170I don't that that looks bizarre. That looks bizarre. What's your favorite movie? Oh, okay. So, throughout my life, I've always said this and I think it still is true.

¶171It's very near and dear to my heart for a variety of reasons. It's this movie called Super Eight. Very cute. I was a teenager at the time it came out. It's about this teenage love story um partly and there's also aliens and there's it's shot through a camcorder recording device perhaps you've heard of them and it just has all the element.

¶172It kind of reminds me the vibes like of Stranger Things. I think it's also set in the 80s. It's got everything you'd want. Everything you'd want as a teenager and so it's it's very sweet. I love the Lord of the Rings movies.

¶173Fabulous. I don't know if anyone else has noticed this. They're very good. I've watched all the Harry Potter movies a billion times. So, [snorts] those have fallen out of being my favorite just because I've seen them so many times.

¶174So, but they're still so good. Still so good. But I'm not a hu Oh, and then the all of the Spider-Man films with Tom Holland. Love that man. Love that man.

¶175Super super big celebrity crush. But also, I think he's so funny and like such a good Spider-Man and that all the movies are great. I recently rewatched all of them and then watched the newest movie and I was like, "You're so good, Tom. So good." If any of you are Tom Holland right now and if you want to come on the channel or if you know Tom Holland and you could ask him to come on the channel, that would just be great. I would love to talk to him.

¶176I think we'd be good friends. I think we'd be good friends. Okay. One or two of the Spongebob games have recently been remastered and released. They were considered cult classics, apparently.

¶177Oh, great. I absolutely would like to uh check them out just for the sheer nostalgia. Also, how was it meeting Alex Okconor? It would be really cool if you went on his channel to discuss fine-tuning or if Alex came on your channel. So, hard agree.

¶178I met him. We we went to the pub with several other people, chatted, had a nice time, laughed, and uh he gave me his number and then we got coffee a few days later here in Oxford. Hung out for like four hours just chatting Uh his girlfriend came by and we all hung out. Went to an antique shop. I am trying to get him on the channel.

¶179I asked him, but he said he's busy right now because he's writing a book. I don't know if that's secret, but he's writing a book. So, he's busy and I said, "I will circle back to you." Because he said he needs the month to write. I'll circle back to him in a month's time. I'll ask him again.

¶180Hopefully, we can get him on the channel because that would be that would be cool and it would be really helpful to my channel. Um, [clears throat] okay. Where are we at here? Oh, man. Okay.

¶181I'm gonna have to skip down because I'm really far behind. Oh, well I'm not super far behind. We can hear you. Well, good. Talking about heated that conversation with Tim Modlin.

¶182Exactly. It's exactly what I'm thinking about. I'm thinking about Tim Modlin, thinking about Ethan Muse, and now we can add to the list John Norton. But you tell me what you think. I mean, do you think those the two you've seen of those heated conversations?

¶183Do you think those were helpful? Because I think they were uniquely helpful or substantive in a way that you just can't get with someone you're on super good terms with where it's not tense. I I think it was productive and for that reason I think even though it was difficult to sit through it, I learned a lot. It it's character building. You learn how to handle yourself under that kind of pressure.

¶184It's it's super good. All good things all the way across. Um what do you think of metaposy? I don't I don't have any thoughts. I don't I have never looked into the philosophy of philosophy.

¶185So do you believe in God? Yes. What would convince you that God doesn't exist? Could anything falsify that belief? Yes, I'm sure.

¶186I'm sure. I mean, I I think that it's been well said that there are two interpretations of a question like this. What would change your mind and what should change your mind? I'm less confident in my answer to the second one. But in answer to the first, I'm sure that if I experienced heartbreaking, horrific, horrendous evils that would break me.

¶187So, I'm very blessed to have not gone through that. But you know, wholly apart from the success or failure of the problem of evil, I think it just is a psychological fact about me that if you put me through terrible kinds of suffering, I might very well become a nihilist. Neilist, for example, Miles, why does God absolutely exist in five words or less go? I, as I've always said, I I don't have an ironclad argument for you. I believe in God because life is better when you believe such things.

¶188the the belief in a loving God or something similar to that makes life better right now. And I think that we we talk about the pursuit of truth for its own sake, but I I think that that is naive. I think that it's important to be happy and it's important to have a good life, to live a good life. And if the real truth out there is something that would destroy the possibility of leaving leading a happy life, there's no virtue or benefit or reason to pursue it. So I think that doesn't compromise my ability to do philosophy because I can be perfectly objective with respect to the arguments and whether they succeed or not.

¶189But I do think fundamentally that this kind of epistemological commitment of mind that pragmatic considerations can make it rational to believe even if say there's no evidence one way or another or even if the evidence is against your view it can still be rational to believe that view because of the pragmatic benefits that result I just think that's very very correct so yeah that's that's why God exists because for me uh life is better believing that God does u mile okay we already that how much do you need read? Oh, [laughter] or have you ever read? Yeah, I read every day obviously that's it's how we do philosophy, right? I read book chapters, books, articles all the time and then I interview the scholars and other people on my YouTube channel and read some of their stuff in preparation for it. So, yeah, it's reading, thinking, writing all day long, every day.

¶190Hey, I really enjoyed the debate with Malpass and can't wait for your one with Lynford, too. Yes, good. Thank you. I wanted to ask if you'll have a debate with photo and fine-tuning and if there's news on humor versus Bush debate. Absolutely.

¶191Absolutely. I I fully intend to debate James on this one. Um but I had two fine-tuning debates back toback. That's a lot of really specific like I don't want to be just a one-hit wonder of like, oh, he only does fine-tuning and if all I do is fine-tuning debates, I'm kind of creating that for myself. So, we're gonna space it out.

¶192I I like the fact that I'm going to debate Phil Halper on has science buried God. We will talk about fine-tuning, but that's just like onethird of what we're going to discuss. We're also going to talk about cosmology and we're also going to talk about animal suffering. So, that allows me to broaden things out so that I'm not just the fine-tuning guy. But yes, I I have to talk to James about these things.

¶193He's got really well done YouTube videos too at least where he lays out his case. So that gives me a lot to prepare with. I think we'd have a substantive exchange. Humor v. Bush.

¶194Uh I haven't organized it yet. No no no particular reason. Uh but I think that would be good. I I just haven't done that yet. I'm curious what you think about how to respond to peer disagreement.

¶195You say that you are very confident in robust moral realism, but it seems the quarter of metaethicists are anti-realist. Sure. Sure. But that's, you know, three quarters aren't. I think that I've not plumbed the depths of the peer disagreement literature.

¶196So I've got no wellthoughtout views on the matter. But sometimes things are just so obvious to one that the rational thing to do is to believe it. Even if there's some level of pure disagreement. If now now if every single philosopher aside from me reported back and said that all of the arguments for moral realism are bankrupt and that they all have the opposite intuition, there obviously are no moral facts. Sure, there are possible circumstances which could break my confidence, but I mean really guys, it's like it's like getting to the level of trying to convince me there's no external world.

¶197Like all right, peer disagreement. How do we adjudicate? Like even without a solution to that, the rational thing to do is to keep believing there's an external world. And for me, the reality of moral facts are so powerful and so strongly warranted and so warranted and so obvious that the rational thing for me to do is to believe they exist. Problems with pure disagreement notwithstanding.

¶198[clears throat and cough] Okay, how do I go? I need to get some more water. How do I go on an ad break? Insert ad. I'm going to click this and see what happens.

¶199Try again. Says try again. Ads inserted. Is the ad happening? I I doubt that there's an ad going on right now.

¶200Okay. Well, until I know, I'm not just going to Yeah, the ad is not happening. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for bearing with me.

¶201Okay, I'll get I'll get water in a bit. It's all good. Um, if you could get Tom Wait, Alex is writing a book. Yes. Yes.

¶202If you could if you think you could get Tom Holland on the channel, but not the Spider-Man one. Lol. Oh, no. I want the Spider. The Spider-Man one is the one I have a crush on.

¶203[laughter] That's the one I want on the channel. Um, can we get a conversation with Alex Bruce? I I've tried to. I've tried to. He's declined the offer and that's okay.

¶204That's his prerogative. But I' I'd love to chat with Alex. [clears throat] How do you respond to the problem of old evidence with respect to fine-tuning? The problem of old evidence is a general problem for basian inferences as such. And so if it's a problem for fine-tuning, it's just a problem for basianism.

¶205It tanks the whole machinery. And uh so it's got no special import with respect to fine-tuning. I think that one solution is to say that epistemic probabilities concern degrees of evidential support between propositions. In which case the those degrees and of support can uh obtain regardless of in what order we finite knowowers happen to learn the evidence. So in a nutshell that's my response also.

¶206What plan would you recommend a layman that wants to get good [clears throat] at philosophy like an academic level for philosophy, religion, ethics or whatever without going to university a reading reading read like I can't necessarily recommend this but back in the day when I was in high school I read philosophical foundations for a Christian worldview loved it thought it was great and had a lot of fun with it and that that gave me a great overview. So, I think get a good textbook uh introduction to philosophy, one that isn't just selections of readings, right? And one that's not just a historical introduction, but an actual topical introduction, something like Michael Humer's knowledge, value, and reality. Read that and go from there. You begin to build.

¶207And so, uh that's what I would say. That's what And then listen to every single episode of the uncertainty podcast. I like fake it till you make it argument. Yeah. I mean, I guess that's one way to uh capture what I was saying about the pragmatic benefits, but but yes, I am going to assume you overlooked my comment by accident rather than delay.

¶208Yeah, [laughter] it was by accident. Are you familiar with Jeffrey conditionalization? Yeah. Yeah. Where that's a form of basian conditionalization which allows that the probability of our evidence isn't one.

¶209We're not certain about what the evidence is, but we can still have it affect our credences. If a stranger would tell you, "I'm God and I can do any mira miracle you ask for," and he'd do it, would you believe that they are God? Potentially. Potentially. That feels like the wrong answer, but yeah, if they raised the dead, I would want to rule out like demonic activity.

¶210So, I would gauge them by their moral qualities. I I don't see any other way to do it. But you know that's what Jesus did. So not that he know that he was the person ostensibly going around claiming to be God in some implicit christoologgical kind of way and then performing these miracles. At some point the right rational inference is to believe him.

¶211Thank you for your work. No thank you Adela. Thank you. Darn it Miles. You were supposed to be my chosen one.

¶212What? [laughter] How? Well, first of all, why am I not? Why am I not? Do you read much fiction?

¶213Do you have favorite fiction books? Well, when I was growing up, I read all of the Warrior Cats books by Aaron Hunter. Warriors is what it was called. There's like 50 or 60 of those. Loved them.

¶214I haven't read fiction in a very long time. I recently started reading, actually. It's this nice gay book called Maurice. It's flipped around, but you'll have to trust me. It says Maurice.

¶215It's a classic gay fiction. Uh, nothing smutty, but just it's it's was written early 1900s and then the author died in 1970 and it was publishedly a year after his death. Very good, very sweet, wholesome, feel-good kind of book. Besides that, I have not read fiction in a very long time. My probably my all-time favorite fictional book is The Giver by Lewis Lowry.

¶216I read the four books in that kind of saga and they're all excellent. They're all amazing. So yeah, I'm going to go for six more minutes. So that's an hour and 20. If you've got some Well, maybe maybe I'll go for 15 more minutes.

¶217Get to an hour and 30. So okay. Would you ever do a discussion with a detractor philosopher on the LGBTQ exian topic? No. I I just wouldn't.

¶218I you don't have to talk to everyone about everything. And I think I don't know that I could be objective in that conversation. I don't know that I have the the maturity to extract myself away from my personal investment in the topic to kind of like objectively analyze and assess. May maybe I could keep my cool, but I'm not sure that I could. Um, and I just I just have no interest in [clears throat] platforming someone on the other side of that debate, depending on what the topic is, right?

¶219I'm not I don't think being gay means you have like one predefined set of views on all these topics that agree with every other queer person. So, it depends. But, but no, if if we're talking about wanting to talk to someone who thinks that gay marriage shouldn't be legal, I have no interest in talking to them. So, um, also [clears throat and cough] crap, I've got to stop with the scrolling. It just they just booms down to the bottom.

¶220Yeah, I'm way far behind. Okay. What kind of music do you like? What's your favorite band? I like EDM.

¶221Hard style EDM. Uh, and then I like pop music, too. But honestly, my appreciation for EDM is very superficial. I listen to the playlists that are like either pre-made or autogenerated on Spotify. My relationship to music is kind of toxic.

¶222I listen to the same 10 songs constantly. It's I I don't know why. I can't stop. I can't stop. New music makes me anxious.

¶223[laughter] So anyway, uh bro, go get water. Yeah, but then I'd have to leave. I'd have to leave. I don't I don't I don't know the I don't know the etiquette of this. This is my first time, you know, so I'm nervous.

¶224Uh where do you land with regards to physicalism versus dualism versus idealism? >> [clears throat and cough] >> Dualism. Yeah. Yeah. I don't I don't People say, "Oh, but it's more complex." No, it's like two versus one thing.

¶225Two kinds of thing versus one. So, it's a little more complex, but not profoundly so. Anyway, thoughts on Joe Smith's conversion? Uh, yeah. No, no comment as of now.

¶226Joe Schmidt is Tom Holland if you squint. That's true. That is true. Do you think that Jesus teaching on divorce being impermissible is authentic? If so, how do you receive it?

¶227Oh, I I you'd have to ask a New Testament historian for that one specifically, the credibility of that, but it I don't think there's any reason to think it doesn't go back to the historical Jesus. If so, how do you receive it? I don't I Okay, I I hear you. It's It's there. It's there.

¶228But there are several things in the Bible that if interpreted literally and so on and so forth don't align with my views. Uh what do you reckon is the best way? Hi Caleb. What do you reckon is the best way to bridge the isot gap? Yeah.

¶229So I I mean I'm not quite sure exactly what the isot gap problem is supposed to be. We can't get an is from an or no we can't get an a from an is. I think there are at base fundamental evaluative facts and we can derive our moral obligations, our specific moral obligations from those. So if you grant fundamental evaluative facts about what our moral obligations say are, then I don't see the problem. So maybe I'm not understanding the the issue.

¶230Uh you should do more of these by the way. No pressure though, of course. Yeah. No, I I this is very fun. This is great and I like this.

¶231Honestly, it's like way lower pressure than an interview with a scholar that I have to prepare for and do. Doesn't mean I'm going to do those less, but I think what I'll do is, you know, with a PhD it gets stressful and there are more work intensive times when I I can't do the interviews as frequently. And so I think what I will do is say like if there's a week where I don't have an interview coming up or one prepared to publish, I'll do a live stream or I'll do it more consistently on top of the interviews here and there. We'll see. We'll see.

¶232This has been a lot of fun though. So these are these will come back. Okay. Very cool. I think using Jeffrey conditionalization when you do the update on fine-tuning substantially tanks the update on like orders of magnitude even when you're 90%.

¶233Well, I think I agree with you because in a sense because I think that the the fact that there's a large range of possible values for any of the parameters and that we have no deeper explanation for them is itself uncertain. The fact is our physics is incomplete. There may be a future physics which fixes the values of the constants. And so you have to apply the law of total probability to in order to understand the likelihood of na of life permitting values given naturalism. It's going to be the weighted average of that likelihood given present physics added to the likelihood given future physics.

¶234And how do you evaluate that? Well, that's why I think that the likelihood of fine-tuning given naturalism is on the order of uh one part in 10,000 rather than one part in 10 to the 90. So I think I think we agree. Since your belief in God is majorly based on pragmatic considerations, do you give any weightage or significance to prayer in your life? Yes, I do.

¶235Although I don't immediately see the connection between pragmatically based belief in God and prayer, but but I do. Yeah. Um, Carne Oh crap, I did it again. Carned Carnades, whatever his name is or her name or their name has a four-part series, can atheists know God? Where he talks about how an atheist could not know God?

¶236Tries to prove that God couldn't prove any of the classic properties. Okay, I I don't know what that means. In my view, prayer is only meaningful if you already if you are already convinced God exists. I don't think praying for purely pragmatic reasons works because deep down you'll suspect it won't accomplish anything. I don't know that that's true.

¶237I mean the there's the Pascalian wager aspect of like if God exists then there's benefit for you to pray even if you're not sure. So I think it makes sense to pray you know God help me guide me so on and so forth because there's a chance God does exist and is listening. So why not why not throw out a SOS message so to speak? But even if I I I think there is pragmatic benefit even if you're unsure like benefit to you that occurs to you even if whether or not it's true. I I think it does.

¶238I don't think the uncertainty nullifies that benefit. Um yeah, that's just my impression though. [clears throat] order of magnitude like classical conditioning giving you a posterior of 1* 10 to the negative19 or whatever versus Jeffrey 1* 10. Right, we're saying the same thing. [clears throat] We're saying the same thing.

¶239Sorry, I'm clearing my throat, but I can't help it. What kind of horrific evil would convince you God doesn't exist? Must you experience it yourself or can other suffering count? Um, what about war crimes? Right.

¶240I I think that once you start to specify the really kind of like horrific evil that would count as decisive evidence against God's existence, the problem is going to be that human history is rather horrific. And so, hasn't it actually already obtained or happened? That's a good problem. It's a good point. That's a good issue to uh think about.

¶241Again, I I don't have a profound response to the problem of evil. It is the number one factor that gives me the most pause in my theistic belief. I think if it weren't for the problem of evil, I would be much more self- assured theist, but it's there and so I am not. Okay. Do you plan on having Muslim philosophers on to discuss Islam or Islamic conception of Oh crap, I did it again.

¶242Okay. Yeah, I would love to have Islamic philosophers on. Absolutely. So, I just don't know the field at all and so I don't know who to email, but I can fix that. I can do some research.

¶243Any phil advice for philosophy under grad looking to apply to grad school programs? Yeah, apply widely. I should make a video with more advice. I don't have time to give you the full answer, but apply widely. Apply like to 15 places.

¶244Treat it as like another class. Your college applications cast your net widely. put a lot of work into your written sample, get people to review it, get philosophers to look at it, help you construct the arguments, you know, that's the case you're making for yourself to show to these programs that you can do philosophy that you can do well. Um, if there's any chance at all that you could get published, even co-authored as a philosophy undergrad, that would be exceptional. You don't need to.

¶245You don't need to, but if you could, that would be cool. Um, but yeah, the philosophy grad programs are just very competitive. So, you know, do your do your very best. If you don't get in the first year, do it again. I didn't get into a PhD program my first attempt and I went to New Zealand and spent a whole year working to make a better application and it happened.

¶246Sometimes it just takes time. What's your favorite designer? I don't like clothing designer. I don't know who I don't know what you mean. What's the most mind-blowing philosophical idea you've ever encountered?

¶247I don't know off the top of my head, but I'll think about it. How do you prepare questions for interviews? I'm planning to produce philosophy content too and want to interview philosophers too, but I have zero experience. So, I'm typical. Cool.

¶248Yeah. So, I like to have like 10 to 12 questions or just a list a page of stuff. Page or two pages. Oh, $5. Thank you.

¶249I don't know who gave me that. Oh, Durgget. Okay. Thank you. But but yeah, I I like to I read an article or two from the person or a selection of their book or the whole book if I have time, watch interviews from them if there have been any available and I use all of that to compile a list of questions.

¶250I really just a lot of the time I go by feel like what would be interesting for me to talk about. What do I want to know from them in general? So sometimes it doesn't have to be related to their work specifically. It can just be general questions about the field. Like in my interview with Ralph Stefen Wear, I just uh asked him some really general questions about philosophy of mind and that was fun.

¶251I think we had a really good conversation. Does religious diversity cause you to question your faith? How do you understand non-Christian religious experiences? No. No.

¶252Because as I've said, I'm a theist and I'm an agnostic beyond that. And so I think God's being genuinely experienced across a range of religions is perfectly consistent with mere theism and with universalism, for example. Okay. Uh, how do I get out of that? All right.

¶253Um, do you think it's crazy coincidence that the fundamental normative facts and concepts roughly happen to be the stuff contingent human beings are evolved to care about? Um, yeah. I don't I don't this this seems like a harmony argument. I just I'm not sure what to think about that. My instinct is to say this is a pseudo problem, but I'd have to think about it.

¶254What argument would you run against substance monism if established? Wouldn't that be enough to establish naturalism given the existence of the natural substance? Sure. Yeah. If we grant that natural stuff exists and then you find out that only one kind of stuff exists, you get to naturalism.

¶255Do you believe that we have free will? If so, where do you land? Yeah, I'm a libertarian. That's another view I hold relatively confidently, though much less confidently than moral realism. It's my my chief reservations are going to be that it seems kind of spooky as a capacity.

¶256It doesn't seem to be one that like neuroscientists, physicists recognize. It's it's hard to see where it fits in the capacity for libertarian free will. Where does it come from? Uh Michael Huer didn't have much patience for those kind of questions, but that's that's how I felt. So anyway, yeah, I but I think that like another one of those times I think like uh a lot of meaning in life is tied into genuine libertarian freedom, but I would I'm much more open to like a compatibilist understanding of free will if if if I gave it a fair hearing.

¶257I haven't looked into the literature that much. And so if I found an account which was much more intelligible, could resolve some of these difficulties, much more intelligible than libertarianism and also seemed sufficient as a concept of free will without just being something that's not free will but having the label slapped on it, then I would I would grant it. So I'm much more psychologically open to it than than say like subjectivism about morality. What is the second most attractive position in your opinion after theism? Buddhism.

¶258Buddhism. I I don't know that that is the an alternative or if it's orthogonal to theism, but I I've took several philosophy of well Buddhist philosophy courses and Buddhist religion courses in undergrad and I thought, damn, this is very plausible. The idea that life is suffering. [laughter] Not to get too dark, but but I think Buddhism is naturalism poorly defined. Wait, does this mean I got another one dirt gut or is this the same one?

¶259Okay, someone replied to it. I see. Okay. Do you like debates more or interviews? Good question.

¶260Um, debates are new for me and so they're kind of novel and I so I like them more right now. Like I said, I seem to be able to get into a kind of flow state in a debate like like everything turns on inside my head. like all the gears are moving, all the pistons firing. I know nothing about cars. Um, when I'm in a debate in a way that is very hard to get into in a conversation because in a debate the adrenaline gets going and I just feel like it dials me in and I it's fun.

¶261It's fun. So, I really enjoy debate. But I think that that should not become the bread and butter of the channel or of my intellectual contributions to the online space. It's sport. Alex uh Okconor has said that it is sport.

¶262It's fun. I enjoy it. But the real progress I think comes from sitting down and talking to people without the stakes being so high. That being said, you can call things a debate which are really discussion. Like my debate with Alex Malpass that that felt more like a discussion, but even then I felt like really uh really supercharged, really energized by it.

¶263So So I think right now I I like debates more. How long does it take you for to prepare for an interview with a scholar? Depends. Sometimes I go in just wanting to ask them questions in general about their field. Um, and I don't have to prepare that much because I have enough acquaintance with philosophy as a whole that I know the questions to ask and I just ask them things that I think about that I don't know.

¶264And so then it doesn't take that that much. Uh, like when I had David Wallace on, I knew something about Everettian mechanics and I so I just asked some really kind of low-level general questions and they didn't have to be hyper specific. And I think that kind of interview is more helpful and of broader interest to people than a really hyper specific one based on a really technically sophisticated knowledge of their publications and work. Anyway, I like to read if where possible, I like to read one to two papers from the person and prepare the questions. So, you know, we're looking at like four or five hours of preparation when I need to prepare.

¶265And then if it's just, you know, bringing Michael Humor on to chat then not a lot of prep. Oh, okay. I watched an older v Oh crap. Okay, where I I'll do like two, three more minutes. Let's see if I can do a lightning round here.

¶266Watch an older video where you say you're a Christian. Did that change? Oh, I mean, you know, it's tough, right? In your opinion, what is the best objection to the FTA? Probably really digging in on the probabilities and challenging the low probability of fine-tuning given naturalism and the high probability given theism.

¶267Um, at least more so the low probability on naturalism, being skeptical about the use of probabilities there. Does Michael Humer believe in libertarian free will? Yes, my issue with compatibilism is that it causes so many problems. I probably agree. I mean, I I am a libertarian, but it's not my area of expertise.

¶268Genuinely asking 1 to 10, how friend of Dorothy are you? Actually, friend of Dorothy. Oh. Oh, you did say EDM, but somehow thought designer didn't mean clothing design. Oh, yeah.

¶269Well, that just goes to show if you're testing by knowledge of EDM, I'm a fake fan, apparently. Like I said, I admitted this. I admitted this. I listen to the pre-made um uh playlist, that's the word, and that gets me through walking or working out or whatever. Uh my appreciation for music is very limited and I I wish I had a deeper appreciation for it, but I just it's there for the background.

¶270Do you know IQ? So, what do you think of him? I don't. I'm so sorry. Do you believe God is brute necessity?

¶271If not, what is he? Good question. Like, why does God exist? This is an intelligible question. It matters.

¶272I hope the ontological argument works because then you could say God exists because it's possible that God exists and that's a good one. Uh, what ancient or medieval philosopher would you like to interview if you could? Plato and then Thomas Aquinus. Thomas Aquinus because I think we would have a heated conversation. [laughter] If you plan on becoming a vegetarian, don't forget about taking vitamin B12.

¶273Okay, thank you. Do you have any thoughts on the omission the Odyssey? Oh, it's just bananas, isn't it? is just bizarre and weird. And I said this on Substack.

¶274It feels like the Twilight Zone. I love Matthew. I love Amos. I don't know if Amos supports it, but I love Matthew. He's he's a genius.

¶275He is. This is like one of those peer agreement things where something just looks so obvious to me that I'm like, how could you how could you believe this? Uh I I think it's a nice little fun intellectual exercise, but I have no of like thinking does the Odyssey work and why not if it doesn't, but I have no serious credence at all in this idea of blaming angels [sighs] for I know and it made it into the Oxford studies of philosophy of religion. I'll have to read the paper and give it a really serious hearing. There's enough smart people who think it's good, but right now I think it's redonkulous.

¶276The term debate okay term debate has adopted a negative connotation recently for me at the point I find it rather tiring now which is why I prefer simple discussions yeah I mean I'm not there yet I'm having fun with it is there any reason to assume that aams razor necessarily applies when theorizing about the ultimate foundation of reality probably not but it's like is there any reason to think inductive reasoning works at this fundamental level like no but what about this level so it just seems like we rely on it besides fine-tuning are there any other arguments for theism you think work at least a little bit contingency >> [snorts] >> I think a basian formulation of the colum argument is interesting, right? That's what I'm going to be bringing up in my debate with with Phil. So, the foreshadowing of what's to come. Uh, I don't understand. That's okay.

¶277I don't understand a lot of things, too. Do you hate overhead lighting? Yes. That's so specific, [laughter] but I do. I hate overhead lighting.

¶278Are you an atheist? No. Do you think there are many compelling arguments for God besides fine-tuning? Compelling? No.

¶279I I don't even think fine-tuning is compelling. But like I said, contingency that seems primapacia plausible. There's there's something there. The colum argument beginning of the universe when given that basian inductive formulation. The evidence we have for a cosmic beginning, I think is some evidence for theism by implication.

¶280Oh. Oh, so many things. Um, do you think there are comp? Yeah. Got to go now.

¶281Thanks again. Enjoy your evening. Thank you, Adelaide. Bye-bye. Yep.

¶282Same exact thoughts on that. Thought on going to grad school for a nonprof philosopher career path. Thoughts on going to grad school for nonprofessor phil Oh, I think so. Professor of philosophy. Um, if you can afford it or if you're paid to do it, like if they pay you to go, sure, go.

¶283Why not? Why not? I There's nothing wrong with spending your time in a collegiate environment. I've honestly had the best time of my life here at Oxford, which would hold even if I didn't go to become a professor after the fact. I would not regret any of this time.

¶284You only get one life. You only get one life. Do what makes you happy. There you go. Caleb is continental philosophy just a bunch of nonsense in your opinion.

¶285Generally speaking, yes. But I remain to I I'm open to being corrected. The stream was very delayed for me, but I can't believe you al you're also debated. I haven't debated him, but I will. You really take on every challenger, the strongest of the That's what I I am naturally ambitious, right?

¶286Like I just have this drive in me where I'm like, we got to go to the very top and see what I can do. See if I can hold my own against the very best and just see what I can do. I'm I'm ambitious in that way, you know? So, reach for the and everybody should be reach for the top shelf. See See, never I always say this in not a cliche way.

¶287Um, no one's going to believe in you like you. So, you might as well you might as well believe in yourself. Love the content, currently not working. I have 10 plus years experience in content marketing world. Would love to have a conversation.

¶288See if I can help. Yes, email me room 9 podcast if you're real. Uh, email me mileskdon@gmail.com. So, I'm always here to improve. And if you got advice, I'm here to hear it.

¶289Do you believe a cumulative case for God using all his arguments is compelling? Even including religious data in principle, yes. But I've never assessed them thoroughly. McQueen, Galliano or Dema? McQueen, is Oxford do you feel affordable without external funding?

¶290No. No. Are there the TA ships or such that pay enough? No. No.

¶291At Oxford, you're you're no. You can get I suppose in theory if you get uh not instate tuition, but incountry tuition, British tuition, then yeah, potentially you could you could make it work. But overseas funding, it's like40,000 pounds a year, which is like $55,000 a year. You can't you can't unless you've got the money, then it's not affordable. I think if you host a debate between humor and Lance on moral realism, it would really push the dialect of forward.

¶292All right. All right. Miles is so inspirational. Thank you. Thank you.

¶293You're inspirational. Front 10en Inferno. Okay. What do you think of Victor's work on the FTA? I don't Victor Stinganger in which case I've never read his work and I think isn't he regarded as having been refuted by that Luke Barnes article.

¶294Uh how's this guy not more famous? That's what I'm saying man. I'm just saying I'm real lol. I'll send you an email now. Okay, with that we will end my first ever live stream.

¶295Thank you so much for watching. This has honestly been so much fun. Thank you for being here. If no one was here to chat with this would have been sad. So thank you for not making this sad.

¶296Keep watching. Keep coming on the channel. I'll think of a I'll think of a catchphrase goodbye thing soon. Okay. Byebye.

¶297in the stream.