¶1This is going to be a response to a video by Christopher Kloose of Christian Philosophy Academy which was itself a response to part two of my series on divine hiddenness where I initially laid out Schellenberg's argument. As a Christian, Kloose of course rejects the argument as unsound but he nevertheless appreciates the argument and thinks that a number of the popular objections against it are misguided and he is of course right about that. Anyway, knowing his interest in the argument, I emailed him a few months ago letting him know that I was about to start this series on the argument from divine hiddenness and invited him to interact with it hoping that such an exchange could prove productive. Kloose of course did not disappoint. My name is Justin Schieber and this is Real Atheology.
¶2In his video, Kloose presents two responses to the argument from the literature. One by Daniel Howard-Snyder of Western Washington University and the other by Mark Murphy of Georgetown University. Now of those two responses, Howard-Snyder's is the primary focus of Kloose's video and so I'm going to hear limit myself to discussing that response saving discussion of Murphy's reply for another time. The essay in question is titled Divine Openness and Creaturely Non-Resistant Non-Belief which can be found in this excellent uh 2015 collection of essays titled Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief New Perspectives edited by Adam Green and Eleonore Stump. Now before we discuss Howard-Snyder's 2015 paper, I think it's going to be useful to go back further in the dialectic between him and Schellenberg.
¶3Um so, in a 1996 article published in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy appropriately titled The Argument from Divine Hiddenness, Howard Snyder canvases what he suggests are possible ways by which non-resistant non-believers may be disposed to, upon an acquisition of theistic belief, respond in some way negative or inappropriate. No doubt, many non-resistant folks will respond positively in the sense of seeking relationship with God, uh and appropriately in the sense of having good motivations or having earned that disposition um upon coming to believe that God exists. But, this in itself cannot rule out the possibility that for others the reaction might be far less positive or appropriate in the relevant sense. Now, possibly, prior to such theistic belief, a non-resistant non-believer may have been heavily influenced by their surroundings such that they acquire a disposition making them likely to respond indifferently toward a relationship with God. Um and if that's true, could that not provide even a perfectly loving God with a reason to keep them in doxastic darkness for even longer, say until they take on a contrary disposition?
¶4Moreover, even if one's response to such belief acquisition would be positive, that does not by itself guarantee that the response is in no way inappropriate. Perhaps, God prefers that we be responsible for our own dispositions or further that our dispositions are correctly motivated. Um and these possibilities are in the eyes of Howard Snyder huge problems for Schellenberg's deductive argument. Indeed, these can initially appear as very plausible answers to the hiddenness problem. However, recall that the hiddenness argument claims that from the very first moment of one's having the cognitive capacities to relate personally to God and each moment thereafter not connected to resistance, they will also at that time have belief in God.
¶5Any interruption in that person's belief must then be caused by either their resistance to God or a lapse or loss of their capacity for relationship with God. Now, in his response, Howard Snyder is clearly talking about instances where God refrains from giving belief to already existing non-resistant non-believers. He explicitly talks of a quote "inculpable non-believer who is disposed to reject God upon coming to believe that he exists." Now, by hinging his response on the possible reactions of God to the reality of existing non-resistant non-believers, he presupposes that God would allow for a time some non-resistant non-believers, which is to assume that Schellenberg's argument is unsound. As Schellenberg explains, it does not follow from the fact, if it is a fact, that some bad state of affairs would be permitted or some good foregone if God gives evidence for belief to some inculpable non-believer in the midst of life that such would be the case if God has prevented her from ever being an inculpable non-believer in the first place. And it is the latter state of affairs that the hiddenness argument tells us we will find if there is a God.
¶6Put another way, Howard Snyder has misinterpreted Schellenberg's argument to be an argument about continued non-resistant non-belief, rather than non-resistant non-belief simpliciter. Okay, so now we can put that paper behind us and we can jump ahead to Howard Snyder's 2015 paper in, again, the hidden divinity book. um that uh Christopher Kloos employs in his response video. Now, this updated response corrects for that earlier 1996 error by explicitly clarifying in a footnote on the bottom of page 131, I emphasize that here and below I am not describing non-believers in the midst of life. Meaning that he's talking about people at the very first moment at which they gain the capacity to relate personally to the God, rather than some later moment in their life.
¶7So, in the updated response, Howard Snyder will appeal to similar kinds of reasons, but will instead highlight the possibility that such reasons could be at play from the very first moment. Right, at the very first moment of acquiring the relevant capacities, right? Um, so here is Chris Kloos reading Howard Snyder's two questions from the beginning of that 2015 paper, intended to kind of summarize his general approach to the paper. >> So, Daniel Howard Snyder asked two key questions concerning this. Quote, why couldn't preventing one whom we love from being able, just by trying, to participate in a relationship with us sometimes be the loving thing for us to do?
¶8Why couldn't making ourselves unavailable be what love requires or at least allows? End quote. >> Ultimately, what Howard Snyder argues is that God may lovingly refrain for a time from satisfying the necessary conditions, in this case, belief of a personal relationship from the onset of that person's capacities to have a relationship with God. Perhaps this is to ensure that persons disposed to respond well are responsible for their being so well disposed. His case is constructed in multiple stages, and I'm going to briefly rehearse those here.
¶9He begins by noting that in some cases of human love, it can be quite appropriate or even required by the nature of love that the lover withdraw in a sense from their beloved for a time. If, for example, the nature of some ongoing relationship is in some way enabling the beloved's self-destructive behaviors or selfish motivations, a withdrawal of some sort may be seen as the last best hope for reform as the loving thing to do. Loving parents who come to recognize themselves as participating in a problematic relationship with like a drug-addicted child of theirs, um may heartbreakingly yet lovingly withdraw from their beloved if they've come to realize that their presence is enabling their son in his self-destruction. Howard Snyder then rightly sets this suggestion aside because it deals only with reasons someone might have to withdraw in the midst of an already existing relationship, right? Um and so it can't really be used as reasons to actively withdraw from even the possibility of one before it were to begin.
¶10He writes, quote, "Our question then is whether such unavailability in such circumstances can make sense before any relationship even begins." Unquote. Now, in the second stage, again, we're working in stages here, Howard Snyder explores the possibility that some finite persons may be ill disposed to a relationship with God through no fault of their own at the dawn of their capacity to relate personally to God. Here is Kloos reading again for Howard Snyder. >> Quote, "Some created persons at the dawn of their capacity to relate personally to God might already be ill disposed toward such a relationship. Through no fault of their own, they might have become ill disposed toward anything having to do with God.
¶11Perhaps they were raised to be hostile or indifferent toward religion, whether by family members or social groups in which they grew up. Religion is for the servile and the spineless, the stupid and unscientific. They were taught day in and day out. God is a crutch, worse yet, a stretcher for the weak and cowardly. And the teaching stuck.
¶12They are now ill disposed or perhaps they had instilled in them an extreme self-centeredness or disrespect for proper authority or perhaps they were raised in an abusive strict religious surroundings or perhaps there was some other cause, but whatever the cause may be, they now find themselves through no fault of their own ill disposed non-believers. That is to say, if God were to reveal himself to them in such a way that they came to believe that God exists, they would or would very likely respond inappropriately. They would or would very likely either reject God's self-revelation or believe anything from in dis- indifference to hostility, end quote. Now, how might a God that's perfectly loving respond to such people? Daniel Howard Snyder continues, quote, first off, God might think that there's no point in reve- revealing himself to them or even if such a revelation does result in their believing God exists, God doesn't care about mere belief, he cares about an appropriate response.
¶13But such a response would be at least very unlikely. Second, if God were to reveal himself in such a way that they came to believe, he would have for the very least stand in a a good chance of contributing actually to their ill disposition being confirmed in them by their actually rejecting his self-disclo- disclosure or actually believing with indifference or hostility. And that would be counterproductive to his purposes since he wants their ill dis- disposition to him to be weakened, not strengthened. So, God waits for a time, waits to reveal himself in such a way that they believe he exists, giving them the opportunity become more receptive to him, and so more apt to respond appropriately to his self-disclosure. And he influences them in subtle but respectful and loving ways toward this end.
¶14For example, by placing religiously serious people in their lives who are neither stupid nor unscientific, neither servile nor spineless, and so on. End quote. Now, you might wonder, isn't this a case of a resistive non-believer? Aren't ill-disposed non-believers resisting relationship with God? Yes, good observation.
¶15And then Daniel Howard Snyder uses this to prepare us for addressing a well-disposed non-believers who are non-resistant regarding a a relationship with God. >> Howard Snyder considers the possibility of non-resistant non-believers who are well-disposed toward God as their capacity to relate to him personally emerges. Might God even then have reasons consistent with perfect love to remain hidden even from them? In an attempt to reach an affirmative answer to this question, a distinction's drawn between those who are not responsible for the fact that they are so well-disposed and those who are responsible for the fact that they are so well-disposed. Howard Snyder is quite skeptical that anyone belongs in the second case.
¶16He thinks that we know too much about the sources of character formation in children. Here is Howard Snyder, again read by Chris Clouse. >> Quote. Examples might include creative persons who have been virtually determined, say, by parental or other social training to be well-disposed, but who, for one reason or another, do not yet believe that God exists. In that case, as they become capable of relating personally to God, they're disposed to entering into such a relationship with him, all right.
¶17But, they had no say in becoming so well disposed. This is unfortunate because all else being equal, a state of affairs in which one enters into a personal relationship with God, but one has little if any say in being disposed to do so in the first place, is not nearly as good of a state of affairs in which one enters into such a relationship with God, and one had a significant say about becoming disposed to do so. >> Lastly, even if there are persons who are responsible for their being so well disposed at the onset of the relevant capacities, perhaps they would, upon acquiring the belief that comes with those capacities, freely enter a relationship with God, but have improper motivations for doing so. Here is Howard Snyder, again read by Chris Clouse. >> For example, it's arguably most fitting to want to relate to God personally, mainly for God's moral beauty, his holiness.
¶18Relatedly, perhaps no disposition to enter into a personal relationship with God is properly motivated unless its source is in a strong desire to surrender to God's will, to unite one's own will with God's will. In that case, the possibility arises that if were God to have revealed himself in such a way that such people believe that they exist, they would welcome entering into a personal relationship with him, all right. But, their initial welcome would not be properly motivated. Although they are responsible for being disposed to enter into a personal relationship with God, God prefers that right from the start of their relationship, the sources of their good disposition toward being in a relationship with him are better than they in fact are. So, Daniel Howard Snyder offers an anthropological defense.
¶19He argues that there are good reasons rooted in perfect love for God to not reveal himself to non-resistant non-believers before such a relationship between God and the persons gets underway. Now, just as a reminder in the case of the well-disposed persons that are not responsible for being so disposed, God prefers, quote, that they make their good disposition toward entering into a relationship with God their own and confirm it as such before God reveals himself to them in such a way that they come to believe and begin a personal relationship with him, end quote. And then in the case of well-disposed non-believers who are responsible for being so disposed to God, he prefers, quote, that they modify or at least aim to modify the unfitting sources of their good disposition toward entering into a relationship with God and confirm this modification or aim before God reveals himself to them in such a way that they come to believe and begin a personal relationship with him, end quote. >> Now, that's the end of Clouser's comments about the Howard Snyder paper. Now, notice that while we might normally reach for the accommodationist strategy to show how these exact divine preferences could be acquired within the context of belief, these exact preferences are such that they cannot be so acquired.
¶20They explicitly appeal to the very onset of such capacities. And so, the accommodation strategy simply won't work here. However, we can still ask, is there another pair of alternatives that would be more preferable than those just outlined from the perspective of a perfectly rational and perfectly loving God, keeping in mind what has been said about perfect love in the other videos of this series? Consider these alternative divine preferences as suggested by Howard Snyder. In the case of well-disposed non-believers who are not responsible for being so well-disposed, the alternative is this: one prime, that God reveals himself to them in such a way that they believe, then they begin a personal relationship with him, and they make their good disposition toward him their own and confirm it within that context.
¶21And in the case of well-disposed non-believers who were responsible for being well-disposed, the alternative is this: two prime, that God reveals himself to them in such a way that they believe, they begin a personal relationship with him, and then they modify the unfitting sources of their good disposition toward God and confirm this modification. Now, in my view, it seems that one prime and two prime are clearly better states of affairs than one and two, in the sense that it seems a perfectly loving God would necessarily prefer those. I think there are several conceptual reasons for this. Naturally, Howard Snyder disagrees. More importantly, he provides an argument by analogy for his disagreement.
¶22He writes, "Consider an analogy. Suppose that over several months Nancy describes her friend Joe to Mary in glittering detail. He is intelligent, kind-hearted, witty, athletic, responsible, and just plain fun to hang out with. Moreover, as the photos reveal, he's handsome as heck. To make a long story short, Mary finds herself attracted to Joe.
¶23She wants to meet him. Then she learns that Nancy has been talking her up to Joe as well, and he's attracted to her and wants to meet her, too. Excellent. She has those first pangs of love for Joe, to get to know him and him her. And the same goes for Joe.
¶24Now, suppose that Mary somehow learns that some trait of character that makes for a long-term relationship has never been tested in Joe. For example, faithfulness through difficulty, or suppose that she somehow learns that Joe's budding love for her is in no small part motivated by an unconscious desire to benefit from her connections to people that can advance his interests. Would we count it against Mary's budding love if she were to pause, mull it over, give it some time before she connected with Joe? I wouldn't. After all, his capacity for faithfulness is untested.
¶25The source of his budding love isn't what it should be, or at least it could be significantly better. Is it a strike against her love if she prefers a state of affairs in which Joe's faithfulness in relationships is tested before she connects with him? If she prefers a state of affairs in which there is a more admirable source of his attraction to her before she connects with him? Again, I wouldn't. Unquote.
¶26Now, in Schellenberg's view, there are a number of problems with this story. In response, he writes, "Quote, notice that what Mary gives up for a better start is time with Joe now, whom we're assuming Mary loves. So, the choice for Mary is not as simple as a choice between a superior and an inferior start to the relationship. What we really have to ask, keeping in mind that Mary is an analogue for God, is whether Mary would prefer A, to give up time with Joe now so that the whole relationship start to finish, which of course will now start later, can be good, or B, to spend time with Joe now, accepting a wobbly but earlier start for this reason, and also because she knows Joe will improve later. It is the nature of love that it aims toward relating personally with the other, and so we lack good reason to think that Mary, who again doesn't just like Joe, but loves him, would prefer A over B.
¶27As Schellenberg puts it, "Quote, the weight of the better start is canceled out by that of not being with Joe. Moreover, this story just isn't analogous to God and his consideration of creatures. Schellenberg notes that if God considers relationship with creatures at all, it is while knowing that they will be relatively immature. If God exists, he has created them immaturely, and being perfectly rational, God wouldn't put particular creative decisions of his up against his perfect love. Finally, the story set before us is exclusively framed as a potential romantic relationship, but this sets up a dichotomy between no personal relationship at all and a love affair.
¶28But that right there is a big problem because a romantic relationship isn't the only species of personal relationship that there is. What about a friendship or a casual acquaintanceship? Now, to be clear, given Mary's stipulated cautious preferences, it may well be quite good for her to hold off on diving into a specifically romantic relationship with the untested Joe. After all, relative to friendship, romantic relationships require a much higher degree of both emotional investment and vulnerability, and therefore carry with themselves a larger potential for hurt feelings and loss. All that being said, if Mary loves Joe, she will be open to relating personally, even if not yet romantically, with him.
¶29Schellenberg notes that in some sense a personal relationship has already begun. They know each other exists, and they have already, albeit indirectly, connected. Schellenberg writes, "We should not conflate openness to personal relationships with a willingness to be experientially present to the other." Okay, so we're almost done. Recall that to correct for the misinterpretation in 1996, Howard Snyder's 2015 paper is repeatedly explicit in referring to the possibility that persons might be well disposed toward a relationship with God prior to the moment they acquire the cognitive and affective capacities necessary for a personal relationship with God. Now, in our discussion of objections to Howard Snyder 2015 so far, we have been granting that this is possible.
¶30That is, we've been granting that it is possible to become, say, well disposed toward a relationship with God prior to even being able to relate personally to God. However, I'm not convinced that this is possible. Consider what must be involved in the process of a person becoming well disposed to a relationship with God. It seems to me that the very process of a person becoming so disposed presupposes or requires several capacities of its own. First, it requires the cognitive capacity to conceive of the target object, in this case God, as a person, a distinct conscious being with their own private mental states.
¶31Secondly, it requires the affective capacity to feel positively or negatively about that person as a person. But wait, that sounds an awful lot like the cognitive and affective capacities required for personal relationship with God in the first place. Now, if the capacities required to become well disposed toward relationship with God are the same capacities required to be in a personal relationship with God, then there just is no time when one does not yet have the capacity for a relationship with God while also having the capacities to become well disposed or develop dispositions either positively or negatively toward God. In other words, it is far from clear that Howard Snyder's proposal here is even possible. And if that's true, then even setting aside the problems highlighted in the earlier discussion, there is something far more conceptually problematic lurking at the very foundation of his reply.
¶32I want to thank Chris Clouse for the effort that he put into his video reply. That video will of course be linked below. I strongly suggest that people watch it. It's It's an excellent unpacking of two objections to the divine hiddenness argument. Now, before you do that of course, please hit like and subscribe.
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